Value co-creation in the B2B context: a diagnosis of knowledge management based on multiple case studies

Purpose This study aims to empirically investigate how organizations delivering services in business-to-business relations deal with the boundary paradox and knowledge asymmetry in value co-creation. Design/methodology/approach This study adopted a qualitative multiple case study strategy. Datas were gathered through 13 semi-structured interviews that were then analyzed through the content analysis. Findings The authors identified three mechanisms that organizations use to deal with the boundary paradox and two strategies to handle the knowledge asymmetry. Research limitations/implications First, no opportunities were afforded to involve more participants. Second, owning to confidentiality reasons, not all organizations provided us documents to be analyzed. Practical implications The findings guide managers in balancing the use of contracts and trust in inter-firm collaborations and fostering the learning of customers. Also, insights to protect knowledge based on the paradox of openness in value co-creation. Originality/value This study’s findings address the gap in value co-creation literature concerning the lack of empirical studies.

Efficient multi-period distribution mechanism for the innovation investment system under uncertainty

In this paper, we study the problem of a venture investor who distributes the budget between several innovation projects under conditions of uncertainty. A common method for solving this problem is through bilateral negotiations with the external evaluation of projects. However, the effectiveness almost entirely depends on the evaluation quality, but external evaluation seldom reduces the knowledge asymmetry for innovation projects. We propose an iterative revelation mechanism for this problem when the investor sequentially offers possible allocations of the limited budget in the form of threshold dividing questions. The binary choices of innovators serve as a signal of internal estimates of the project implementation costs. Under perfect information, such a mechanism, regardless of the method for determining budget allocations, always produces an effective allocation in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Under uncertainty, the method of offering distribution options matters – the optimal solution is found under the English auction class of mechanisms. In an efficient iterative allocation mechanism for innovation investment, the investor proposes a new allocation of the budget each round until an efficient allocation is achieved. The proposed mechanism does not necessarily need to identify the exact minimum budgets for each innovator. Another advantage of the proposed mechanism is the ability to use different processes for organizing rounds.

The manifestation of coordination failures in service triads

Purpose This paper aims to investigate governance in service triads, specifically studying significant steering and connecting coordination failures, to reveal typically hidden characteristics and consequences. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on coordination functions and activities between a buyer (a government department), a customer (a military service) and two service providers. Rich data on these normally confidential service ties are drawn from an official report into the causes of a fatal accident involving a UK reconnaissance aircraft and specifically from the evidence presented regarding the earlier development of its complex safety case. The authors also analysed a range of additional secondary data sources. Findings The authors examine the sources, drivers and manifestation of coordination failures. The authors uncover a series of coordination failures driven from the bridge position, revealing that while bounded rationality and opportunism influenced steering coordination failures, connecting coordination failures were associated with knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia and unethical practices. Practical implications Organisations and governments delivering complex projects and knowledge-intensive professional services should guard against outsourcing the “coordination” activity to a third party, thereby relinquishing the bridge position. Handing over the bridge position to an integrator would leave the client vulnerable to coordination dysfunctions such as bounded rationality, opportunism, knowledge asymmetry, dyadic inertia and unethical practices. Originality/value The study links the previously separate research streams of service triads and inter-organizational coordination. While extant research pays attention to mainly positive control functions, this study focuses on all three actors in two (failed) service triads – and highlights the impact of coordination activities and failures.

Developing collaboration between research-oriented and practice-oriented experts in public administration: How does expert participation make a difference in public policy making and governance practice?

The contradiction between experts’ research (or theory) and practitioners’ practice has plagued public administration for over a century. However, this study emphasizes that experts themselves are not exactly the same. To address the contradiction between research and practice and to improve the role of experts, we need not only to improve the collaboration between experts and practitioners but also to strengthen the collaboration between research-oriented and practice-oriented experts. Using desertification control experiences in 12 counties in northern China as policy examples and through case studies and analysis of a survey of more than 4000 individuals, the study finds that the collaboration with high participation of both research-oriented and practice-oriented experts had the highest governance performance, due to reducing information and knowledge asymmetry, enhancing trust, and strengthening expert participation in public governance. The study also reveals that there are eight institutional design principles that are important for the success of experts’ participation. These principles emphasized knowledge and experts themselves, experts’ relationship with other social actors, and external support (support from laws and regulations and financial support). The study is enlightening to policy makers and public administrators in their endeavor to integrate research (theory) and practice, design public policy, and maximize the use of their knowledge and expertise to advance the cause of public administration.

Self–Other Knowledge Asymmetry (SOKA) Model

Despite the strong intuition that people know themselves well, much research in self-perception demonstrates the biases present when evaluating one’s own personality traits. What specifically are these blind spots in self-perceptions? Are self-perceptions always disconnected from reality? And under what circumstances might other people actually be more accurate about the self? The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model suggests that because individuals and others differ in their susceptibility to biases or motivations and in the information they have access to, self- and other-knowledge will vary by trait. The present chapter outlines when and why other-perceptions are sometimes more accurate than self-perceptions, as well as when self-reports can be most trusted. Also discussed are next steps in the study of self- and other-knowledge, including practical, methodological, and interdisciplinary considerations and extensions. In sum, this chapter illustrates the importance of taking multiple perspectives in order to accurately understand a person.

Information disclosure in a local socio-economic system with tacit knowledge and information asymmetry

We study the effects of institutional information disclosure on the market equilibrium in a local market with knowledge asymmetry and scarce information. The purpose of our work is the analysis of long-term efficiency of a dedicated institutional mechanism of information disclosure for such a market. The paper presents the game-theoretic model of a local property rights market with an infrastructural institution disclosing non-personalized information in a system with a combination of market elements, administrative and shadow economy. For each object, there is some hidden non-transferrable information essential for assessment. Under such conditions, the influence of subjective biases on the market equilibrium can be described as a Bayesian probability model of adverse selection. In the elaborated model, the equilibrium parameters are theoretically analyzed. It is shown that information asymmetry in the modeled systems leads to an irrational allocation of investment resources. It is shown that the infrastructural institutions disclosing non-personalized information are not only unable to efficiently counteract adverse selection, but facilitate it.