The Significance of Selected Socio-economic Factors for the Achieving of Fiscal Sustainability of Local Government Units (LGUs) in Poland

The article attempts to assess the impact of selected economic and social factors on the fiscal sustainability of 241 urban municipalities in Poland in 2004-2016. The article uses the econometric modelling of panel data. The analysis revealed that most of the variables had a negative impact on local fiscal performance. The main reason for this is the low fiscal autonomy of Polish cities and the strong dependency on grants from the central budget, as well as the high share of unfunded mandates. This situation means that cities are particularly sensitive to the external environment, while at the same time are deprived of fiscal stabilisation instruments allowing them to counteract this problem. It can be an important obstacle to achieving sustainable economic development.

Prospects for the use of the “model budget” in the distribution of equalization grants in Russia

The paper analyzes the impact of the “model budget” on the problems of intergovernmental relations in the Russian Federation: a high proportion of expenditure obligations of regional and local budgets and a high degree of interregional inequality in fiscal capacity and socio-economic development. It was concluded that the planned broader use of the “model budget” will not solve the problem of unfunded mandates and will lead first to a significant reduction in incentives for regional authorities to develop the territorial revenue base, and then to economic slowdown in the country. As an alternative approach to improving intergovernmental relations, options are being considered for adjusting the parameters of the equalization transfers distribution formula, the procedure for determining their total volume and calculating the budget expenditure index. In solving the problem of unfunded mandates, an equally important role is given to the procedure for preparing a financial and economic rationale for draft laws.

Improving regulatory analysis at independent agencies

<p>Desenvolvendo a análise regulatória nas agências independentes</p><p> </p><p>Each year, independent regulatory agencies—such as the Federal Communications Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission—issue highly consequential regulations. When they issue their regulations, however, they do not have to meet the same requirements for analysis that apply to other agencies. Consequently, courts, policymakers, and scholars have voiced serious reservations about a general lack of high-quality prospective analysis of new regulations at independent agencies. These agencies’ track records with retrospective analysis of their existing regulations raise similar concerns. In this article, I approach the quality of regulatory analysis at independent agencies as a policy problem, assessing the current quality and offering possible solutions Congress could adopt to improve these agencies’ regulatory analysis. I present three options for improving prospective analysis by independent agencies: continuing to allow courts to encourage better analysis; subjecting independent agencies to the same White House review that currently applies to executive agencies; and amending the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) to impose a requirement for analysis but not White House review. The UMRA option would best balance the desire to improve prospective regulatory analysis at independent agencies with prevailing norms of autonomy that surround these agencies. In addition to improving prospective analysis, independent agencies should seek to produce more rigorous retrospective analysis of their existing regulations, both to improve the substantive performance of their existing regulations and to learn better what to expect when analyzing new regulations. I thus offer options for improving retrospective analysis by independent agencies, each of which could be adopted without undermining autonomy norms. Ultimately, to see independent regulatory agencies better fulfill their public missions, their leaders must make still smarter regulatory decisions—and the first step toward smarter decisions is to improve regulatory analysis.</p><p> </p><p>A cada ano, agências reguladoras independentes — como a Comissão Federal de Comunicações, a Comissão Reguladora Nuclear e a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários — emitem regulamentações altamente pretenciosas. Quando elas emitem suas regulamentações, no entanto, elas não precisam atender aos mesmos requisitos de análise que se aplicam a outras agências. Consequentemente, tribunais, formuladores de políticas e acadêmicos expressaram sérias advertências sobre uma falta geral de análise prospectiva de alta qualidade de novas regulamentações em agências independentes. Os registros dessas agências com análises retrospectivas de suas regulamentações existentes levantam preocupações semelhantes. Neste artigo, abordo a qualidade da análise regulatória nas agências independentes como um problema político, avaliando a qualidade atual e oferecendo as possíveis soluções que o Congresso poderia adotar para melhorar a análise regulatória dessas agências. Apresento três opções para aprimorar a análise prospectiva por agências independentes: continuar a permitir que os tribunais incentivem uma melhor análise; submeter agências independentes à mesma revisão da Casa Branca, que atualmente se aplica às agências executivas; e alterar o Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) para impor um requisito de análise, mas não a revisão da Casa Branca. A última opção é a que melhor equilibraria o desejo de desenvolver a análise prospectiva das agências independentes com normas vigentes de autonomia que cercam essas agências. Além de melhorar a análise prospectiva, as agências independentes devem procurar produzir uma análise retrospectiva mais rigorosa de suas regulamentações existentes, tanto para melhorar o desempenho substantivo de seus regulamentos existentes quanto para aprender melhor o que esperar ao analisar novas regulamentações. Assim, ofereço opções para melhorar a análise retrospectiva de agências independentes, cada uma das quais poderia ser adotada sem prejudicar as normas de autonomia. Por fim, para que as agências reguladoras independentes cumpram melhor suas missões públicas, seus líderes devem tomar decisões regulatórias ainda mais inteligentes — e o primeiro passo em direção a decisões mais inteligentes é melhorar a análise regulatória.</p>

Can small institutes address some problems facing biomedical researchers?

At a time of historically low National Institutes of Health funding rates and many problems with the conduct of research (unfunded mandates, disgruntled reviewers, and rampant paranoia), there is a concern that biomedical research as a profession is waning in the United States (see ”Rescuing US biomedical research from its systemic flaws” by Alberts and colleagues in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences). However, it is wonderful to discover something new and to tackle tough puzzles. If we could focus more of our effort on discussing scientific problems and doing research, then we could be more productive and perhaps happier. One potential solution is to focus efforts on small thematic institutes in the university structure that can provide a stimulating and supportive environment for innovation and exploration. With an open-lab concept, there are economies of scale that can diminish paperwork and costs, while providing greater access to state-of-the-art equipment. Merging multiple disciplines around a common theme can catalyze innovation, and this enables individuals to develop new concepts without giving up the credit they deserve, because it is usually clear who did the work. Small institutes do not solve larger systemic problems but rather enable collective efforts to address the noisome aspects of the system and foster an innovative community effort to address scientific problems.