Best Graph Type to Compare Discrete Groups: Bar, Dot, and Tally

Different graph types might differ in group comparison due to differences in underlying graph schemas. Thus, this study examined whether graph schemas are based on perceptual features (i.e., each graph has a specific schema) or common invariant structures (i.e., graphs share several common schemas), and which graphic type (bar vs. dot vs. tally) is the best to compare discrete groups. Three experiments were conducted using the mixing-costs paradigm. Participants received graphs with quantities for three groups in randomized positions and were given the task of comparing two groups. The results suggested that graph schemas are based on a common invariant structure. Tally charts mixed either with bar graphs or with dot graphs showed mixing costs. Yet, bar and dot graphs showed no mixing costs when paired together. Tally charts were the more efficient format for group comparison compared to bar graphs. Moreover, processing time increased when the position difference of compared groups was increased.

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

The Contemplative Mind and Life: First-Person Methods and the Challenge of Pure Consciousness and Phenomenal Selfhood for the “Neurophenomenological” Research Program

<p>A new paradigm in cognitive science has emerged called the “enactive approach”, which has given rise to a research program known as “neurophenomenology”. This research program attempts to calibrate third- and first-person methods to investigate consciousness. In his recent and representative work Mind in Life, Evan Thompson has put forward the thesis that there is a “deep continuity between life and mind”. While I remain sympathetic to the neurophenomenological approach as an exemplar par excellence of how the science of consciousness ought to proceed, I argue against this continuity thesis from three perspectives: (1) the nature and potential of first-person approaches to consciousness; (2) the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) the egological or non-egological nature of consciousness and selfhood. My argument begins by laying out the foundations of enactive cognitive science, the continental analysis of time-consciousness and Thompson‟s attempt to close the empirical gap between life and mind with the help of the neurophenomenological bridging strategy (dynamic systems theory). Next, I discuss the phenomenology of different types of (structured) experiences and the fact that continental and contemplative methods share a common logic. I then argue that first-person methods (i) offer prima facie evidence that there are perceptual and non-perceptual types of experience, and (ii) grant us “cognitive access” to both types of experience. Following this, I consider at least one non-perceptual type of experience (pure consciousness) that breaks down the dynamic and relational structure of time-consciousness. I argue that pure consciousness is phenomenally lived-through but without egocentricity (subject-pole). Furthermore, a sophisticated distinction between (i) a minimal, core sense of (ego-) self and (ii) a non-egological but phenomenally lived-through subjectivity, is capable of shedding light on long-lasting debates surrounding the existence and non-existence of self (ātman). This especially holds true with regards to Buddhist philosophy and objectors to the doctrine of not-self (anatta/anātman). Finally, the nature of pure consciousness will lead me to challenge Thompson‟s continuity thesis, on the grounds that phenomenological evidence shows that the contemplative mind (pure consciousness) is decidedly not dynamic and intentional in structure. Thus there is a conceptual discontinuity between the biological domain and the phenomenological domain, being a decisive conceptual disanalogy between the contemplative mind (consciousness proper) and life. I thus conclude that prima facie: (1) first-person methods give us cognitive access to the objective and subjective domain of consciousness; (2) continental phenomenology is mistaken about the most fundamental invariant structure of consciousness; (3) consciousness qua awareness per se is non-egological. Having completed my argument against the continuity thesis, I will briefly recommend specific avenues for future neurophenomenological research to (a) adjudicate between continental and contemplative phenomenological views of consciousness; (b) judge whether or not Thompson‟s continuity thesis can be upheld; and (c) introduce new ways of studying (phenomenal) selfhood. In this way, I hope not only to argue against Thompon‟s continuity thesis, but to also point towards the potential of the neurophenomenological research program to advance our understanding of consciousness and phenomenal selfhood.</p>

Number of autonomous agents in a neural network

This paper considers several aspects of the relationship between size, structure, speed of propagation and the number of autonomous cognitive agents in a neural network. Whereas, memory and function generation capacities of neural networks with scale invariant structure have been investigated extensively, the number of autonomous agents has not received prior attention. We propose the emergence of the dichotomy of causal and noncausal regions that is related to speed of propagation, in which the autonomous cognitive agents are not bound in a causal relationship with other agents. Arguments are presented for why the count of autonomous agents is best estimated with respect to the dimensionality of the underlying space. The number of autonomous agents obtained for the human brain equals twenty-five, and it is significant that the number in the sub-system modules also turns out to be close to the same value. It is possible that this near equality across layers provides a special uniqueness to the human brain. We argue that the findings of this study will be useful in the design of neural-network based AI systems that are designed to emulate human cognitive capacity. <br><br><br><br>

Number of autonomous agents in a neural network

This paper considers several aspects of the relationship between size, structure, speed of propagation and the number of autonomous cognitive agents in a neural network. Whereas, memory and function generation capacities of neural networks with scale invariant structure have been investigated extensively, the number of autonomous agents has not received prior attention. We propose the emergence of the dichotomy of causal and noncausal regions that is related to speed of propagation, in which the autonomous cognitive agents are not bound in a causal relationship with other agents. Arguments are presented for why the count of autonomous agents is best estimated with respect to the dimensionality of the underlying space. The number of autonomous agents obtained for the human brain equals twenty-five, and it is significant that the number in the sub-system modules also turns out to be close to the same value. It is possible that this near equality across layers provides a special uniqueness to the human brain. We argue that the findings of this study will be useful in the design of neural-network based AI systems that are designed to emulate human cognitive capacity. <br><br><br><br>

A Framework for Authentic Ethical Decision Making in the Face of Grand Challenges: A Lonerganian Gradation

This paper contributes to the contemporary business ethics narrative by proposing an approach to corporate ethical decision making (EDM) which serves as an alternative to the imposition of codes and standards to address the ethical consequences of grand challenges, like COVID-19, which are impacting today’s society. Our alternative approach to EDM embraces the concept of reflexive thinking and ethical consciousness among the individual agents who collectively are the corporation and who make ethical decisions, often in isolation, removed from the collocated corporate setting. We draw on the teachings of the Canadian philosopher and theologian, Fr. Bernard Lonergan, to conceptualize an approach to EDM which focuses on the ethics of the corporate agent by nurturing the universal and invariant structure that is operational in all human beings. Embracing Lonergan’s dynamic cognitive structure of human knowing, and the structure of the human good, we advance a paradigm of EDM in business which emboldens authentic ethical thought, decision making, and action commensurate with virtuous living and germane to human flourishing. Lonergan’s philosophy guides us away from the imposition of over-arching corporate codes of ethics and inspires us, as individual agents, to attend to the data of our own consciousness in our ethical decision making. Such cognitional endowment leads us out of the ethics of the ‘timeless present’ (Islam and Greenwood in Journal of Business Ethics 170: 1–4, 2021) towards ethical authenticity in business, leaving us better placed to reflect upon and address the ethical issues emanating from grand challenges like COVID-19.

State Management of National Resources at the Conceptual Level - Images and Meanings of State Symbols

This article is a further continuation of the work on the review of the basics of state management of national resources (state and use), in relation to its system - forming function-state policy and political symbols (the conceptual level of management). From the system positions of the general theory of classification and systematization, the functions of state management of national resources are considered and the role and place of each of them in a single universal management circuit is determined. The role and place of political symbols (a sub-function of the conceptual-strategic level) are considered on the basis of the proposed invariant structure of the typical contour of state management of the state of national resources (operational-tactical level). From the modern state symbols of the Russian Federation, the iconic image two - headed eagle is selected and its prototypes and the origins of their origin, which are located in ancient times, are considered. To consider the evolution of the iconic images of state symbols of modern Russia, it is proposed to systematize and analyze them at different historical stages, to this end, systematize and analyze the following Old Testament images of power (state symbols) of various countries of the world: non-predatory bird, bird of prey, griffin, two-headed eagle, systematize and analyze the sacred images of power double-headed eagle and griffin in the symbolism of the countries of the world with the identification of their sacred meanings-binary (binary). Conclusions are drawn about the common origins of the origin and distribution of these Old Testament images of state symbols in the countries of the Indo-European community, the systematization and analysis of the Old Testament images of power (state symbols) of various countries of the world: non-predatory bird, bird of prey, griffon, double - headed eagle allows us to trace the evolution of the origin and formation of the main state symbol of Russia double-headed eagle, at the heart of the Old Testament images of power griffin and double-headed eagle in the symbolism of the countries of the world lie the sacred meanings of the universal and fundamental principle of reality (world, reality, being) - the duality (duality) of opposite, proportionate and balanced entities.

SIS-BAM Algorithm for Angular Parameter Estimation of 2-D Incoherently Distributed Sources

For two-dimensional (2-D) incoherently distributed sources, this paper presents an effective angular parameter estimation method based on shift invariant structure (SIS) of the beamspace array manifold (BAM), named as SIS-BAM algorithm. In the proposed method, a shift invariance structure (SIS) of the observed vectors is firstly established utilizing a generalized array manifold of an uniform linear orthogonal array (ULOA). Secondly, based on Fourier basis vectors and the SIS, a beamspace transformation matrix can be performed. It projects received signals into the corresponding beamspace, so as to carry out dimension reduction of observed signals in beamspace domain. Finally, according to the SIS of beamspace observed vectors, the closed form solutions of the nominal azimuth and elevation are derived. Compared with the previous works, the presented SIS-BAM method provides better estimation performance, for example: 1) the computational complexity is reduced due to dealing with low-dimension beamspace signals and avoiding spectral search; 2) it can not only improve the angular parameter estimation accuracy but also have excellent robustness to the change of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and snapshot number. The theoretical analysis and simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method.

THE FRACTAL SCALE-INVARIANT STRUCTURE OF A TEMPORAL HIERARCHY IN THE RELAXATION PROCESSES

The phenomena of elastic aftereffects during loading/unloading of viscoelastic and capillary-porous bodies, relaxation of their stresses is accompanied by the energy accumulation and dissipation to be taken into account in the theory of oscillations which also considers the behavior of materials when the force is applied to them, the elastic aftereffect and stress relaxation forms ostensibly opposite energy processes that’s why the main problem to one is to understand and discovery laws for such aftereffects. The goal of the research to show that the distribution of relaxation time in viscoelastic and capillary-porous media may have a scale-invariant structure and that the indirect confirmation of the scale invariance of relaxation time hierarchy can be the principle of temperature-time superposition according to which the experimental relaxation functions obtained for different temperatures can be combined with each other using the appropriate coordinate axes stretching. We used methods of viscoelastic theory, fractal analysis and methods of mathematical physics. So, in this paper, an attempt has been made to harmonize both these theories and numerous experiments on the destruction of materials described in the academic literature. It is shown that the hierarchy of times determining shear and bulk relaxation in viscoelastic/capillary-porous medium has a fractal structure and it was observed that the presence of time fractality eases the modeling of viscoelastic/capillary-porous bodies resulting in the universal relaxation function of a rather simple kind.