MANAGEMENT OF DERELICT VESSELS THAT THREATEN OUR WATERS: A PRIMER ON DERELICT VESSEL REMOVAL WITH SUCCESS STORIES

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1081-1085
Author(s):  
Dan R. Norton ◽  
Danielle M. Renoud

ABSTRACT Derelict vessels pose significant hazards to the communities in which they reside due to the cornucopia of oils and hazardous materials they contain including fuel oils, lubricating oils, lead-based paints, acid batteries, asbestos, and refrigerants like ammonia and Freon. Additional threats include attractions for children and vagrants, navigational hazards, and potential locations for illegally dumped oil or hazardous materials. The removal of derelict vessels is a complex undertaking due to restrictive legal authorities, ownership questions, high costs, and limited funding streams. The overview provided covers important points to consider prior to initiation of any removal action for a derelict vessel. Points include owner identification and notification, federal removal authorities, removal funding, and potential disposal methods. Included are vessel removal success stories and best practices from a U.S. Coast Guard - State of Washington partnership and the program titled ‘Operation Trash Compactor’. This partnership successfully mitigated pollution threats from the vessels FAL-91 and HERON. Ultimately the creation of such partnerships or creations of taxation systems or mandatory environmental insurance programs are important tools to ensure proper disposal of derelict vessels. According to African legend older elephants instinctively would direct themselves when they reached their time to an area to die called the elephant graveyard. The myth was due partly to the fact that while elephants are the largest of land mammals, their bones were supposedly never found lying around openly on the African plains. Contributing to the myth was that older elephants and elephant skeletons were often found in the same habitat. Thus the elephant graveyard was believed to be the final destination for literally thousands of elephants and that their bones and tusks would litter the graveyard. While elephants may have been believed to have had elephant graveyards to go to die in, the question remains for today'S maritime vessels; where do vessels go to die? Like elephants, today'S fleets of maritime vessels are relatively large as far as man-made structures, and older vessels may be found clumped together near industrial waterways or low rent marinas. Unlike elephant bones, however, the steel frames and structures of vessels do not quickly decompose and remain visible symbols of our nation'S limited success in creating a process for dealing with vessels that are no longer profitable to operate. Derelict is broadly defined as deserted, neglected, or abandoned property. Many states have statutes which include specific legal definitions of derelict and/or abandoned. Derelict vessel is the term best used to describe vessels that are no longer profitable to operate and may have exceeded their service life. In most cases these vessels will incur more costs for proper maintenance than profits gained from their operation. Thus, these vessels represent a negative operational value. In addition most such vessels posses an overall net negative value as any inherent recycling value is more than offset by incurred disposal costs. Without a positive operational or overall value, such vessels are ripe for becoming a derelict/abandoned vessel and thus be a burden for their community, local, state, and federal government. Derelict vessels are public eye-sores and pose hazards to the communities in which they reside due to the cornucopia of hazardous materials they contain. Hazardous materials include fuel oil, lubricating oils, lead-based paints, acid batteries, asbestos, and refrigerants like ammonia and Freon. Other threats include physical threats from attracting children and vagrants, local environmental impacts from the leaching of iron, potential homes for illegally dumped oil or hazardous materials, and navigational hazards. While many derelict vessels are abandoned, not all are. Abandonment refers to a vessel which has no active owner, although the definition can vary from state to state. The Abandoned Barge Act (48 USC 4701) defines an abandoned barge as “an owner who has moored, stranded, or left a barge unattended for longer than 45 days” (Abandoned Barge Act, 48 USC 4701). Frequently for derelict vessels an owner or operator can be found, however they often lack the financial means to correct the vessel'S deficiencies. Independent surveys from 1991 by the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers found approximately 1300 and 4000 abandoned vessels respectively (USCG Marine Safety Manual, Volume 10, Chapter 10). In response to this national survey, U.S. Congress enacted the Abandoned Barge Act (ABA) of 1992. Unfortunately, as the name implies, the act is relevant only to barges, specifically those over 100 Gross Tons. Other federal laws against derelict/abandonment of a vessel are also narrowly constructed (Boring, 2006). The limitations of other federal laws are addressed later in this paper as they apply to the various challenges presented by derelict vessels. For communities seeking to properly dispose of derelict vessels, there are several core issues to consider. These include ownership, removal authority, funding sources, environmental cleanup, and disposal methods. While this paper is intended to provide a general discussion of primary issues involved in the derelict vessel removal process, it is by no means all-inclusive.

1979 ◽  
Vol 1979 (1) ◽  
pp. 403-405
Author(s):  
John L. Bailey

ABSTRACT During the severe winter of 1977, five loaded tank barges grounded on a rock in the upper Mississippi River, 42 miles above the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The hull of one of those barges was ruptured and approximately 1,000 barrels of its cargo of heavy, black No. 6 fuel oil was subsequently discharged into the river. Because of inadequate action by the owner, the incident became a federal removal activity involving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, several commercial companies, and several units of the Coast Guard, including the Gulf Strike Team. The closure of the Mississippi River due to heavy ice and ice gorging restricted the availability of necessary equipment, and the extremely low temperatures, often well below zero, sometimes made available equipment inoperative. This paper offers no panacea for dealing with damaged oil barges under these adverse conditions, but does provide a description of the incident so that others in similar situations may assess their problems quickly and plan improved courses of action.


1983 ◽  
Vol 1983 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-79
Author(s):  
Steven Cohen ◽  
Stephen Dalton

ABSTRACT The U.S. Coast Guard's success with the high seas skimming barrier prompted the development of a smaller, half-scale version for use in protected bays and harbors. The smaller version (SCOOP) enables more rapid deployment with significantly fewer people. Individual components of the system include a 65-foot section of skimming barrier with redesigned skimming struts, 200 feet of containment boom, two 30-foot work boats for storage, transport, and operation of the system, trailers to carry the boats to the scene, and an oil recovery system including double-acting diaphragm pump, gravity-type oil-water separator, and 750-gallon collapsible storage bags. In tests at the Environmental Protection Agency's Oil and Hazardous Materials Simulated Environmental Test Tank (OHMSETT) facility, the SCOOP exhibited recovery efficiencies between 30 percent and 60 percent over a speed range of 0.5 to 1.75 knots. The oil recovery rate was between 30 and 70 gallons per minute over the same speed range. At speeds below 0.9 knots there were no losses of oil from the boom. The system has been delivered to the Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, where it is being evaluated through use in routine spill response operations and exercises.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-147
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Norton

ABSTRACT The annual volume of oil spilled into the marine environment by tank vessels (tank barges and tanks hips) is analyzed against the total annual volume of oil transported by tank vessels in order to determine any correlational relationship. U.S. Coast Guard data was used to provide the volume of oil (petroleum) spilled into the marine environment each year by tank vessels. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Transportation's (US DOT) National Transportation Statistics (NTS) were used for the annual volume of oil transported via tank vessels in the United States. This data is provided in the form of tonnage and ton-miles, respectively. Each data set has inherent benefits and weaknesses. For the analysis the volume of oil transported was used as the explanatory variable (x) and the volume of oil spilled into the marine environment as the response variable (y). Both data sets were tested for correlation. A weak relationship, r = −0.38 was found using tonnage, and no further analysis was performed. A moderately strong relationship, r = 0.79, was found using ton-miles. Further analysis using regression analysis and a plot of residuals showed the data to be satisfactory with no sign of lurking variables, but with the year 1990 being a possible outlier.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-252
Author(s):  
Mark H. Johnson

ABSTRACT In September 1999, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater delivered a report on the marine transportation system (MTS) to the U.S. Congress. It captured the growing alarm by MTS stakeholders that the current system of marine transportation was barely adequate now and certainly not capable of accommodating the predicted growth and changing nature of shipping over the next two decades. While the report's recommendations seemed to highlight the economic aspects of the MTS, solving impediments to economic efficiency also can translate into significant pollution prevention. Principal among potential pollution prevention is in the area of reducing the numbers of vessel collisions, allisions, and groundings—29 of which resulted in oil spills of 10,000 gallons or more between 1995–1999. These casualties impact the ability of a port to conduct business, resulting in accrual of demurrage and risking competitive position. Attacking the port-specific and systemic factors influencing human factor causes of collisions, allisions, and groundings, the U.S. Coast Guard has embarked on several risk-based decision tools that enable local MTS coordinating committees, called harbor safety committees (HSCs), to evaluate the greatest factors that can contribute to vessel casualties. The tools include a Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PWSA) and a tailored model to evaluate U.S. Army Corps of Engineers facility permits. Early results show opportunities to improve navigational risk in specific ports. Additionally, another MTS effort involves providing real-time navigational and environmental information to vessels to aid decision making.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-195
Author(s):  
Francis J. Sturm ◽  
Charles Jennings

ABSTRACT In January 1999, over 200 oiled waterfowl were recovered from the coastal beaches of South Carolina and North Carolina. A large, multiagency response effort was mounted to collect and rehabilitate these birds, and to identify the source of the damaging oil spill. This was the first time on record that the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) was used on the East Coast of the Unite States to clean wildlife in the absence of any known spill. A temporary rehabilitation center was established for the bird rescue and recovery operation under the direction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR), while the U.S. Coast Guard spearheaded efforts to determine the cause and source of the damaging spill. Representatives from a number of government agencies located up and down the eastern seaboard and Gulf Coast worked together to respond to this wildlife damage and identify the source of the spill: the Star Evviva, which discharged 24,700 gallons of heavy fuel oil approximately 30 miles off the coast of South Carolina. Responding agencies used a unified response and innovative techniques to deal with the unusual challenges presented by this event. This paper summarizes the “lessons learned” in that response effort and attempts to provide useful advice concerning wildlife contingency planning and oil spill investigation and identification.


EDIS ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 2004 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Olexa ◽  
Aaron Leviten ◽  
Kelly Samek

This document discusses the important federal laws and regulations that impact solid waste management. Each particular statute is “explained” as it would probably apply to you. It also includes a brief description of the federal agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing these statutes. First and foremost is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but other federal agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Coast Guard, may become involved in the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes. This is EDIS document FE443, a publication of the Department of Food and Resource Economics, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, UF/IFAS, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Published December 2003.  https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/fe443


1987 ◽  
Vol 1987 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-58
Author(s):  
Alexander E. Tanos ◽  
Tony E. Hart

ABSTRACT In early February 1986 the U.S. tank barge St. Thomas struck a submerged object in Charlotte Amalie harbor, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. Damage to the barge's number 1 starboard cargo tank resulted in the loss of an estimated 500 barrels of No. 6 fuel oil. Later, an additional 100 barrels were lost when temporary patching of the tank let go. These two spills are believed to be the largest that have affected the U.S. Virgin Islands. When the operators of the barge failed to initiate an appropriate response to remove the oil, the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator initiated a federal response under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Over the next month the OSC coordinated the cleanup of this oil which had pocketed around the harbor. Total costs for the cleanup exceeded $1.9 million. No long-term environmental damage is believed to have occurred.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1077-1078
Author(s):  
Robert Pavia

ABSTRACT Spills seriously strain the normal abilities of organizations to gather, process, and distribute information. Added to the problems of supporting local multiagency decisions within the Unified Command (UC), there often are pressures from groups not directly involved in response operations and the public for rapid access to information about the spill. A UC can provide Command Post staff, official personnel not on-scene, and the public with specifically tailored information by establishing Incident Internet Operations. Incident-specific Internet sites can disseminate information about the response rapidly to the general public and specify target audiences inside and outside the Command Post. The Hazardous Materials Response Division, Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration worked with the U.S. Coast Guard to successfully deploy an Incident Internet Operations site during the M/V New Carissa incident. Examples of Incident Internet Operations from the New Carissa incident and other spills are available for viewing on-line at http://www.incidentnews.gov.


Author(s):  
Erin C. Trager

Section 388 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) amended the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to grant the U.S. Department of the Interior (USDOI) discretionary authority to issue leases, easements, or rights-of-way for activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) that produce or support production, transportation, or transmission of energy from sources other than oil and gas, except for where activities are already otherwise authorized in other applicable law (e.g., the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9101 et seq.)) [1]. This authority was delegated to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which was charged with developing regulations intended to encourage orderly, safe, and environmentally responsible development of alternative energy resources and alternate use of facilities on the OCS. MMS published its Alternative Energy/Alternate Use proposed rule in the Federal Register in July 2008 for public comment and held a series of public workshops to discuss the proposed regulations. The final regulations were submitted to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (USOMB) on November 3, 2008 for clearance. In advance of final regulations, MMS announced an interim policy in November 2007 to authorize offshore data collection and technology testing activities in Federal waters. This measure was designed to allow developers to jumpstart data collection activities in support of potential future alternative energy development once regulations are in place. MMS has worked very closely with its State and Federal counterparts in implementing the interim policy, which has progressed most expeditiously on the Atlantic Coast. The interim policy is in effect until the MMS promulgates final rules. Beyond the MMS leasing process, several other Federal entities are involved in the permitting and licensing of alternative energy in the offshore environment, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the Federal Aviation Administration (USFAA), among others. This paper will discuss the history of MMS’ program and policy development for offshore alternative energy activities; the steps taken to arrive at final regulations; as well as note the other regulatory bodies involved in the authorization of these activities in U.S. Federal waters.


Author(s):  
H. H. Shih ◽  
James Sprenke ◽  
David Trombley ◽  
John Cassidy ◽  
Tom Mero

The U.S. National Ocean Service (NOS) of NOAA maintains and operates a Physical Oceanography Real Time System (PORTS®) in the Nation’s major ports, harbors and bays. The traditional method of obtaining real-time data from bottom mounted instruments is via underwater cable link. However, this is vulnerable to damage and costly to install and maintain. This paper describes an approach utilizing acoustic and Iridium satellite links to report in real-time wave and current data. The system consists of an ocean bottom instrumentation platform and a U.S. Coast Guard Aid-to-Navigation buoy for data relay. The bottom platform contains a Nortek 1 MHz Acoustic Wave and Current profiler (AWAC) with an integrated Nortek Internal Processor (NIP), a LinkQuest omni-directional UWM2000H underwater acoustic transmitting modem, an ORE acoustic release-based recovery component, and a Teledyne-Benthos UAT-376/EL acoustic transponder. The surface buoy supports an omni-directional UWM2000H receiving modem, an Iridium antenna, and an electronic box containing an Iridium modem, a controller, battery packs, and temperature and voltage sensors. The AWAC measures current profiles along the vertical water column at 30-minute intervals and surface waves at hourly intervals. The NIP processes a set of user selected wave and current parameters and sends these data to the controller on the surface buoy through acoustic modems. The data are then transmitted via Iridium satellite to remote offices in real-time. Sample measurement results and reference data from a near-by Datawell’s Waverider directional wave buoy are presented. The Waverider is operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO). Several unique system design features and interesting wave phenomenon observed at the measurement site are discussed. The goal of this project is to demonstrate the performance of AWAC, NIP, shallow water acoustic modems, and Iridium satellite in real-time data telemetry.


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