Religious Freedom and the New Evangelical Foreign Policy Lobby

Author(s):  
Lauren Frances Turek

This chapter explores how evangelical internationalism developed into a focused vision for U.S. foreign relations that provided the foundation for political advocacy on a wide range of global issues by the late 1970s and early 1980s. It argues that a powerful evangelical foreign policy emerged in response to growing anxieties about developments in international relations. It also explains how evangelicals drew on their connections with coreligionists abroad and combined their spiritual beliefs with human rights language in order to build support among policymakers for the cause of international religious liberty. The chapter reflects the layered and multimodal nature of evangelical internationalist development and of the foreign policy challenges that evangelical activists confronted. It also reveals how evangelical leaders, missionaries, and interest groups drew on their political power and the international evangelical network to shape international relations and national policies in the United States, the Soviet Union, Guatemala, and South Africa.

1946 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-474
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff

On the two victory days, military action on the fronts stopped. But peace did not return, nor does anyone know when it will. Peace is not simply absence of military .ction. It is a state of international relations corresponding to “periods of normalcy” in the internal affairs of a nation. Peace exists, when these relations are dominated by good will, mutual understanding and friendly cooperation.The post-war world longs for peace. But there is no peace because, among the sovereign states, there is one which acts against peace. This is the Soviet Union. Is it, however, certain that the foreign policy of the Soviets is aggressive? Is it not true that, in Moscow, aggressiveness is ascribed to the United States and to the alleged Western bloc headed by it?In March, 1946, Professor E. Tarle, an authoritative spokesman of the Soviet government, placed in opposition “the old imperialistic concept of international relations” practiced by London and Washington and “the Soviet conception which is based on respect for the rights of the peoples and their real independence.”


Author(s):  
Dar'ya Viktorovna Yakupova ◽  
Roman Aleksandrovich Yakupov

The relevance of this research is defined by the need for analyzing the historical experience of adaptation of foreign economic activity of the Soviet State to the challenges of Western policy deterrence, the imperatives of which are being applied to Russia in the current context. The subject of this research is the Soviet grain procurement crisis and foreign policy ways for its overcoming. The object of this research is trade and diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The scientific novelty lies in elaboration of the concept of “commercial diplomacy” – the foreign economic activity of the USSR government aimed at solution of the domestic problems and tasks of modernization. Leaning on the newly introduced sources, the conclusion is made that the policy of commercial diplomacy implemented by the Soviet Union suggested the use of international dialogue within the framework of cooperation between the governments and public-private business circles on achieving the economic goals associated with the national interests of the Soviet Union. The critical need for grain procurement, discovery of the oil resources potential, and détente in the international relations between the two superpowers led to a new round in the Soviet Union – United States relations. It is underlined that grain and oil manifested as the factor of maintaining domestic political stability and the object of foreign policy exchange. The article answers the question: how the grain procurement problem has transformed from the economic into social issue, and the grain import has become the vulnerable spot of the Soviet Union in the ideological confrontation with the United States, and the object of international relations.


Author(s):  
David L. Prentice

The history of the Republican Party’s foreign policy reminds historians that national politics often entails efforts to hold together a diverse coalition. The party’s regional alignments, ideas, and positions were seldom static. Rarely has it enjoyed unity on foreign relations. Intra-party differences mattered as wings, factions, and insurgents feuded over both domestic policy and America’s aims, interests, and engagement with the world. Mugwumps, jingoes, insurgents, Irreconcilables, the Republican Right, and neoconservatives, among others, interpreted events differently. These differences modulated the party’s swings from isolationism to interventionism, pulling it closer to the center of American politics. Regarding foreign relations, Republicans have generally united around five themes. First, there existed a common understanding that US interests were paramount in defining foreign policy. A shared “America first” ethos made Republicans wary of liberal internationalism and reluctant to concede any autonomy on foreign or economic affairs. While different wings of the Republican Party may have backed divergent policies, each agreed the United States should preserve its flexibility and engage in unilateral action when necessary. Second, Republicans have supported preparedness for national defense and military superiority even when members may oppose US intervention in a foreign conflict. As for diplomacy, they maintained sound negotiations would come from victory or positions of strength. In a world of dangers, the strong survive. Third, the nature of the foreign foe mattered. Republicans opposed revolutionary regimes abroad whereas anti-fascist or anti-authoritarian causes drew weak or belated interest. The common Republican perception that the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to the international order than Nazi Germany accounted for much of the party’s isolationism before World War II. And during the Cold War, Republicans frequently turned a blind eye to the human rights and political abuses of America’s allies while condemning communist nations for the same. Fourth, the Republican preference for limited government influenced how they approached armed conflict. They resisted large peacetime armies and land wars while, in recent eras, placing inordinate faith in modern firepower to deter enemies and accomplish swift victory when used properly. They feared long wars encouraged the growth of the federal government. Finally, opposition to Democratic alternatives, especially in an election year, could bridge some of the party’s greatest chasms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 59-72
Author(s):  
Carola Tischler ◽  

Research on international relations today is no longer limited to diplomatic contacts but also includes economic and cultural ties. Another factor that should not be neglected is the people themselves; the personalities who shaped politics. This text focuses on those concerned with German-Soviet relations in the 1930s, both at the “centre” in Moscow and at the Soviet plenipotentiary representation in Berlin. This article deals with this range of problems against the background of Soviet-German relations in the 1930s both in the Kremlin and in the Soviet mission in Berlin. The article is based on archival ma- terials discovered and published in the framework of the edition project “Germany and the USSR 1933–1941” pursued under the aegis of the Joint Commission on the Study of Contemporary History in Russian-German Relations. The methodological guidelines are borrowed from the works of Western historiography. The documents under scrutiny shed the light on the functioning of one of the primary foreign-political instruments — the diplomatic corpus of the Soviet Union and Germany. In the documents published in Volume 2, three main areas of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Relations’ (Narko- mindel) functioning are covered: the personnel responsible for the Soviet-German relations, the inner life of the Soviet mission in Berlin, and the work of the central apparatus in Moscow. On the basis of the interdepartmental correspondence of the Narkomindel staff, their memoranda, and the impressions of the German diplomats, one can get an impression of the level of professionalism of at least some Soviet diplomats. In sum- mary, owing to the publication of such a large amount of documents from the Russian and German archives, historians from different countries can now pursue research on a wide range of problems related to the international relations of the 1930s and early 1940s, which is extraordinarily important for understanding the causes and mechanisms which led to World War Two.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 222-229
Author(s):  
Kaniet Zhamilova ◽  

This work is dedicated to learn about the Kyrgyz - US relationships after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The paper analyzed the political and economic relationships between two independent countries after 1991. This work is identified the three steps of the development of bilateral relationships, analyzed how the cooperation changes during the different president administrations and how do external and internal problems affected on it. It has also identified that the relationship between the United States and Kyrgyzstan in political and economic sphere was different as far as presidents were different. So, every president had their own ideas, provisions, strategies and priorities based on their awareness and knowledge of politics and international relations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised a number of questions that have profound implications for American foreign policy; for example, whether the Russian Federation, which inherited half the population and 70 per cent of the territory of the former Soviet Union, would become a friend and partner of the United States, a full and equal member of the community of democratic nations, or whether it would return to a hostile, expansionary communist or nationalist power. The chapter considers US–Russia relations at various times under Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, and Donald Trump. It also discusses a host of issues affecting the US–Russia relations, including the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the crisis in Kosovo and Ukraine, and the civil war in Syria.


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