A CONTRIBUIÇÃO DE ERNST MAYR PARA A FILOSOFIA DA BIOLOGIA

Introdução: A ciência que estuda os seres vivos em seus mais variados aspectos, se encontra, de acordo com o pensamento do biólogo Ernst Mayr, estabelecida como uma ciência genuína, autônoma e única, embora por muito tempo tenha sido considerada uma disciplina pouco rigorosa e tratada como um ramo da física. Objetivo: Identificar no pensamento de Ernst Mayr sua contribuição para o estabelecimento de uma filosofia da biologia. Material e métodos: Pesquisa bibliográfica às obras “Isto é Biologia: A Ciência do Mundo Vivo” e “Biologia, Ciência Única”. Resultados: Para o autor, a biologia é considerada uma ciência genuína (Bona fide), pois demonstra organização e classificação do conhecimento com base em princípios explicativos. Para que a biologia fosse reconhecida como ciência autônoma, independente da física, foi necessário que (1) os princípios equivocados do vitalismo e a teleologia cósmica fossem refutados; (2) se demonstrasse que princípios básicos do fisicalismo como o pensamento tipológico, o determinismo, o reducionismo e as leis naturais universais não se aplicam à biologia; e, (3) se assumisse o caráter único da complexidade dos sistemas vivos, reconhecendo que o paradigma evolutivo é uma ciência histórica, que se vale então da metodologia das narrativas. Além disso, Mayr ressalta o papel do acaso para esta ciência, além da necessidade do pensamento holístico e a limitação do seu escopo de investigações ao mesocosmo. Para o autor, o que garantiu a unidade da ciência biológica foi o reconhecimento da teoria evolutiva como um paradigma após a publicação do livro “A Origem das Espécies” de Charles Darwin, paradigma este que se consolidou com a síntese evolutiva. Conclusão: O pensamento de Ernst Mayr sobre as características exclusivas da biologia, suas diferenças marcantes em relação à física, a refutação de antigos pressupostos e o reconhecimento do darwinismo como o paradigma norteador da ciência biológica, representam uma grande contribuição para o estabelecimento de uma filosofia da biologia.

Metaphor and Meaning in the Teleological Language of Biology

In the early twentieth century, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory replaced traditional teleological causality as the accepted explanatory basis for biology. Yet, despite this rejection of teleology, biologists continue to resort to the language of purpose and design in order to define function, explain physiological processes, and describe behavior. The legitimacy of such teleological language is currently debated among biologists and philosophers of science. Many biologists and educators argue that teleological language can function as a type of convenient short-hand for describing function while some argue that such language contradicts the fundamentally ateleological nature of evolutionary theory. Others, such as Ernst Mayr, have attempted to redefine teleologyin such a way as to evade any metaphysical implications. However, most discussions regarding the legitimacy of teleological language in biology fail to consider the nature of language itself. Since conceptual language is intrinsically metaphorical, teleological language can be dismissed as decorative if and only if it can be replaced with alternative metaphors without loss of essential meaning. I conclude that, since teleological concepts cannot be abstracted away from biological explanations without loss of meaning and explanatory power, life is inherently teleological. It is the teleological character of life which makes it a unique phenomenon requiring a unique discipline of study distinct from physics or chemistry.

Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.

Teleonomy and the proximate–ultimate distinction revisited

It is now widely accepted that living systems exhibit an internal teleology (or teleonomy), but there are conflicting views about how this should be interpreted. Colin Pittendrigh and others have defined teleonomy broadly. It encompasses all ‘proximate’ (functional) biological phenomena. In contrast, Ernst Mayr and others would limit teleonomy to an a priori ‘program’ (the genome) and exclude proximate phenomena. I argue that living systems exhibit an ex post facto, means–ends teleonomy. Purposiveness is also a property of proximate functional phenomena. Mayr’s definition would also discount the causal role of teleonomy in shaping differential survival, i.e. natural selection and evolution. Proximate and ‘ultimate’ (evolutionary) causes are deeply interpenetrated. Going forward, we must integrate the various domains of causation better.

O essencialismo na classificação de Lineu e a repercussão dessa controvérsia na Biologia

ResumoNos últimos dois séculos, Lineu e toda taxonomia tradicional têm sido acusados de exercerem uma prática essencialista, pautada na descrição de tipos. Ernest Mayr foi um dos que contribuíram para disseminar essas ideias que passaram a ser consideradas como verdades na Biologia. Entretanto, nas últimas duas décadas, historiadores e filósofos da Biologia contestaram esse argumento oferecendo novas análises que corrigem o anacronismo efetuado na história das classificações biológicas. Neste artigo, nosso objetivo é argumentar, com o auxílio de obras originais de Lineu e fontes secundárias provenientes de estudiosos da vida e do trabalho do sueco, bem como de historiadores e filósofos da Biologia, por que a classificação biológica lineana não é fundamentada no essencialismo platônico ou aristotélico. Observamos que as obras e o contexto de Lineu foram mal interpretados, que suas influências na ciência eram totalmente contrárias à lógica escolástica e que, apesar de usar termos como essência, gênero e espécie em suas obras, não há qualquer relação com a lógica aristotélica. Palavras-chave: Carl von Linné; Classificação dos Seres Vivos; História da Ciência. AbstractIn the last two centuries, Linnaeus and all traditional taxonomy has been accused of exercising an essentialist practice, based on the description of types. Ernst Mayr was one of those who contributed to disseminate these ideas that came to be considered as truths in Biology. However, in the last two decades historians and philosophers of biology have contested this argument by offering new analyzes that correct the anachronism in the history of biological classifications. In this article, our objective is to argue, with the help of original works by Linnaeus and secondary sources from scholars of the life and work of the Swedish, as well as historians and philosophers of Biology, because the linear biological classification is not based on essentialism Platonic or Aristotelian. We note that Linnaeus' works and context were misinterpreted, that his influences on science were wholly contrary to scholastic logic, and that in spite of using terms like essence, genus, and species in his works, he had no connection with Aristotelian logic. Keywords: Carl von Linné; Classification of Living Beings; History of Science.

The Modern Synthesis

The “modern synthesis” generally refers to the early to mid-century formulation of evolutionary theory that reconciled classical Darwinian selection theory with a newer population-oriented view of Mendelian genetics that attempted to explain the origin of biological diversity. It draws on the title of zoologist Julian S. Huxley’s book of 1943 titled Evolution: The Modern Synthesis, a semi-popular account of evolution that ushered in this “modern” synthetic view of evolution. Covering an interval of time approximately between 1920–1950, it also refers to developments in understanding evolution that drew on a range of disciplines that were synthesized or brought to consensus that generally include systematics, paleontology, and botany with a populational view of evolutionary genetics. Whether or not it served to unify the study of evolution, or to unify the disparate biological sciences—and whether or not it led to the emergence of a science of evolutionary biology, as some of its proponents have claimed—remains a topic for discussion. Though they do not refer to precisely the same things or share identical meanings, the phrase “modern synthesis” has overlapped with terms such as the “evolutionary synthesis,” coined and used especially by Ernst Mayr and William B. Provine, to refer to the historical event, as well as terms such as Neo-Darwinian theory or Neo-Darwinism (though criticism has been made regarding the latter term’s applicability to the mid-century developments in evolutionary theory). As Ernst Mayr noted, the term “Neo-Darwinism” was first coined and used by George John Romanes in 1895 to refer to a revision of Charles Darwin’s theory first formulated in 1859, which included Lamarckian inheritance. The extent to which the modern synthesis, and the evolutionary synthesis map with what is also called the synthetic theory, is open for discussion as is specific understanding of the term. For the most part, there is little in the way of consensus or agreement by scientists, philosophers, and historians as to what “the synthesis” (the abbreviated reference) precisely means, and what (if anything) specifically occurred of a general nature in studies of evolution, broadly construed, in the interval of time between 1920–1950.

Museum, Library and Archives Partnership: Leveraging Digitized Data from Historical Sources

The Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University (MCZ), founded in 1859, has approximately 20 million extant and fossil invertebrate and vertebrate specimens. These historical collections continue to be a focus of research and teaching for the MCZ, Harvard and outside researchers. The Ernst Mayr Library/Archives (EMLA) of the MCZ is a founding member of the Biodiversity Heritage Library (BHL), an international consortium with a mission to make biodiversity literature openly available for use. Meeting the needs of the MCZ is a priority for EML Museum/library and achives collaboration One collaborative Museum/Library project was the digitization of approximately 81,000 MCZ specimen ledger pages/cards associated with various collections. These historical items, once digitized and deposited in the Harvard Digital Repository Service (DRS), were linked to the relevant specimen records in MCZbase, the museum-wide database. Over 1.2 million specimen records are now linked with digitized sources which benefit all users by adding to the provenance of the specimen data and allowing direct referral to the primary collection source. The EMLA holds an extensive collection of field notes, letters and manuscripts of researchers associated with the MCZ. Collector records are a gold mine of unpublished observations, notes, sketches, specimen lists and narratives. They are primary source data at its most personal, and may be the only documentation of a scientist’s thought processes and observations, particularly for unpublished materials. William Brewster was a prominent late 19th, early 20th century naturalist associated with the MCZ Ornithology Department until his death in 1919. Brewster provided authoritative and novel additions to the knowledge of birds, and his detailed, long-term observations are the key to his published contributions. Brewster’s unpublished scientific legacy is being digitized and deposited in the Harvard DRS and BHL by the EMLA. Transcribed notebook pages will be attached to images in BHL thus improving data discovery. Brewster deposited over 45,000 specimens in the MCZ Ornithology Collection. Combining specimens and unpublished notes is an opportunity to link hidden data and enhance research capabilities. Next steps for this collaborative project include finely grained cross-linking of specific pages, correspondence and photographs to and from the MCZ’s specimen database and BHL. We show how MCZ has leveraged data in digital repositories to enhance and directly relate to MCZbase, with citations to notes, transcriptions and published literature. These collaborations enhance discoverability of hidden data while promoting cross-discipline research to interrelated historical sources.

Epidemias e colapso demográfico no México e nos Andes do século XVI: contribuições da biologia evolutiva

Resumo Discute as epidemias no colapso demográfico de ameríndios no México e na América Andina após a chegada dos espanhóis. A partir das categorias de Ernst Mayr de causas distantes (ou evolutivas) e próximas (ou funcionais), argumenta-se que causas distantes, como causas genéticas, que conferiram resistência imunológica aos espanhóis, manifestaram-se em um cenário muito estratificado, provocando a destruição de incas e astecas. Interpretações recentes do projeto colonialista europeu buscam minimizar a importância das epidemias ou matizá-las com fatores sociais, econômicos e políticos, interpretados aqui como causas próximas. Defendemos que somente pela articulação dessas duas categorias é possível entender a importância das epidemias na conquista espanhola da América Latina.

Prelude

In this autobiographical essay Donnelley explores the animating childhood experiences growing up in Libertyville, Illinois, that have informed and propelled his relationship to nature and to the vocation of philosophy. The essay begins with a reminiscence of playing Little League baseball on makeshift fields bordered by cow pastures, a cemetery, and a trailer park. This becomes a metaphor for the life of engaged thinking and acting on big ideas concerning the human place in and impact on nature as a larger reality of life and meaning. Such a life requires openness to the disciplines of ontology and cosmology. The remainder of the essay is a discussion of the history and development of cosmological thinking since the pre-Socratic philosophers, such as Heraclitus, through seventeenth-century philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza, and finally post-Darwinian thinkers such as Ernst Mayr and Aldo Leopold.