PENERAPAN MODEL ANTREAN MULTI CHANNEL SINGLE PHASE PADA SISTEM PELAYANAN RESTORAN CEPAT SAJI

A queue will occur if the average number of arrivals exceeds the capacity of service facilities. Fast food restaurants are one of the places that usually have long queues at lunchtime and dinner time. KFC in Bali, located in the village of Sanur, is a fast food restaurant that is experiencing long queues. This is because this restaurant is located in a tourism area and the only KFC outlet on the Ngurah Rai Sanur bypass line and does not yet have a drive-thru service. The current condition at KFC Sanur is that there is more than one service facility, disciplined first come first service (FCFS) queues according to the multi channel single phase queuing model. After being analyzed with data taken before the pandemic period on November 18, 2019 to December 1, 2019 for 14 days during weekdays and weekends, it was found that the performance of the KFC Sanur queue system would have a smaller utility level if there were 3 active server. The total cost per customer if there are 2 active server is IDR 78,692.38 and if there are 3 server is IDR 75,788.45. Based on the results of this analysis, it can be concluded that it will be more optimal if there are 3 active server.

Consumer expenditure when positional concerns matter

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study which factors affect consumer expenditure and how, when positional concerns matter. It also investigates how consumers finance and reallocate their expenditure, and modify their consumer baskets when members of their reference groups spend more on positional goods, and they do not want to lag behind.Design/methodology/approachA literature review is presented, and then a new model is developed from a behavioural economic perspective. It describes how consumers with various risk attitudes reallocate their consumer expenditure and modify their consumer baskets when consumption externalities influence their relative consumption due to a positional game, but they want to “keep up with the Joneses”.FindingsConsumers with different risk attitudes finance and reallocate their consumption expenditures variously to sustain their relative positions. Risk-neutral, slightly and intermediately risk-seeking consumers achieve a lower utility level than others. They do not realise a utility-maximising consumer basket, as it includes a relatively low number of nonpositional goods, but this choice can be considered the best response in a positional game in order to sustain their relative position.Originality/valueThe relationship between positional and nonpositional goods is explicitly described. The model assumes that consumers can be classified based on their risk attitudes when positional concerns matter. It also describes how consumers with various risk attitudes reallocate their consumer expenditure when they want to sustain or improve their relative consumption in a positional game.

Growth and long-run sustainability

From any state of economic and environmental assets, the maximin value defines the highest level of utility that can be sustained forever. Along any development path, the maximin value evolves over time according to investment decisions. If the current level of utility is lower than this value, there is room for growth of both the utility level and the maximin value. For any resource allocation mechanism (ram) and economic dynamics, growth is limited by the long-run level of the maximin value, which is an endogenous dynamic sustainability constraint. If utility reaches this limit, sustainability imposes growth to stop, and the adoption of maximin decisions instead of the current ram. We illustrate this pattern in two canonical models, the simple fishery and a two-sector economy with a nonrenewable resource. We discuss what our results imply for the assessment of sustainability in the short and the long run in non-optimal economies.

A model of weighted network formation

This paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either “reciprocal” or “nonreciprocal.” In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link between them. In a nonreciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into “concentrated” and “diversified” agents, and a concentrated agent is only linked to diversified agents and vice versa. For every link, the concentrated agent invests more in the link than the diversified agent. The unweighted relationship graph of an equilibrium, in which two agents are linked if they both invest positively in each other, uniquely predicts the equilibrium values of each agent's network investment and utility level, as well as the ratio of any two agents' investments in each other. We show that equilibria are not pairwise stable and are not efficient due to the positive externalities of investing in a link.

ANALISIS ANTRIAN PELAYANAN NASABAH PADA PT BANK SYARIAH MANDIRI CABANG BUNGKU

This study aims to analiyzethe system of optimal service queue at the teller that existed in PT BankSyariah Mandiri Bungku Branch. The analytical method used is M/M/1 or single channel singlephase, but to compare the optimal or not the queue of customer service at PT Bank Syariah Mandiribranch when adding one teller in solid time so the used M/M/S analysis method or multi channelsingle phase. The result of analysis by using one teller in cash deposit of solid time is probability insystem is equal to 0,0572. The teller utility level is 0,94 or 94 % the average number of customers inthe system is 17 people, while using two tellers can be seen the probability in the system is 0,350 or noone in the system. Teller utility rate is reduced to 0,48 or 48% of the average number of customers inthe system is 1 person, it indicates that the customer queuing in the system is optimal. Based on thedata is can be concluded that the addition of one teller at a solid time can optimize the existingservices in PT Bnk Syariah Mandiri Bungku branc. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis sistem antrian pelayanan yang optimal pada bagianteller yang ada pada PT Bank Syariah Mandiri Cabang Bungku. Metode analisis yang digunakanadalah M/M/1 atau Single Channel Single Phase, tetapi untuk membandingkan optimal atau tidaknyaantrian pelayanan nasabah pada PT Bank Syariah Mandiri Cabang Bungku apabila menambahkansatu teller pada waktu padat sehingga digunakan metode analisis M/M/S atau Multi Channel SinglePhase. Hasil analisis dengan menggunakan satu teller pada penyetoran tunai waktu padat adalahprobabilitas dalam sistem adalah sebesar 0,0572. Tingkat utilitas teller adalah 0,94 atau 94 %, jumlahnasabah rata-rata dalam sistem adalah 17 orang, sedangkan dengan menggunakan dua teller dapatdilihat probabilitas dalam sistem adalah 0,350 atau tidak ada orang dalam sistem. Tingkat utilitas tellerberkurang menjadi 0,48 atau 48 %, jumlah rata-rata nasabah dalam sistem adalah 1 orang, inimenunjukkan bahwa nasabah yang mengantri dalam sistem sudah optimal. Berdasarkan data tersebutdapat disimpulkan bahwa penambahan satu teller pada waktu padat dapat mengoptimalkan pelayananyang ada pada PT Bank Syariah Mandiri Cabang Bungku.

Statistical characteristics of the mean level of an elite group utility in selection

Introduction:The development of biological and social systems is largely determined by the utility level of the elite group which stands out from the main population, being characterized by a high status. An elite group development process is random due to unavoidable errors in selection. The degree of influence of these errors on the utility level of an elite group can differ depending on the selection rules.Purpose:Evaluation of the influence of selection rules on the dynamics of the mean level of an elite group utility.Results:We have studied the dynamically changing probabilistic characteristics of an average elite group utility level, following two different selection scenarios: with a fixed threshold, and with a threshold determined by the mean level of the group utility achieved by the moment of the selection. It has been found out that in the first scenario the mean level of the elite group utility tends to a level whose value, even when the selection error probability is high, is greater than the mean utility level for the whole population. However, if it is unacceptable to reduce the mean level of the elite utility below the selection threshold, the error probability should be less than or equal to the square of the probability that a population member is selected for the elite group. It is proved that in the second scenario the mean level of the elite group utility tends to the mean value of this parameter for the whole population, regardless of the selection error probability. The latter affects only the duration of the transition process during which the elite «dissolves» in the population and its representatives cease to differ on average from the other members of the population in terms of their utility. The concept of critical probability of selection errors is introduced, at which the mean level of the elite group utility is equal to the lowest permissible boundary.Practical relevance:It is proved that correct elite development requires a selection scenario with a fixed high threshold. The calculated value of the critical probability of selection errors can be used to control the development of an elite group.