EFFECTS OF OPA 90 RESPONSE PLANNING ON REPORTED SPILLS

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Stalcup ◽  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Brad Kaiman ◽  
Adam Hall

ABSTRACT In the years following the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), government agencies and regulated parties in the United States have begun to implement spill prevention and preparedness programs. For this analysis, 7 years of oil spill data collected in the Emergency Response Notification System were used to measure the impact that OPA 90 has had on preventing large spills. Furthermore, relationships among the types, sources, and location of spilled oil are characterized. A comparison of the number of reported 10,000-gallon oil spills for the years 1992-1995 to that number for the years 1989-1991 indicates a decline, not only for vessels but also for pipelines and fixed facilities. The decline in large oil spills to water from various sources appears to indicate that the efforts of government and industry have had a measurable impact on environmental protection.

1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-355
Author(s):  
Cadets John P. Nolan ◽  
Susan J. Blood

ABSTRACT The International Oil Pollution Prevention and Response (OPPR) Convention represents current international efforts to improve capabilities to prepare for and respond to catastrophic oil spills. Initiated by the United States, it is being negotiated by the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Major components of the proposal include the establishment of an International Marine Pollution Information Center located at IMO headquarters, National Response Centers in each coastal state, and oil spill response contingency plans for ships. Other proposed articles include prepositioning of oil response equipment in high-risk areas, a research and development program for response techniques, and international cooperation during responses to catastrophic oil spills. Several problems have complicated negotiations of the OPPR Convention. First, severe time constraints have been placed on the negotiators, with the final conference1 to consider the OPPR scheduled for November 1990. Second, the United States suffers from a lack of credibility in the IMO, since the Senate has not yet ratified previous initiatives, the 1984 protocols to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Finally, the IMO's financial troubles have placed the concept of the International Information Center in jeopardy. In spite of these obstacles, a clear majority of countries are willing to support the document, realizing that it fills a gap in marine oil pollution prevention and response. The OPPR Convention will likely be carried through to adoption by the November conference. This paper traces the development of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Response and Prevention. It summarizes the background and initial proposals of the Convention, and then discusses the problems that arose during negotiations. Finally, it describes the present status of the Convention and offers a projection of its future direction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2408-2431
Author(s):  
Mark Dix ◽  
Alan Mearns

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Emergency Response Division’s success over 40 years draws on the nascent and sustained vision of its founders and the people that dedicated themselves to providing state of the art science in combatting oil spills and hazardous material releases. Lessons in research, development, partnership, reinvention, reorganization, and adaptation season the story that describes what is now the scientific touchstone in the United States’ maritime spill response vanguard. But the voyage to present day was (and is) not all smooth sailing. The scientists who built the unit and staffed it for decades recall the best, worst, and in between history of a small but highly influential division in the Federal government that helped pioneer spill science in the United States and internationally by responding to over 4,000 incidents. This retrospective highlights the genesis and growth of the 1970’s Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Assessment Program (OCSEAP) and its evolution through Hazardous Materials Response Division (HMRD) to the now Emergency Response Division (ERD). The paper concludes with the vision of what growth areas lie ahead for the Division and oil spill response.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Tannahill ◽  
Alexis Steen

ABSTRACT Since its inception, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) was intended to greatly improve the ability to respond to large spills in the United States and has been the subject of frequent discussion and debate within the United States and elsewhere. Its provisions created new regulatory programs, expanded existing requirements, and established a variety of competency requirements for those entities and personnel involved in the production, transport, handling, or storage of petroleum within the United States. Tens upon tens of articles have been published in prior Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) and in many other venues about legislative intent, subsequent regulatory programs and their implementation, interagency negotiations, industry compliance successes or difficulties, training issues, etc. OPA 90 has also had an impact on U.S. policies internationally and in U.S. participation in international spill conventions/treaties. In recognition of a decade's passage since its enactment, IOSC sponsors commissioned a review and analysis of the effectiveness of OPA 90 and the interrelationship of OPA 90 with other oil spill laws and rules in the world. Another important purpose was to identify issues for the related panel discussion of this topic at the 2001 IOSC. This review was conducted using a questionnaire to acquire input from a broad range of individuals with OPA 90 expertise and experience. An informal survey of 57 questions in four sections was prepared and distributed to 22 participants. These participants were selected to represent a core of knowledge about OPA 90 and its history of implementation. Findings from the survey are presented to foster discussion and debate, educate members of the spill response community, assist with resolution of outstanding issues, and help focus on future issues that will need attention. The rate of response to the survey questions was high and enabled a broad review of the effectiveness of some of the various OPA 90 requirements. Questions were in either multiple-choice or essay format. Commonalties, differences, and issues were identified from all responses and used to evaluate OPA 90. From the commonalties and differences in the responses, selected OPA 90 requirements were classified as effective or ineffective. Based on an analysis of multiple-choice and essay answers, respondents generally agreed that OPA 90 was moderately effective (across all covered provisions). Closer examination of the four survey sections, however, indicated distinct concerns and benefits derived from implementation of OPA 90. In addition, where OPA 90 provisions were judged effective, caveats sometimes followed. Despite the effective rating of many OPA 90 prevention provisions, prevention still needs more attention based on the opinions of the survey respondents. Some respondents felt more attention and resources often are given to preparing to respond to a spill than to preventing spills, even though preventing a spill is considered preferable. Further, some believed that spill prevention would be enhanced if vessels with large, onboard bunker fuel storage also were subject to prevention requirements similar to OPA 90 requirements for vessels carrying petroleum as cargo. Survey feedback indicated that better Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) could result in significant improvements in response preparedness. ACPs need to be improved in many geographic areas. ACPs should be more response-oriented and less like a reference document, and be made more readily available and useable. Many respondents viewed these items as the foundation for any major improvements in response planning. In the United States, spill response using a multiparty management system, which is inclusive of broad stakeholder groups, differs from systems in other countries. Most felt that response activities can impact restoration activities greatly, but the legal structure does not support a seamless and efficient coordination of response and restoration. Coordination between response and restoration needs to be improved to avoid response delays and promote better/faster resource restoration. The biggest concern expressed by survey respondents regarding restoration dealt with management of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. Damage assessments and restoration management need to be streamlined, partly because too many interested parties make decision making inefficient. Some felt that public review of restoration plans led to better results; others felt public review delayed timely restoration activities. While international cooperation has increased over the last decade, respondents felt there was room for further improvement. In particular, sharing personnel and resources better, joining inspection and control programs, and drafting international restoration guidelines were some of the improvement activities mentioned. Findings from this survey have provided insights on what actions are needed to further improve spill prevention, preparedness, response, and restoration. Now is the time to renew this effort and improve performance to a higher plane globally. 2001 IOSC sponsors and Issue Paper Subcommittee desire the response community's commitment and solicit its involvement toward this goal.


Author(s):  
Helkei S. Hemminger

Abstract # —1141278 — In 2018, the Canadian government purchased the Trans Mountain pipeline, running from Alberta to British Columbia, along with the plans for expansion. The expansion could triple the transport capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and would increase the tanker traffic in the inland waterways of the Salish Sea, an area known for its sensitive marine habitat, and narrow, difficult to navigate passages. The anticipated increase in tanker traffic in this busy waterway continues to raise concerns about the impact of an oil spill and the financial means to address related injuries, particularly to natural resources. The transboundary nature of any spill further complicates the situation vis-à-vis the applicable liability regimes and response resources. Under the Canada-United States Joint Marine Contingency Plan (“JCP”), the United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard acknowledge each country's responsibility to fund their own response actions and pursue reimbursement of those costs within their respective jurisdictions. The availability of funding for a response, and to compensate injured parties, however, including the limits of liability of the responsible party, differs under each regime, and could impact the nature and scope of a response. For spills into or posing a substantial threat to the navigable waters of the United States, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs and a national fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”), is immediately available to address an incident, including emergency restoration to natural resources. Canada's Marine Liability Act enables the Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (“SOPF”) to pay claimants who have incurred damages as a result of oil pollution. Both countries' funds operate under the same principal—the polluter pays—but the compensation structure, and claims processes and procedures are entirely different. This paper provides an overview of these funding sources and claims procedures, comparing and contrasting the different systems. The discussion is meant to provide an overall understanding of potential funding pools available for spill responses under each scheme in order to facilitate transboundary spill planning and discussion.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 842-843
Author(s):  
Gail Thomas ◽  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Brad Kaiman

ABSTRACT A paper presented at the 1981 International Oil Spill Conference analyzed spill data in four regions of the United States that carry heavy oil traffic and focused on spills of more than 10,000 gallons in the years 1974 through 1977, to determine what differences, if any, exist in the spill rates. The findings of that earlier study are compared with more recent (1990–1993) data from the Emergency Response Notification System and the Oil Spill Intelligence Report to show how the patterns have changed.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 439-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Henry

ABSTRACT Since the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), dispersants have been used as part of a combined response to mitigate seven oil spills in United States Gulf of Mexico (GOM) waters. Of the dispersant operations reported, four utilized the Regional Response Team VI pre-approval authority to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) that requires a monitoring plan. The successful integration of dispersant pre-authorization along with a fully funded ready response delivery system maintained by industry contributed to the successful use of dispersants to aid in mitigating spilled oil. A key element to gaining the original pre-approval authority was a functional operational monitoring plan. While each response was considered a successful dispersant operation, each incident provided valuable lessons learned that have been integrated into subsequent contingency planning and modifications to existing pre-authorization requirements in the GOM. This paper provides a chronological review of oil spill responses where dispersants were applied in the GOM since OPA 90.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 991-994
Author(s):  
Troy L. Baker ◽  
Jim Jeansonne ◽  
Charlie Henry ◽  
John Tarpley

ABSTRACT Providing rapid and humane care for distressed or threatened marine mammals is crucial to the ultimate success of such actions. Recently, in the southeast United States, marine mammals were observed in the vicinity of several oil spills. Proper coordination of marine mammal rescue or recovery actions with the Unified Command (UC) is essential for response personnel safety and increased probability of saving the affected animals. In the event of animal mortalities, effective coordination between the marine mammal resource agencies and the UC helps ensure the preservation of causal evidence. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration'S (NOAA'S) Office of Response and Restoration (OR&R), generally through the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC), is able to assist the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) and UC in addressing the threat of spilled oil on potentially affected marine mammals. Response actions during recent spills included: documenting the animals’ type and location, notification of the marine mammal agencies and teams responsible for their recovery and care, and coordination between the spill response and the marine mammal response. The actions of responders during recent spills involving marine mammals are summarized and relevant issues discussed, including properly characterizing the threat to marine mammals from spilled oil. The recent oil spill responses involving marine mammals in the southeastern U.S. are applicable to future spills throughout the United States and potentially worldwide. These recent incidents underscore the need to fully understand and plan for high profile wildlife issues during oil spill responses.


2013 ◽  
Vol 837 ◽  
pp. 775-779
Author(s):  
Ramona Tromiadis ◽  
Costel Stanca

The paper presents a comparative analysis of tanker ships incidents and their environment impacts. The focus is on oil tankers because this type of ships poses the highest environmental risk. By the sheer amount of oil carried, modern oil tankers can be considered a threat to the environment. In case of a maritime accident a ship can suffer fracture of the ships hull that may lead to oil outflow leading to environmental consequences or stability problems, which may again result in capsizing of the vessel. In terms of the consequences for the vessel maritime accidents can be classified in different categories. Severe accident means an accident involving a total loss of the ship, loss of life or severe pollution. Accident that is not severe which may involve: fire, explosion, stranding, collision damage caused by bad weather, damage caused by ice, fracture in the hull or suspected damage to the body. This may also lead to pollution. And incidents that are circumstances or events caused by, or related with the operation of a ship from which the ship or any person is being hazard or results in serious damage to the ship, the ship's structure or the environment. Oil spills have devastating effects on the environment. Shipping regulations have been developed or modified over years on the basis of some significant marine accidents. The regulations are mostly concentrated on reducing the consequences of maritime incidents. Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the United States passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90), which excluded single-hull tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more from U.S. waters from 2010 onward, apart from those with a double bottom or double sides, which may be permitted to trade to the United States through 2015, depending on their age. Following the sinkings of the Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002), the European Union passed its own stringent anti-pollution packages (known as Erika I, II, and III), which also require all tankers entering its waters to be double-hulled by 2010. Oil tankers are only one source of oil spills. Air pollution from normal tanker engines operation and from cargo fires is another serious concern. Ship fires may not only result in the loss of the ship due to lack of specialized firefighting gear and techniques but the fires sometimes burn for days and require evacuations of nearby residents due to the dangerous smoke.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 801-805
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Waldron

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) promoted a coordinated industry and government enhancement of response resources to combat oil spills effectively in the United States. However, the United States remains vulnerable to oil spills near the borders it shares with Canada, Mexico, and various nations in the Caribbean due to legal and administrative impediments associated with cross-boundary spill response activities. This paper explores cross-boundary related issues that could hinder a response and the relationship and roles of industry and government with regard to such issues, and provides recommendations to enhance improved cooperation between government and industry to facilitate response activities. The international structure that currently exists—globally, regionally, and bilaterally—provides a basic framework that promotes cooperation between nations to respond harmoniously to spills threatening the shores of neighboring countries. However, the existing agreements and understandings only provide a basic umbrella. They require planning and implementation of details and commitment to take the specific actions required to implement these agreements and understandings fully. As a result, the enhanced private response capability that now exists in the United States may not be available in a spill involving cross-boundary operations. Neighboring nations must take action to facilitate cross-boundary activities by responders by providing responder-immunity protection similar to that provided under OPA 90 and by removing potential impediments to response activities: laws and other requirements relating to matters such as customs, immigration, and safety training.


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