scholarly journals A model-based approach to social ontology

2021 ◽  
pp. 004839312110569
Author(s):  
Matti Sarkia
Keyword(s):  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Theoretical Modeling ◽  
Model Construction ◽  
Scientific Models ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Analytic Tradition ◽  
The Social

This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, but less demanding than Tuomela’s own description of his account as a philosophical theory of the social world. My approach is also suggested to be applicable to many (but not necessarily all) other methodologically naturalist accounts of collective intentionality and social ontology.

scholarly journals Collective Attitudes and the Anthropocentric View

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattia Gallotti
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Good Theory ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Social

AbstractThe anthropocentric view holds that the social world is a projection of mental states and attitudes onto the real world. However, there is more to a society of individuals than their psychological make up. In The Ant Trap, Epstein hints at the possibility that collective intentionality can, and should, be discarded as a pillar of social ontology. In this commentary I argue that this claim is motivated by an outdated view of the nature and structure of collective attitudes. If we aim at a good theory of social ontology, we need a good theory of collective intentionality.

scholarly journals Précis of The Ant Trap

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
New Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
Traditional Approaches

AbstractThis article summarizes The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. The book develops a new model for social ontology, applies it to groups and collective intentionality, and criticizes various forms of individualism. Part One of the book presents two traditional approaches to social ontology and unifies them into the “grounding–anchoring model” for the building of the social world. Part Two shows that individualism is mistaken even for basic facts about groups of people, challenges prevailing views of group intention and action, and illustrates how to approach facts about groups in general.

Social Ontology and Model-Building: A Response to Epstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Model Building ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Model Construction ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Social

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.

Constructivist Moral Realism

1998 ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
J. K. Swindler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Social World ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Realm

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

scholarly journals Social contexts of music culture in the epoch of “current modernity”: from aleatoric to reflecting Shostakovich

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 23-28
Author(s):  
Marina A. Petinova
Keyword(s):  
New Media ◽  
Public Sphere ◽  
Social Communication ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Digital Environment ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Public Sphere

The dynamic processes taking place in society encompass all the meridians of activity-based forms of culture, including art. The social optics of everyday life shows that today the conditions for the existence of institutions can suddenly change, leading to a change in the way a person exists, transforming his place and habitual forms of activity, leading to an unexpected change in perception, destroying established expectations and goals. Time in such a new social ontology loses its processuality and connectedness, turning into isolated moments, impulses. Creativity processes either freeze, giving way to states of obscurity, prostration, or go into the development of a new media reality, into the public sphere of the digital environment and social communication. The above-described properties of the modern social world have allowed Sigmund Bauman to metaphorically describe it as fluid modernity. But if the borders are fluid and pass everywhere (M. Bakhtin), then the global question arises of the place and position of culture and, in particular, art. Time in such a new social ontology loses its processuality and connectedness, turning into isolated moments, impulses. Creativity processes either freeze, giving way to states of obscurity, prostration, or go into the development of a new media reality, into the public sphere of the digital environment and social communication. The above-described properties of the modern social world have allowed Sigmund Bauman to metaphorically describe it as fluid modernity. But if the borders are fluid and pass everywhere (M. Bakhtin), then the global question arises of the place and position of culture and, in particular, art. In the article, music as a form of culture is considered in relation to the social theory of Z. Bauman. And also mentioned D.D. Shostakovich in the context of the double meaning of his work.

Reflexive dis/embedding: Personal narratives, empowerment and the emotional dynamics of interstitial events

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trish Ruebottom ◽  
Ellen R. Auster
Keyword(s):  
Social Bonds ◽  
Personal Narratives ◽  
Social World ◽  
Institutional Work ◽  
The Social ◽  
Emotional Dynamics

Reflexivity is required for institutional work, yet we know very little about the mechanisms for generating such understandings of the social world. We explore this gap through a case study of an interstitial event that aims to create a community of ‘change-makers’. The findings suggest that such events can generate reflexive dis/embedding through two complementary mechanisms. Specifically, personal narratives of injustice and action and individual-collective empowering generate emotional dynamics that disembed actors from their given attachments and embed them within new social bonds. Through these mechanisms, the event in the case study was able to challenge audience members’ conceptions of self and others and change their worldview. This research advances our understanding of how reflexivity can be developed by uncovering the emotional dynamics crucial to the dis/embedding of actors.

scholarly journals Collective intentionality or documentality?

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 423-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurizio Ferraris
Keyword(s):  
Exponential Growth ◽  
Social World ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
The Social ◽  
Technological Developments

In this article I defend two theses. The first is that the centrality of recording in the social world is manifested through the production of documents, a phenomenon which has been present since the earliest phases of society and which has undergone an exponential growth through the technological developments of the last decades (computers, tablets, smartphones). The second is that the centrality of documents leads to a view of normativity according to which human beings are primarily passive receptors of rules manifested through documents. We are not intentional producers of values. The latter, as I shall suggest in my conclusion, should be viewed as being ‘socially dependent’ rather than ‘socially constructed’.

Logic, Paralogisms and Social Distinction

Theoria ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 65 (155) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Michel Lallement
Keyword(s):  
Sociological Theory ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Social Classes ◽  
Theoretical Interest ◽  
Social Distinction ◽  
Relevant Today ◽  
The Social ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Value Judgements

In La Barrière et le Niveau (1925), the French philosopher Edmond Goblot applied a logic of quality to the social world. The major thesis which Goblot defended at that time was: having no titles or property, the bourgeois class constructed itself superficially through value judgements, building upon commonly shared appreciations, however intrinsically contradictory they may be. If we accept this logical reading found in La Barrière et le Niveau, then two different types of paralogism, useful for sociological theory, merit consideration: paralogisms of criteria and paralogisms of judgement. When interpreted in this way, Goblot’s work presents a threefold theoretical interest: it associates logic and sociology in an original way; it illustrates the heuristic relevance of a social ontology approach, and it provides a grid of sociocultural analysis of the social classes which is still relevant today.

Instrumentalizing and Naturalizing Social Ontology: Replies to Lohse and Little

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-39
Author(s):  
Richard Lauer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social World ◽  
Scientific Methodology ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Social Science Methodology ◽  
Made In

This article addresses Simon Lohse’s and Daniel Little’s responses to my article “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?.” In that article, I present a pragmatic and deflationary view of the priority of social ontology to social science methodology where social ontology is valued for its ability to promote empirical success and not because it yields knowledge of what furnishes the social world. First, in response to Lohse, I argue that my view is compatible with a role for ontological theorizing in the social sciences. However, the view that results instrumentalizes social ontology. Second, in my response to Little, I argue that the same considerations I made in my article apply to naturalistic attempts to motivate a non-deflationary view, repeating some of the central issues of that article.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document