Moral wrongs, indigeneity and the enactment of farmer-herder conflicts violence in South-Eastern Nigeria

Existing studies of the farmer-herder conflicts (FHCs) in Nigeria have not explored the political ecology of the conflict in South-Eastern Nigeria (SEN). Using the political ecology framework (PEF), the paper examines the nature of the FHCs in Nimbo and Awgu areas in SEN. Data were collected through field observations and in-depth interviews. The paper shows that resource scarcity or reduced farming and grazing spaces did not engender violent FHCs in the study area. Instead, actions of the actors that are perceived to be morally wrong are critical. Allegations of moral transgression such as rape, kidnapping by herders and claims that a herder was used as a sacrifice by villagers triggered the violent episode. The pastoralists are discriminated against on the ground of indigenous belonging only after being alleged to have morally transgressed by kidnapping and raping women. However, on the ground that a herder was allegedly used as a sacrifice, they felt also wronged. While the herders are discriminated against based on their non-belonging in the community because they are not indigenous, they have mount resistance by emphasising their citizenship rights and using force to maintain access to grazing spaces, thereby amplifying the farmer-herder tensions. Thus, while identity has contributed to the FHCs violence, moral wrongs enacted and amplified it. The paper contributes to the literature by arguing that while what triggers FHCs may be moral wrongs, moral transgressions can heighten identity constructions that get implicated in practices of exclusion.

Evidence for a dual-process account of over-imitation: Children imitate anti- and prosocial models equally, but prefer prosocial models once they become aware of multiple solutions to a task

Children imitate actions that are perceivably unnecessary to achieve the instrumental goal of an action sequence, a behavior termed over-imitation. It is debated whether this behavior is based on the motivation to follow behavioral norms and affiliate with the model or whether it can be interpreted in terms of a behavioral heuristic to copy observed intentional actions without questioning the purpose of each action step. To resolve this question, we tested whether preschool-aged children (N = 89) over-imitate a prosocial model, a helper in a prior third-party moral transgression, but refuse to over-imitate an antisocial model, the perpetrator of the moral transgression. After first observing an inefficient way to extract a reward from a puzzle box from either a perpetrator or a helper, children over-imitated the perpetrator to the same degree as they over-imitated the helper. In a second phase, children were then presented the efficient solution by the respective other model, i.e. the helper or the perpetrator. Over-imitation rates then dropped in both conditions, but remained significantly higher than in a baseline condition only when children had observed the prosocial model demonstrate the inefficient action sequence and the perpetrator performed the efficient solution. In contrast, over-imitation dropped to baseline level when the perpetrator had modelled the inefficient actions and the prosocial model subsequently showed children the efficient solution. In line with a dual-process account of over-imitation, results speak to a strong initial tendency to imitate perceivably irrelevant actions regardless of the model. Imitation behavior is then adjusted according to social motivations after deliberate consideration of different options to attain the goal.

Do Social Relationships With Those Who Witness Moral Transgression Affect the Sense of Guilt?

Moral emotion is thought to have evolved to guide our behavior and control our impulse to achieve immediate rewards, thus serving to enforce pro-social behavior. Guilt, one of the moral emotions, is a social, other-oriented emotion that is experienced primarily in interpersonal situations, although it may also be experienced in non-interpersonal situations. We predicted that the intensity of the sense of guilt would differ depending on the relationship between a witness and the person who performed the antisocial behavior because building a good reputation plays an important role in the evolution of reciprocal altruism through indirect reciprocity. Participants were asked to imagine that they had been observed by a third party while committing five kinds of moral transgression based on moral foundation theory, and to describe the intensity of their sense of guilt when witnessed by parents, a cordial friend, a neighbor, or a stranger. The intensity of guilt was significantly lower when the act was witnessed by a stranger regardless of the moral foundation involved. The effects of the kind of witness, however, differed for each moral foundation. The results support the hypothesis that guilt functions to guide our behavior, to achieve cooperation.

How personality shapes third-party moral judgment

Although recent research in the moral judgment field has explored third-party judgment, much less is known as to how personality influences these judgments. The present preregistered study addresses this issue by exploring the influence of various personality traits, namely honesty-humility, emotionality, and conscientiousness. Adult participants recruited online (N = 405) read short narratives describing the interaction between two protagonists (“agent” and “victim”). We manipulated the intent of the agent (intent to harm or not) and the outcome for the victim (harmful consequences or no harm). Participants indicated the extent to which they perceived the agent’s behavior as acceptable and blameworthy, and how much punishment they felt the agent deserved, before filling the HEXACO questionnaire. Our results point to a moderate role of honesty-humility, emotionality, and conscientiousness on acceptability of the agent’s behavior, with their relative weight depending upon the type of moral transgression. While higher honesty-humility scores were associated with lower acceptability of moral transgressions overall, higher emotionality was associated with reduced acceptability when the agent attempted to harm, and higher conscientiousness was associated with lower acceptability ratings only when the agent harmed intentionally. We also found a moderate effect of extraversion and emotionality on decisions of punishment and blame of an agent who harmed or attempted to harm. The results suggest that third-party moral judgment is modestly, yet selectively modulated by personality traits and the type of moral transgression.

EXCESSIVE DRINKING AS A MORAL TRANSGRESSION IN THE WORK OF F. M. DOSTOEVSKY

The article studies the topic of excessive drinking in the works of F. M. Dostoevsky in the light of the tradition of the ancient feast, or symposium. The wine offered at a symposium did not merely incline people to philosophical conversations and discussions about eternal questions, but also revealed the inner human essence, thoughts and intentions. There is ancient understanding of wine as a means of forgetting sorrows and attaining temporary joys. Excessive drinking is associated with the ancient Dionysian idea — excessive drinking at the festival of Dionysus, and the concept of metamorphosis — people lose their human essence and begin to resemble animals. In the fates of the heroes of Dostoevsky’s Poor Folk, Humiliated and Insulted, Notes from Underground, Crime and Punishment, Demons, The Brothers Karamazov, the ancient tradition is combined with the Christian understanding of a feast as reveling, and amusements at a feast, and excessive drinking as a moral transgression. On the pages of Dostoevsky’s magazine Citizen excessive drinking is equated to a serious illness, a flood, a fire, an enemy invasion, that is, to a catastrophe that affects the Russian people. The ancient tradition allows to reveal additional meanings in Dostoevsky’s interpretation of the topic of excessive drinking.