OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND CONTROL AT NAVAL SHORELINE ACTIVITIES1

1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-224
Author(s):  
Warren G. Hansen ◽  
Ernest Clements ◽  
Elizabeth A. Lundt

ABSTRACT In response to Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Coast Guard regulations, the United States Navy has undertaken a comprehensive program to minimize the potential for land-based oil spills originating from naval shoreline oil storage and handling facilities. Construction and maintenance projects have been begun to prevent land-based oil spills from occurring or from reaching adjacent navigable waters. These projects were preceded by careful policy development, surveys of existing conditions, and analyses of remedial alternatives. Specifically, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command divisions have assisted shoreline activities in the preparation of oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasures (SPCC), and oil spill contingency plans. Improved spill containment and cleanup technologies, as well as improved personnel training, have contributed greatly to the refinement and upgrading of these plans. SCS Engineers (SCS) has been involved in all phases of compliance with these plans. Plan and manual reviews were supplemented by detailed field surveys and subsequent development of remedial projects to be instituted at all deficient facilities. Based on the preliminary recommendations and design sketches prepared for tank farm sites at San Clemente Island, SCS is now providing design and related services for oil spill prevention and control facilities.

1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 393-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McIntyre

ABSTRACT In April 1978, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region I office received an oil spill report which involved a sheen leaching from an industrial park into a river in Connecticut. Initial investigation revealed only two 10,000-gallon and one 11,000-gallon buried storage tanks as possible sources. All were located relatively close together about 200 feet from the river. The maintenance man reported that one of the 10,000-gallon tanks had spilled an estimated 500 gallons into the ground the previous year. EPA responded and initially worked with the property owner and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection in addressing the problem. Although the leaching seemed to be relatively minor at first, it gradually increased after July 1978. The property owner was unable to finance cleanup actions after the first few months. EPA assumed cleanup responsibility, using federal funds, and eventually took over all investigation and recovery efforts in 1980. The incident has involved many phases, including locating and estimating the volume of the underground contamination, attempted source identification through sample analysis, installing recovery systems, excavating the oil storage tanks, winter operations of the recovery systems, disposal of product, and river cleanup. Analyses of test boring data in 1979 indicated the maximum volume of spilled product on the groundwater to be between 50,000 and 150,000 gallons. Since 1980, the recovery systems alone have yielded more than 90,000 gallons of oil, making this innocuous incident one of the largest inland oil spills ever in Region I. It also has been the most expensive federally-funded inland spill in the region. Recovery from the groundwater is expected to continue through 1982, albeit at a decreasing rate. The total observed volume of oil involved in the spill will probably exceed 110,000 gallons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1467-1469
Author(s):  
Stéphane Grenon ◽  
Vincent Jarry ◽  
Darcy Longpré ◽  
Kenneth Lee ◽  
Albert D. Venosa

ABSTRACT The St. Lawrence River, situated between Canada and the United States, provides a major transport route in North America for the transport of millions of tons of crude oil, condensates, and refined products each year. In addition, as one of the largest rivers in the world, it is of major ecological significance. For example, over 55,000 hectares of wetlands are found along the St. Lawrence alone. These areas provide habitat for wildlife, the nurseries for fisheries, and control coastal erosion are highly vulnerable to oil spills. Furthermore, as traditional oil spill cleanup methods may be ineffective or cause more damage, emergency responders are considering less intrusive methods such as biorestoration as operational countermeasures. A biorestoration experiment was designed to measure the effectiveness of this method in the St. Lawrence River. To conduct this experiment, 1,200 liters of crude oil were to be spilled in a controlled manner over an experimental zone of 750 m2 in a marsh area. To obtain regulatory approvals from governmental agencies, environmental groups and, more importantly, to avoid the “not in my backyard” protests from the local communities, site selection, emergency planning, contingency measures, and especially community meetings, were all necessary steps towards the acceptance of the project. This controlled spill was done in June 1998 without any incident. Sampling of the experimental site will be completed in the fall of 2000. This paper aims to provide insights on the steps needed to gain acceptance from concerned citizens for the conduct of a controlled oil spill experiment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1345-1365
Author(s):  
Paul Meyer

Abstract 2017-321 The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility, Ohmsett, plays a critical role in advancing oil spill response capabilities through research, development, testing, and training. Ohmsett’s 10 million liter (l) saltwater wave tank provides an independent venue to conduct research and development with full-size response equipment using real oil, in realistic, repeatable conditions. This paper will discuss recent research and development conducted at Ohmsett, including: Remote sensing of surface oil by BSEE, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Army, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA); using acoustics to measure oil slick thickness; creating large volumes of emulsions for Ohmsett tests; mechanical recovery of chemically treated, undispersed oil; skimmer testing in diminishing slick thickness; a USCG and BSEE test of a skimmer ice management system; and an autonomous skimmer development. This paper will summarize the setup and methodology used during recent testing, training, and research conducted at Ohmsett. Reports of BSEE funded oil spill response research can be found at https://www.bsee.gov/site-page/master-list-of-oil-spill-response-research.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 609-613
Author(s):  
Captain Jeffrey D. Stieb

ABSTRACT In the United States, the Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in the role as Captain of the Port (COTP) is charged with investigating marine casualties resulting in oil spills in the coastal zone.2 The FOSC is in the challenging position of working with the responsible party as a member of the Unified Command, while simultaneously investigating the incident. Complicating the FOSC's balancing act is the likelihood that other federal, state, and local agencies will have an interest in the investigation. The parties conducting investigations (Department of Justice, National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Coast Guard Investigative Service, Environmental Protection Agency investigators, and state and local investigators) report to their own senior officials and are not under the direction and control of the FOSC. This article will discuss, from a Coast Guard officer's perspective, the FOSC's conflicting roles as a member of the Unified Command working closely in cooperation with the responsible party to mitigate the incident, and as a federal officer supervising at least one of the investigations. The article will describe the dynamics of significant oil spill investigations and provide recommendations on how investigative agencies should work together to conduct thorough investigations while minimizing the impact on the Unified Command's goal of working cooperatively to mitigate the effects of the spill.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017-102
Author(s):  
Scott Knutson ◽  
Craig Dougans

Abstract number: 2017-102The Salish Sea comprises the North American inland marine waters of Washington State and British Columbia; an international border between Canada and the United States intersects it. Planning for oil spills that threaten to cross the international border is under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) as described in the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan. As Canadian companies gain approval to construct new pipelines to move oil-sands-derived crude oil from the landlocked province of Alberta to the tidewater province of British Columbia, governments, agencies and citizens are publicly questioning whether current levels of oil spill preparedness and response equipment will be adequate for the increased tanker traffic from Canadian ports. These stakeholders may likewise be unaware of forthcoming spill prevention and response enhancements, by the Canadian government and industry, associated with new energy infrastructure projects.This paper will expand on a 2014 IOSC paper entitled CANADA – UNITED STATES (SALISH SEA) SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON,1 which was a snapshot of regulations, actual inventories and philosophies that made up the 2014 response picture for the south Salish Sea shared between Canada and the United States. In order to see the entire picture, the reader is encouraged to have both documents at hand.2 The updated paper reviews changes to American Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) and Canadian Response organization (RO) equipment inventories, changes to the Canada Shipping Act 2001, Canada's new Oceans Protection Plan (OPP), United States newly implemented non-floating oil ORSO classification, Washington State's oil spill contingency plans and the future buildup of response equipment and personnel.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.


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