VESSEL RESPONSE PLANS: FORGING BETTER PLANS THROUGH INDUSTRY/GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 443-446
Author(s):  
Charles Corbett ◽  
Svein Ringbakken
Keyword(s):  
Coast Guard ◽  
Final Rule ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan

ABSTRACT The vessel response plan process of review and the substance of the existing requirements are in need of review and refinement. Both vessel operators and, we believe, the Coast Guard are overwhelmed with a paperwork burden that should be relieved, and can be relieved. Additionally, there are a number of issues that require attention to ensure that all interested parties are reacting to the provisions of the final rule (as amended, we suggest) in a constructive manner. This paper proposes a joint industry/government forum in which dialogue can occur, and it offers examples of why that dialogue is needed.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs): Developing Response Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2879-2894
Author(s):  
Christopher Klarmann ◽  
LCDR Johna Rossetti
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Marine Environmental

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-101 – GIUEs: Developing Best Practices to Improve Marine Environmental Response Preparedness The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is authorized by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 to conduct Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUE), a cornerstone of the oil spill exercise cycle. These exercises are instrumental for USCG Captains of the Port (COTP) to evaluate industry preparedness for oil spill response by specifically testing a facility or vessel on notification procedures, response time, and deployment of facility-owned or Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) equipment. Facility Response Plan holders and Vessel Response Plan holders are subject to these exercises under federal regulations 33 C.F.R. § 154 and § 155. In 2013, the USCG restructured their GIUE policy to provide better guidance for employees. This updated policy detailed how to properly plan and conduct a GIUE as well as established expectations following both satisfactory and unsatisfactory exercises. In this paper we will examine the changes that the USCG has made regarding its policy on planning and conducting GIUEs, describe how USCG field units are implementing the new policy, including how unsatisfactory GIUEs are addressed, and examine what commonalities, are being seen in GIUE unsatisfactory results. Finally, we will discuss how plan holders, OSROs, and regulatory agencies can work together to better prepare for responding to an environmental emergency when it occurs.

Enhancing Preparedness and Response ≈ Transition Management Architecture Improvements

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017100
Author(s):  
Tracy Ferguson ◽  
CAPT Anthony Lloyd ◽  
Jon Turban
Keyword(s):  
Situational Awareness ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Technology Change ◽  
Transition Management ◽  
Effective Response ◽  
Response Strategies ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Day To Day Operations

Experts continue to debate about the range of threats that could realistically occur in America today. Disagreements range through the prevention, preemption, and response strategies with advocates continuing to argue for robust “whole-of-government” capabilities to muster and effective response. The debate is complicated by the increased societal churn driven by the changing popular culture, intense effects of technology change and impacts from social media and the 24 hour news cycle. Whether you can hear it, or see it, or not, the truth remains regarding an underlying latency of increased risk in our society. Further compounding this is the change in the oil economy. Latent risk has risen there as well, challenging current preparedness efforts. Increased flexibility, transitional success, better data sharing methods, and deeper situational awareness is needed for planning, preparedness, and response success. Coast Guard legal authorities are foundational in this regard especially as it relates to the proper apportionment of National Contingency Plan resources. The Coast Guard Vessel Response and Facility Response Plan regulations reflect an appropriate effort to assure the retention and allocation of those resources to meet preparedness and response requirements. How can we be sure, however, that this “force lay down” is effective? Can those resources be better accessed to support NCP requirements? This poster will depict a way to envision better transition of VRP/FRP resources. It will also explain a capability and architecture developed to ease the rapid shifts from day-to-day operations to a rapidly expanding crisis.

Revised PREP Guideline Review: What You Should Know?

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-172
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Sobieski ◽  
Kathryn L. Kelley
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Remote Assessment ◽  
Qualified Individual ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
New Guidelines

ABSTRACT No. 2017 – 296 On April 11, 2016 the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released the 2016 National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines. The new guidelines became effective on June 10, 2016 and replaced the previous guidelines issued in 2002. Established under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the PREP guidelines were developed to provide a mechanism for compliance with response plan drill and exercise requirements under the Act and implementing regulations. Use of the PREP Guidelines is voluntary, however, compliance with the PREP guidelines will satisfy these requirements. The 2016 PREP Guidelines apply to all OPA 90 response plan holders including USCG regulated vessels and marine transportation-related facilities, EPA non-transportation-related onshore and offshore facilities, PHMSA-regulated facilities and pipelines, BSEE-regulated offshore facilities and area on-scene coordinator (OSC) exercises. The guidelines specify that, within a three-year cycle, all elements of the Facility Response Plan (FRP) or Vessel Response Plan (VRP), including the 15 core components, should be exercised in a drill, or series of drills, involving the Owner/Operator, Qualified Individual (QI), Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSRO) and Salvage and Marine Firefighting (SMFF) resource providers. This paper will provide an overview of the PREP requirements, including plan holder initiated exercises, the remote assessment and consultation exercises (RACE) for vessels, shore-based tabletop exercises, response equipment deployment exercises, and Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GUIEs). As the QI, O’Brien’s has designed, conducted, played, and or evaluated well over 1,000 PREP related activities. This paper will discuss the implementation of PREP from the QI’s perspective, and the identification of some lessons learned and best practices that may be applicable more broadly to support the regulated industry and response community with the implementation of PREP.

HARMONIZING REQUIREMENTS FOR OILS, NOXIOUS LIQUID SUBSTANCES, AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IN SPILL PREPAREDNESS REGULATIONS1

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-106
Author(s):  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Ellinor Coder ◽  
Isabelle Morin ◽  
Mark Landry ◽  
Barbara Davis ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Maritime Transportation ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Environmental Response ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Require Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) enforces regulations for vessel response plans and marine transportation-related facility response plans for oil. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces similar regulations for response plans for non-transportation-related facilities. Proposed USCG rules would require response plans for hazardous substances designated under the authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Other USCG regulations implement provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, known as MARPOL 73/78. Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 addresses petroleum pollution, while Annex II identifies and addresses Noxious Liquid Substances (NLSs). The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 gives the USCG authority to require response plans for NLSs under the CWA. There is some overlap, however, in the substances that are listed as NLSs and those that are categorized as oils or designated as CWA hazardous substances. Adding NLSs to the list of substances requiring a response plan has several implications for spill prevention, preparedness, and response programs. Some facilities currently have response plans for oils and may have response plans for CWA hazardous substances in the future. Some NLSs may be hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and response plans for those NLSs must be consistent with spill notification and response requirements under CERCLA. EPA and USCG On-Scene Coordinators must consider these overlapping listings when deciding on the appropriate removal actions for discharges. Facility owners and operators will need to consider their existing response plans when preparing response plans for NLSs. Under the CWA all response plans must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan and Area Contingency Plans.

RESULTS OF A FULL-SCALE SURPRISE TEST OF SUN'S MAJOR SPILL RESPONSE PLAN

1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-231
Author(s):  
Leon J. Kazmierczak ◽  
T. A. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Learning Experience ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Delaware Bay ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
University Of Delaware ◽  
Important Benefit ◽  
Degree Of Confidence ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Level Of Experience ◽  
The University

ABSTRACT The Marine Operations Division of Sun Refining and Marketing (formerly Sun Transport Co.), a division of Sun Company, Inc., has conducted a series of drills to assess the effectiveness of its response plan, originally published in 1976. The latest exercise, conducted in November 1981, was by far the most extensive and complicated. Papers presented at the 1979 and 1981 oil spill conferences described the plan, the rationale behind it, and the first test. This paper reports on the findings and experiences of this latest exercise. The test (as with the original) was known only to a few beforehand to simulate as real-life a situation as possible. Involvement by people and organizations was extensive and included about 40 people representing Sun, the U. S. Coast Guard, the Delaware Bay Cooperative, the University of Delaware, reporters, and a few others. A number of problems identified will be discussed in detail. Two of the more important were early confusion about assignments and reporting; that is, people arriving were not sure where to go or to whom to talk. In general, the test was a very positive learning experience for all involved. Probably the single most important benefit was that the Sun people acquired a level of experience which they can draw on with some degree of confidence in the event of a major spill.

Vessel Response Plans: Measuring Effectiveness After The First 5 Years

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 927-932
Author(s):  
John Caplis ◽  
Shari Tavel
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management Teams ◽  
Actual Usage ◽  
True Value ◽  
Common Thread ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
The Common ◽  
Response Plan

ABSTRACT The owners or operators of tank vessels (herein referred to as “plan holders”) have clear preferences regarding the effectiveness of the vessel response plan (VRP) requirements. Surveys were used to rank the planning elements with respect to preparedness, actual usage, and quality of response. With respect to preparedness, the preferred areas of plan development are “Notification Procedures,” “List of Contacts,” “Onboard Checklists,” “Qualified Individuals,” and “Spill Management Teams.” For actual usage, the planning elements most frequently implemented during an incident are “Qualified Individuals,” “Notification Checklists,” “Shipboard Spill Mitigation Procedures,” “Oil Spill Removal Organizations,” and “Spill Management Teams.” With respect to the quality of a response, the preferred elements for enhancing a response are “Notification Information,” “Lists of Contacts,” and “Qualified Individuals.”, Survey measurements indicate that plan holders perceive the plans as being closely linked to enhancing their preparedness, but not necessarily to enhancing a response through the use of the plan itself during an incident. This highlights the fact that much of a VRP's contents is dedicated to enhancing the plan holder's preparedness and is not, in most cases, intended to be used as an operational set of tools during an incident. VRPs have been designed as planning documents and should not be viewed or used as performance documents. An analysis of the survey data reveals that the common thread or strength that ties all the “most effective” planning elements together is their involvement in creating a predetermined, rapid response structure. The true value of the plans, then, lies in their ability to create this structure and prepare the plan holder to implement it quickly, enabling the response to be set in motion without delay.

VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS: OBSERVATIONS BY INTERTANKO

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-262
Author(s):  
Charles R. Corbett
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Contingency Plans ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
Oil Spill Cleanup ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The U.S. government has elected to proceed unilaterally with respect to oil spill response plans for vessels—despite the fact that it is party to two important treaties which support a globally unified system. While the timetable for implementing the vessel response plans required by U. S. legislation moves forward for tanker owners, the U. S. executive branch has not kept pace by providing badly needed guidelines—demanded by the same legislation. Of particular importance are the failure of revisions to the U. S. National Contingency Plan, area contingency plans, and oil spill cleanup contractor approval procedures and guidelines to appear.

Coast Guard Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS), Past, Present and Future of meeting Service spill response needs (containment, skimming, and pumping)

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017023
Author(s):  
Mike Crickard ◽  
Tim Gunter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Deepwater Horizon ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The Future ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
History Of

The Coast Guard Vessel of Opportunity Skimming (VOSS) has recently gone through a consolidation of pollution response equipment to modernize its spill equipment capability for oil spill (containment, skimming, and pumping) to meet the response needs of the future. This paper will review the history of Coast Guard VOSS implementation, deployment during Deep Water Horizon, VOSS consolidation of 15 sites in 2014–2015, and challenges facing Coast Guard VOSS capability gaps in the future. In the aftermath of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in 1989, the Coast Guard assessed gaps and deficiencies in the ability of government and private sector resources to fully and adequately respond to major oil spill events. At the time, major gaps were found in the private sector's ability to deliver emergency first response equipment in major port areas. These gaps were addressed by Coast Guard acquisition, pre-positioning and on-going maintenance of VOSS systems & other equipment. Regulatory regimes were created and the Coast Guard created a system for determining the ability of the private sector to respond to a worst case discharge (WCD) including Title 33 CFR Parts 154 and 155 requiring facility and vessel response plan holders to have plans and contracts for privately owned pollution response equipment sufficient to respond to a WCD. The regulations have resulted in the increased capacity of Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) in the coastal areas of the continental United States. The Deepwater Horizon response in 2010 was the largest pollution response equipment deployment by private and government resources in the nation's history. Most Coast Guard VOSS systems were deployed in response to Deepwater Horizon. The growth of spill response equipment by the private sector and lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon VOSS spill deployment were utilized to support the consolidation of VOSS equipment in the continental United States while maintaining VOSS capacity in remote areas.

ABANDONED VESSEL AUTHORITIES AND BEST PRACTICES GUIDANCE- A REVIEW OF NRT WORK

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2053-2063
Author(s):  
LT Christopher Kimrey ◽  
Doug Helton
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Marine Debris ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Public Health Hazards ◽  
Abandoned Vessels

ABSTRACT Abandoned and derelict vessels are a problem in almost every U.S. port and waterway, and these vessels can have significant impacts on the coastal environment and economy, including oil pollution, marine debris, and wildlife entrapment. They become hazards to navigation, illegal dumping of waste oils and hazardous materials and general public health hazards. Pollution response, including removal and disposal of these vessels can be complex and costly. As a result, many abandoned vessels are left in place unless they are obstructing or threatening to obstruct navigation, or threatening a pollution discharge. Faced with a growing number of abandoned vessels and costly interventions, the National Response Team (NRT) held a session on abandoned vessels during the 2011 Co-Chairs meeting in Dallas, TX. Representatives from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) gave presentations about the scope of the problem and the need for national guidance for Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs). Based on issues presented and discussed during the session, the NRT Executive Secretariat agreed an interagency best practices document was needed. An Abandoned Vessel Response Workgroup was established, co-chaired by the USCG and NOAA, and was tasked with identifying: 1) best practices used for responding to abandoned vessels; 2) the regulatory and policy authority of each agency with a nexus to abandoned vessels; and 3) the roles and responsibilities of each agency pursuant to those authorities. This paper summarizes the report on authorities and best practices.

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