Heterogeneous investments induced by emotions promote cooperation in public goods games

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui Long ◽  
Rizhao Gong ◽  
Jiaqian Yao
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Cumulative Effect ◽  
Direct Effects ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Memory Length ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cooperation Level

Abstract Emotion plays an important role in heterogeneous investments and has some direct effects on the cooperation behaviour of a player in a public goods game (PGG). How this irrational factor affects the heterogeneous investments and what level of cooperators in players with emotions are still unknown to us. Here, the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions into a PGG were introduced. The emotional index was firstly quantified by considering a memory-cumulative effect, and then an investment formula was proposed based on this emotional index. At last, the effect of emotions on the cooperation behaviour in a PGG was investigated. Results show that the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions can improve cooperation significantly in a PGG, and that an increase of the memory length, the emotional increment, or the memory discounting factor can improve the cooperation level.

Donating money is not the only way to sustain cooperation in public goods game

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 1750149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tong Chen ◽  
Zheng-Hong Wu ◽  
Le Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Time Model ◽  
Research Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Better Than

Most of the previous studies research cooperation mainly based on donating money in social public goods games. Owing to the lack of income, some people prefer to donate time instead of money to promote the activity, in our daily life. Motivated by this fact, we here investigate the influence of the encouragement of donating time on the evolution of cooperation based on village opera. In our study, we set up two models: one is money-only model (MOM). Donating money is the only choice in MOM. The other is money–time model (MTM). Besides donating money, donating time is an alternative in MTM. Through numerical simulations, we find that compared to MOM, MTM has a faster speed to reach cooperation equilibrium and cost advantage to sustain the same cooperation level, without the effects of income, reputation, satisfaction, emotion and maximum nonmonetary input. However, it should be noted that MTM is better than MOM in a moderate interval of general budget [Formula: see text]. Our results provide stark evidence that the encouragement of donating time can promote and sustain cooperation better than only donating money.

Group preferential selection promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1450062 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Bin Zhang ◽  
Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanism ◽  
Preferential Selection ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Public Goods Games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the co-player learning mechanism based on the preferential selection that are brought about by wealthy information of groups where participants collect and search for potential imitators from those groups. We find that co-player learning mechanism based on the choice of weighted group can lead to the promotion of public cooperation by means of the information of wealthy groups that is obtained by participants, and after that the partial choice of public goods groups is enhanced with the tunable preferential parameter. Our results highlight that the learning interactions is not solely confined to the restricted connection among players, but co-players of wealthy groups have the opportunity to be as a role model in the promotion of cooperative evolution. Moreover, we also find the size of learning affects the choice of distant players, cooperators (defectors) having more paths to exploit the phalanx of opponents to survive when the value of preferential parameter is small. Besides, the extinction thresholds of cooperators and defectors for different values of noise are also investigated.

scholarly journals Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249217
Author(s):  
Jakob Hackel ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Akira Goto ◽  
Alfred Taudes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Asymmetric Effect ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Ample Evidence ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Incentives ◽  
Economic Decision Making ◽  
Real Effort

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players’ real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.

Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel

2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-53
Author(s):  
Esmee Bosma ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Multilevel Regression ◽  
Public Goods Games

Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Salahshour
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Fixed Point ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Enhancement Factors ◽  
Shed Light

AbstractThe evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the evolution of cooperation? To shed light on these questions, here, I consider a population of individuals who possibly play two consecutive rounds of public goods game, with different enhancement factors. Importantly, individuals have independent strategies in the two rounds. However, their strategy in the first round affects the game they play in the second round. I consider two different scenarios where either only first-round cooperators play a second public goods game, or both first-round cooperators and first-round defectors play a second public goods game, but in different groups. The first scenario can be considered a reward dilemma, and the second can be considered an assortative public goods game but with independent strategies of the individuals in the two rounds. Both models show cooperators can survive either in a fixed point or through different periodic orbits. Interestingly, due to the emergence of a correlation between the strategies of the individuals in the two rounds, individuals develop consistent personalities during the evolution. This, in turn, helps cooperation to flourish. These findings shed new light on the evolution of cooperation and show how consistent cooperative and defective personalities can evolve and play a positive role in solving social dilemmas.

Endogenous Authority and Enforcement in Public Goods Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wooyoung Lim ◽  
Jipeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Efficiency Gain ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Efficient Outcome ◽  
The Social

AbstractThis paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the social benefits and cost to have an endogenous punishment-enforcing authority in public goods game. An authority is chosen among members of a society via an imperfectly discriminating contest prior to a public goods game. Once chosen the authority has a large degree of discretion to inflict punishment. Our theoretical result shows that an efficiency gain from having the endogenous authority always comes with a social cost from competing for being the authority. The larger the society is, however, the bigger the efficiency gain and the smaller the rent dissipation. The completely efficient outcome can be approximated as the size of society tends to infinity. The experimental results confirm that the presence of endogenous authority for a given group size increases the public goods contributions and the efficiency gain is significantly bigger in a larger group.

Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Pfattheicher ◽  
Johannes Keller ◽  
Goran Knezevic
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Aggressive Behavior ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Destructive Behavior ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Social ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Reflective Processes

In public goods situations, a specific destructive behavior emerges when individuals face the possibility of punishing others: antisocial punishment, that is, costly punishing cooperative individuals. So far, little is known about the (intuitive or reflective) processes underlying antisocial punishment. Building on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis and arguing that antisocial punishment reflects the basic characteristics of sadism, namely, aggressive behavior to dominate and to harm other individuals it is assumed that everyday sadists intuitively engage in antisocial punishment. Two studies document that activating (Study 1) and inhibiting (Study 2) the intuitive system when a punishment option can be realized in one-shot iterated public goods games increased (Study 1) and reduced (Study 2) antisocial punishment, in particular among individuals who reported a proneness to sadism. In sum, the present research suggests that sadistic tendencies executed intuitively play a crucial role regarding antisocial punishment in public goods situations.

HETEROGENEOUS ASPIRATIONS PROMOTE COOPERATION IN THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250089 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEI SUN ◽  
HAN-XIN YANG ◽  
SHAO-MIN CHEN ◽  
YA-SHAN CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Phase Transition ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Square Lattice ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Potential Strategy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Influence Of Noise

We study the impact of heterogeneous aspirations on the spatial public goods game (PGG) in a square lattice. An aspiration parameter u is introduced to decide who will be more probably to become the potential strategy source in structured population. Individuals are divided into two groups A(u > 0) and B(u = 0) by fraction v and 1 - v. We study how u and v affect cooperation in the PGG. For low values of u, the cooperation level monotonously increases as v increases. However, for large values of u, there exist an intermediate v ≈ 0.5 for which cooperation thrives best. The influence of noise is also investigated. We find that the highest threshold of phase transition is reached at the middle value of noise.

scholarly journals Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253527
Author(s):  
Hongwei Kang ◽  
Mie Wang ◽  
Yong Shen ◽  
Xingping Sun ◽  
Qingyi Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Random Selection ◽  
Regional Economies ◽  
Intermediate Region ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Adaptive Network ◽  
Information Approach ◽  
Building Trust ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Unknown Region

In this paper, the coevolution mechanism of trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions on an adaptive network is studied. We investigate a low-information approach to building trust and cooperation in public goods games. Unlike reputation, trust scores are only given to players by those with whom they have a relationship in the game, depending on the game they play together. A player’s trust score for a certain neighbor is given and known by that player only. Players can adjust their connections to neighbors with low trust scores by switching their partners to other players. When switching partners, players divide other nodes in the network into three regions: immediate neighbors as the known region, indirectly connected second-order neighbors as the intermediate region, and other nodes as the unknown region. Such choices and compartmentalization often occur in global and regional economies. Our results show that preference for switching to partners in the intermediate region is not conducive to spreading cooperation, while random selection has the disadvantage of protecting the cooperator. However, selecting new partners in the remaining two regions based on the average trust score of the known region performs well in both protecting partners and finding potential cooperators. Meanwhile, by analyzing the parameters, we find that the influence of vigilance increasing against unsatisfactory behavior on evolution direction depends on the level of cooperation reward.

scholarly journals Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sixie Yu ◽  
David Kempe ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Acting Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Algorithmic Question ◽  
Conventional Models ◽  
Individual Self

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document