scholarly journals Reichenbach: scientific realist and logical empricist?

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Neuber
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Realist Approach ◽  
Language Of Science ◽  
The One ◽  
Reductionist Approach

AbstractHans Reichenbach’s position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach’s view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle’s verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach’s contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

scholarly journals Practical Realism: Against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism

2013 ◽  
pp. 7-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Vihalemm
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Karl Marx ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
The One

In this paper, the elaboration of the concept of practical realist philosophy of science which began in the author's previous papers is continued. It is argued that practical realism is opposed to standard scientific realism, on the one hand, and antirealism, on the other. Standard scientific realism is challengeable due to its abstract character, as being isolated from practice. It is based on a metaphysical-ontological presupposition which raises the problem of the God's Eye point of view (as it was called by Hilary Putnam). Joseph Rouse's conception of science as practice, Sami Pihlström's pragmatic realism, and even Ilkka Niiniluoto's critical scientific realism are interpreted as practical realist conceptions. Pihlström suggests that the contemporary scientific realist should be prepared to accept the pragmatically naturalized Kantian transcendental perspective on realism. It is argued, however, that this realistically naturalized Kantianism can be nothing more than practical realism, as originated by Karl Marx.

Is Philosophy Possible? A Study of Logical Positivism

Philosophy ◽  
1947 ◽  
Vol 22 (81) ◽  
pp. 25-48
Author(s):  
Winston H. F. Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Present Situation ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Technique ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Proper Sense ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

The present situation in philosophy is paradoxical. On the one hand, thinking men and women all over the world are exclaiming that, while science has made sufficient advance to satisfy all our material needs, what we most need, and must find if we are not to suffer shipwreck, is a new sense of values, a new religious awakening and a new orientation towards life, in short a new philosophy. On the other hand, many professional philosophers are coming to hold the view that philosophy has had its day, or rather that it never in any proper sense had its day, because it is not a rational enterprise but a mistake, an illusion, a farrago of nonsense, “a muddle arising out of the complexities of language.” A new inquiry which goes by the name of Analysis and resembles logic more closely than any other existing discipline is at once to give the quietus to philosophy and to reign in its stead. The modern philosopher cries, with Faustus, “Sweet Analytickes! 'tis thou hast ravished me.” I will not prejudice your minds at the outset by recalling where the study of analysis led the Doctor of Wurtemburg.Those who are thus forthrightly sceptical about philosophy and group themselves under the aegis of analysis are themselves divided into a number of sects. One and all, however, are relentless in exposing the weaknesses of philosophy, zealous in proselytizing and deadly in expounding their new technique which combines scholastic subtlety with modern scientific realism. They represent in fact a modern scholasticism loosely grouped round the dogma: “We pursue logical analysis, but not philosophy,” though, by a curious paradox which demands scrutiny, some of them say: “Philosophy is analysis.”

Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Speed Of Light ◽  
Michael Friedman ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.

What's the point in Scientific Realism if we don't know what's really there?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 97-123
Author(s):  
Sophie R. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

The aim of this paper will be to show that certain strongly realist forms of scientific realism are either misguided or misnamed. I will argue that, in the case of a range of robustly realist formulations of scientific realism, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘realism’ are in significant philosophical and methodological conflict with each other; in particular, that there is a tension between the actual subject matter and methods of science on the one hand, and the realists' metaphysical claims about which categories of entities the world contains on the other.

Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 179-201
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Speed Of Light ◽  
Michael Friedman ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory as a whole to be empirically testable. For example, the theory of Special Relativity relies upon the simultaneity convention introduced by Einstein that assumes that the one-way speed of light is the same in all directions of space. Hence, the logical positivists accepted an a priori component to physical theories. However, they denied that this a priori component is necessarily true. Whereas for Kant, metaphysics is the a priori science of the necessary structure of rational thought about reality (rather than about things in themselves), the logical positivists were forced by the history of science to accept that the a priori structure of theories could change. Hence, they defended a notion of what Michael Friedman (1999) calls the ‘relativised’ or the ‘constitutive’ a priori. Carnap and Reichenbach held that such an a priori framework was conventional, whereas Schlick seems to have been more of a realist and held that the overall relative simplicity of different theories could count as evidence for their truth, notwithstanding the fact that some parts of them are not directly testable. All this is part of the story of how the verification principle came to be abandoned, and how logical positivism transmuted into logical empiricism.

scholarly journals Language as an object of rational structuring: from classical philosophy to modern science

2020 ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
Vladimir Medvedev ◽  
Anatolii Nazirov
Keyword(s):  
Modern Science ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Instrumental Approach ◽  
Language Of Science ◽  
Ideal Language ◽  
Traditional Language ◽  
European Philosophy ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The One

This article presents a philosophical analysis of the idea and attempts of rational structuring of the language of science and philosophy. This idea was especially popular in philosophy of the Modern Age. The correlation of this idea with the existing features of New European Philosophy is revealed. It is demonstrated that instrumental approach towards language was not accidental: it stemmed from the idea on the sovereignty of mind, which in the XX century was revived in the logical positivism. It was also implemented in practice of modern science since the beginning of scientific revolution of the XVII century. The authors compare the reasoning of the representatives of classical New European Philosophy and representatives of logical positivism with the practice of modern science. Paradoxes of the concept of ideal language are determined. On the one hand, its formation should become a preliminary means for smoothing the path to cognition; while on the other – it is necessary to cognize the world before building it. Moreover, the introduction of ideal language is possible only on the grounds of the natural. Thus, the flaws of the natural should be eliminated with help of the natural. The dependence of rationally structured language from the natural is retained in the language of modern science. Any of its formalizations and terminologizations is partial. The system of meanings of the traditional language remains the basis and background for interpretation of any scientific theories. Natural languages ensure our affiliation to a certain socio-cultural community with the inherent to it ways of interpreting meanings, within the framework of which the value of scientific cognition becomes evident.  

What's the point in Scientific Realism if we don't know what's really there?

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 97-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie R. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
The One

The aim of this paper will be to show that certain strongly realist forms of scientific realism are either misguided or misnamed. I will argue that, in the case of a range of robustly realist formulations of scientific realism, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘realism’ are in significant philosophical and methodological conflict with each other; in particular, that there is a tension between the actual subject matter and methods of science on the one hand, and the realists' metaphysical claims about which categories of entities the world contains on the other.

scholarly journals Understanding the Methodological Process of Formation and Evolution of Scientific Empiricism in the Philosophy of West

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Abulqasem Mojtahedi Zanjirabadi ◽  
Mohammad Rahim Eyvazi ◽  
Reza Jalali ◽  
Mahbubeh Pakniya ◽  
Hassan Hajizadeh Anari
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fundamental Change ◽  
The West ◽  
Formation And Evolution ◽  
Methodological Approaches ◽  
The One ◽  
Modern Era

The current paper evaluates the transformation of methodological approaches and perspectives of early centuries of the modern era scientism to fundamental change in the philosophical views of the west in the form of postmodern attitudes. Thus, on the one hand, the evolution in crude empiricism and its transition to positivism, logical positivism and how to transition from positivism to falsifiability will be evaluated. On the other hand, we address the transformation of positivism and falsifiability attitudes and thinking into macro structures and attitudes in the form of Imre and Lakatos research program and Thomas Kuhn's paradigm and finally, Feyerabend anarchist approach. Then, we will continue with a brief overview of how to shape the post-modern approaches as the outcome of fundamental change in the attitude of philosophy in the West. Of course, we try to avoid getting into the details of the views, as far as possible because the main focus of this paper is on the analysis of the evolution of the methodological perspectives of "Scientism (Philosophy of science)" to postmodernism.

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