scholarly journals Shared action: An existential phenomenological account

Author(s):  
Nicolai Knudsen

Abstract Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on (a) the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and (b) their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account for not only individual action (in which both (a) and (b) refer only to an individual) but also several distinct subtypes of shared action. My thesis is that behaviour counts as shared action if and only if it is caused by a solicitation in which either (a) the goals, or (b) the commitments, or both (a) goals and (b) commitments are joint, i.e., depend on several individuals. We thereby get three distinct subtypes of shared actions: (i) jointly coordinated individually committed action, (ii) individually coordinated jointly committed action, and (iii) jointly coordinated jointly committed action.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 55-62
Author(s):  
Nicholas Overgaard

Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, scientific community currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between accidental group and community through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the epistemic community that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the non-epistemic community that does not have such a collective intentionality. I note that both epistemic and non-epistemic communities might bear mosaics, but that epistemic communities are the intended social agents of scientific change because their main collective intentionality is to know the world and, in effect, to change their mosaics. I conclude my paper by arguing we are not currently in a position to properly define scientific community per se because of the risk of confusing pseudoscientific communities with scientific communities. However, I propose that we can for now rely on the definition of epistemic community as the proper social agent of scientific change.Suggested Modifications[Sciento-2017-0012]: Accept the following taxonomy of group, accidental group, and community:Group ≡ two or more people who share any characteristic.Accidental group ≡ a group that does not have a collective intentionality.Community ≡ a group that has a collective intentionality. [Sciento-2017-0013]: Provided that the preceding modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept that communities can consist of other communities.[Sciento-2017-0014]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2017-0012] is accepted, accept the following definitions of epistemic community and non-epistemic community as subtypes of community:Epistemic community ≡ a community that has a collective intentionality to know the world.Non-epistemic community ≡ a community that does not have a collective intentionality to know the world.[Sciento-2017-0015]: Provideed that modification [Sciento-2017-0013] and [Sciento-2017-0014] are accepted, accept that a non-epistemic community can consist of epistemic communities.


Author(s):  
Josef Parnas ◽  
Annick Urfer-Parnas

We present a phenomenological account of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) in schizophrenia. We examine the mode of articulation of AVH, their spatial and temporal characteristics, and their relation to self-alienation, reflecting an emergence of otherness (alterity) in the midst of the patient’s self. This process of self-alienation is associated with the emergence of a different reality, a new ontological framework, which obeys other rules of causality and time. Patient becomes psychotic not because they cannot distinguish AVH from mundane perception, but because they are in touch with an alternative form of reality. A characteristic feature of schizophrenia is the coexistence of these incompatible realities. AVH are radically different from perception, and associated delusions stem from a breakthrough to another ontological framework. Thus, the current definition of AVH seems incorrect: The symptom is ontologically complex, involving first- and second-person dimensions, relations to the structure of consciousness, and other psychopathological phenomena.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Griffiths

AbstractThis paper focuses on the assertion of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (1989: 20) that "ethics follow from how we experience the world." I discuss what the statement might mean when applied to Naessian Deep Ecology. There follows a discussion of the close cohesion between experience and practice in Naessian thought. I attend to Naess's descriptions of the relationship between mystical nature experience and "ecological enlightenment," in which he suggests that an intense union with nature will lead the experiencing individual to enact Deep Ecological thought, as Naess formulates it. I seek to amplify the definition of mystical nature experience with reference to William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, and particularly to James's assertions about the effects of religious experience on individual action. Naess (1986: 225-239) has cited James's work as a significant influence on his understanding of the terms "self" and "experience." Is Naess advocating a need to reeducate people to experience nature, in the hope that environmental awareness will increase accordingly? What experience of nature would inspire an environmental ethic? I conclude by arguing that Naess's reformative agenda stands in a complex relationship to the emphasis on individual, mystical nature experience as the catalyst to "ecological enlightenment." This complexity has not been satisfactorily resolved within Naessian Deep Ecology.


Diacronia ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaas Willems

In my book Eigenname und Bedeutung (1996), I started from the observation that modern theories of proper names fail to do justice to the specific and complex semantic nature of proper names. Since the 1960’s and 1970’s, theorizing about proper names has been dominated largely by scholars working in the traditions of analytic philosophy and logic, in particular John R. Searle and Saul Kripke. I argued, however, that the highly specific kind of meaning typical of proper names should be studied within a theory more in touch with general linguistics proper. The main philosophical (especially referential) and logical (especially formal) accounts start from the assumption that a proper name is “backed up” by encyclopaedic information held by speakers of the referents (Searle), or that a proper name is a meaningless, yet rigidly designating sign (Kripke). In contrast to these views, I argue that a general linguistic definition of the proper name has to focus not only on logical and philosophical issues, but also on the specifically linguistic semantic function of the proper name as a “part of speech” in actual utterances. This approach has nothing to do with pragmatics or discourse analysis, but aims at describing proper names and appellative nouns as categories of speech in language use, bringing into play a functional focus on proper names that has largely been lacking in definitions of the proper name so far. An outline of a semantic theory of proper names is then proposed based on some aspects of a “phenomenology of language and linguistics” as found in the work of Edmund Husserl and Eugenio Coseriu. Roughly speaking, Husserl represents the general epistemological implications of the paper and Coseriu its specifically linguistic aspects.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
BERNARD CHAVANCE

Abstract:The paper discusses John R. Commons's original theory of institutions, where the latter are defined as going concerns and their working rules, or collective action restraining and expanding individual action. Such organizational approach of institutions makes important contributions to institutional economics in general, through its notion of a hierarchy of collective action, its threefold typology of transactions, and its holindividualist stance. Commons's genuine advances are counterbalanced by theoretical limits, which illustrate the unfinished character of his attempt to make a contribution to a ‘rounded-out theory of Political economy’, e.g. the ambiguous place of markets in his theory, the state understood as a model for other going concerns and, distinctly, the restricted definition of institutions as organizations. In some important respects, his theory complements or goes further than other currents of institutional economics; its weak points are sometimes the reverse side of his very contributions.


1966 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
W. W. Morgan

1. The definition of “normal” stars in spectral classification changes with time; at the time of the publication of theYerkes Spectral Atlasthe term “normal” was applied to stars whose spectra could be fitted smoothly into a two-dimensional array. Thus, at that time, weak-lined spectra (RR Lyrae and HD 140283) would have been considered peculiar. At the present time we would tend to classify such spectra as “normal”—in a more complicated classification scheme which would have a parameter varying with metallic-line intensity within a specific spectral subdivision.


1975 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 21-26

An ideal definition of a reference coordinate system should meet the following general requirements:1. It should be as conceptually simple as possible, so its philosophy is well understood by the users.2. It should imply as few physical assumptions as possible. Wherever they are necessary, such assumptions should be of a very general character and, in particular, they should not be dependent upon astronomical and geophysical detailed theories.3. It should suggest a materialization that is dynamically stable and is accessible to observations with the required accuracy.


1979 ◽  
Vol 46 ◽  
pp. 125-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Allen

No paper of this nature should begin without a definition of symbiotic stars. It was Paul Merrill who, borrowing on his botanical background, coined the termsymbioticto describe apparently single stellar systems which combine the TiO absorption of M giants (temperature regime ≲ 3500 K) with He II emission (temperature regime ≳ 100,000 K). He and Milton Humason had in 1932 first drawn attention to three such stars: AX Per, CI Cyg and RW Hya. At the conclusion of the Mount Wilson Ha emission survey nearly a dozen had been identified, and Z And had become their type star. The numbers slowly grew, as much because the definition widened to include lower-excitation specimens as because new examples of the original type were found. In 1970 Wackerling listed 30; this was the last compendium of symbiotic stars published.


Author(s):  
K. T. Tokuyasu

During the past investigations of immunoferritin localization of intracellular antigens in ultrathin frozen sections, we found that the degree of negative staining required to delineate u1trastructural details was often too dense for the recognition of ferritin particles. The quality of positive staining of ultrathin frozen sections, on the other hand, has generally been far inferior to that attainable in conventional plastic embedded sections, particularly in the definition of membranes. As we discussed before, a main cause of this difficulty seemed to be the vulnerability of frozen sections to the damaging effects of air-water surface tension at the time of drying of the sections.Indeed, we found that the quality of positive staining is greatly improved when positively stained frozen sections are protected against the effects of surface tension by embedding them in thin layers of mechanically stable materials at the time of drying (unpublished).


Author(s):  
W. A. Shannon ◽  
M. A. Matlib

Numerous studies have dealt with the cytochemical localization of cytochrome oxidase via cytochrome c. More recent studies have dealt with indicating initial foci of this reaction by altering incubation pH (1) or postosmication procedure (2,3). The following study is an attempt to locate such foci by altering membrane permeability. It is thought that such alterations within the limits of maintaining morphological integrity of the membranes will ease the entry of exogenous substrates resulting in a much quicker oxidation and subsequently a more precise definition of the oxidative reaction.The diaminobenzidine (DAB) method of Seligman et al. (4) was used. Minced pieces of rat liver were incubated for 1 hr following toluene treatment (5,6). Experimental variations consisted of incubating fixed or unfixed tissues treated with toluene and unfixed tissues treated with toluene and subsequently fixed.


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