The Historian

2021 ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter focuses on the historian of philosophy. There is a certain amount of historical evidence in the case of philosophy, mainly in the form of texts, or rather copies thereof, but also of inscriptions or even of archaeological remains. The historian has to collect this evidence, evaluate it, and reconstruct, on its basis, a history which is sufficiently supported by it to make it difficult, if not impossible, to think of an equally plausible, or even more plausible, account that fits the evidence as well. The difficulty is not only that it has become a matter of considerable controversy whether there actually is one characteristic way in which historians ought to go about their business and which way this may be. It also should give one pause for thought that, in fact, general historians do not write history of philosophy. This suggests that the historiography of philosophy is not just a matter of applying the historical method to a particular history. Clearly, the most important point here is that it takes some special competence to write the history of a discipline. Having the competence of a contemporary philosopher allows one to tell which arguments are acceptable and which are not.

1974 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 67-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas T. Spear

African myths of origin have long both fascinated and perplexed historians. Naively taken as fact, they have led historians to create their own myths, such as the Hamitic Myth and its corollary, Sudanic Civilization. The most radical corrective has been to dismiss origin myths altogether on the anthropologial rationale that all myths are simply cultural charters and bear little resemblance to historical fact. By so doing, however, quite frequently we uncritically dismiss our sole source for the history of African peoples prior to the nineteenth century. The task, then, is to try to sift the historical wheat from the mythical chaff in order to recover as much valid historical evidence as possible from origin myths without violating the canons of historical method.A case in point is the Singwaya tradition of Mijikenda and other Kenyan coastal peoples' origins. The Singwaya tradition is one of the most frequently cited and discussed myths of origin of African peoples. Most of the discussion, however, has taken place in a void, because the myth concerns peoples about whom we have known very little and whose traditions have been collected only fragmentarily at best. Its appeal has lain in the fact that this tradition has been collected dozens of times from the 1840s to the present from virtually all the coastal peoples, including the Bajun, the Pokomo along the Tana River, the nine different Mijikenda peoples, the Segeju, the lowland Taita, and two Mombasa Swahili groups. Its widespread distribution has caused the tradition to have a fatal fascination for historians.The first collections of traditions of origin for the coastal peoples were made in the latter half of the nineteenth century by Krapf, Rebmann, Guillain, Burton, Wakefield, New, and Taylor, the earliest missionaries and travelers in the Mijikenda area. These collections were sketchy, and although they mentioned northerly origins they did not specifically mention Singwaya. Starting with Hollis' earliest collections in 1897, the traditions rapidly acquired greater detail. Collections by Johnstone, Platts, MacDougall, Champion, Pearson, Werner, Osborne, Sharpe, Weaving, Hobley, Griffiths, Dammann, Kayamba, and Prins among various coastal peoples all relate a common theme: that the Pokomo, the Taita, seven of the nine Mijikenda peoples, the Segeju, and the Kilindini and Jomvu Swahili all shared common origins in a place called Singwaya located on the southern Somali coast; that they were driven from there by an invasion of the Galla; and that they migrated south in several groups to their present areas of settlement.


1997 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 369-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller

Karl Raimund Popper, the philosopher and methodologist of science, died on 17 September 1994 at the age of 92 years. Locke was a Fellow of the Royal Society, of course, and some other early Fellows, Boyle in particular, have a secure place in the history of philosophy. Whewell, an intellectual forerunner of Popper's (Medawar 1967), was elected in 1820 when the Royal Society was, according to a contemporary philosopher, ‘in a state of unstable equilibrium’; he was a mere 26, a lecturer in mathematics, and was to occupy the chair of mineralogy at Cambridge for some years before writing his exceptional studies in the history and philosophy of science. Whitehead and Russell were elected as Fellows for their mathematical work, as have been one or two more recently elected logicians. Popper is the only philosopher in modern times to have been elected a Fellow of the Royal Society primarily in recognition of his philosophical achievement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 106-114
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This chapter explores the account and the explanation of the historical development of philosophy. It was only at the end of the eighteenth century that this development itself became the focus of attention, and thus the phrase ‘history of philosophy’ came to take on the now familiar meaning of an account of the historical development of philosophy from its beginning to the present day. What characterizes the historian’s approach to the historical development of philosophy is that they refuse to resort to such philosophical assumptions about philosophy, about history, and about the history of philosophy to understand and to explain this historical development. The historian tries to understand and to explain it, as well as it can be explained, purely in terms of historical facts, facts which can be ascertained on the basis of the available historical evidence. Meanwhile, if one is concerned with the factual development of philosophy, one should focus on the fact that sometimes, when a philosopher does something, this affects other philosophers, who take notice of what he or she is doing in such a way that, as a result of their taking note of what the philosopher is doing, they modify their way of thinking about things philosophically, which, in turn, might make some difference to the further course of the history of philosophy. In this way, later philosophical activity is shaped or influenced by earlier activity.


Human Affairs ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Ralston

AbstractDid the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a continental version in the hands of Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In this paper, I argue that proof of the linguistic turn’s presence as a moment in a broader pragmatic turn in philosophy can be garnered from close examination of a single article, W. V. O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and a single issue: whether the analytic-synthetic distinction is philosophically defensible.


2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-280
Author(s):  
S. Sujadi

This article concentrates on the history of Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa (PPME, Young Muslims Association in Europe), depicting its founders’qualifications, historical founding, and nature, which has been against practical politics, and restructure and expansion. This association remains the largest Indonesian Islam-oriented Muslim association in Europe. However, there has been little research done on this association, despite its significant contributions to the socio-cultural and religous activities of Indonesian Muslims in Europe, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany. Therefore, this article aims to fill the gap in academic research, dealing with its creation and  development up till the present. To deal with this subject, a historical method emphasizing a chronological approach is applied. In addition to historical evidence, oral sources were primarily used due to the scarcity of written documents.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
Bennett Gilbert ◽  

The paper explores the question of the relationship between the practice of original philosophical inquiry and the study of the history of philosophy. It is written from my point of view as someone starting a research project in the history of philosophy that calls this issue into question, in order to review my starting positions. I argue: first, that any philosopher is sufficiently embedded in culture that her practice is necessarily historical; second, that original work is in fact in part a reconstruction by reinterpretation of the past and that therefore it bears some relation to historiographic techniques for the restoration of damaged objects and texts; and third that the special oddities of the relations of present and past do not fail to ensnare the philosopher, who must restore the past but freely break from it. I describe this relationship as proleptic. Finally, I argue that this is a moral imperative in writing philosophy, derived from the imperative to be honest.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-257
Author(s):  
A . A. Sanzhenakov

The article is devoted to the attempt to reveal the specific nature of Deleuze’s work on the history of philosophy. For this purpose the author analyzes the historical method of Deleuze from two angles. First, he explores the Deleuzean point of view on the history of philosophy. Second, he presents commentators’ account on the work of Deleuze on the history of philosophy. It is shown that, in the opinion of the French philosopher, the history of philosophy in the ordinary sense is a repressive discipline which needs to be overcome. On the other hand, it is shown that the Deleuzean negative attitude towards the history of philosophy and some philosophers of the past arises from his anti-Platonism and an attempt to build an alternative line of metaphysics. In general, the history, according to Deleuze, should not aim to preserve the past (to be a doxography), but, on the contrary, should provide the conditions for creativity.


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