Fiscal Measures to Boost the Economic Development of Russian Territories

Two possible directions of fiscal measures aimed at improving Russian territories’ economic development are discussed in the paper: one at the level of largest agglomerations and another one at the regional level. It is widely accepted that agglomerations are “engines” of economic growth. The Strategy of Spatial Development of the Russian Federation until 2025 pays special attention to the development of agglomerations. However, the latter process has not only natural limitations, but also institutional ones arising from low fiscal independence of municipalities which form agglomerations. To overcome the institutional limitations, the paper proposes a set of fiscal measures, including a redistribution of tax revenues and expenditure obligations between the center of a given agglomeration and the region that contains it. The current fiscal mechanisms of stimulating economic development of Russian regions are analyzed. A mechanism of additional stimulation for regions to develop their own revenue base is proposed; it includes the transfer of receipts of VAT levied with a reduced rate of 10 % to regions in exchange for centralization of some part of corporate income tax in the federal budget. Different scenarios of this exchange are analyzed. It is shown that centralization of the corporate income tax amount corresponding to the 1 % rate in the federal budget in exchange for the transfer of VAT levied with a rate of 10 % to regions with a compensation mechanism within the transferred amounts is neutral to the federal budget and to budgets of the regions which receive equalization grants.

Problems of Fiscal Capacity Increasing in the Regions of the Russian Far East

The article examines the current state of regional budgets in the Russian Far Eastern macroregion. The regional per capita budget expenditures lag far behind the country’s average values, that makes regions unable to overcome the existing gap in social development, infrastructural provision of the territory and to improve the quality of life. The article considers possibilities of increasing the regional budget revenues from existing major revenue sources such as tax capacity, intergovernmental transfers (equalization grants) and borrowing. It is argued that in the short term the level of regional budget expenditures may best be increased by grants, in the long term the major potential for sustainable increase in budget income is associated with expansion of economic activity and rise of factor productivity

Subsidiarity and the Moral Justification of Intergovernmental Equalization Grants to Decentralized Governments

An important problem with decentralized government relates to its tendency to create disparities between the various units with respect to their capability to provide public goods. In response to this problem, intergovernmental equalization grant transfers are a ubiquitous feature of many systems of decentralized government. However, since the earliest times, scholars of fiscal federalism have struggled to provide a convincing moral justification for providing intergovernmental equalization grants. We outline how the principle of subsidiarity might be employed to create a robust moral justification for providing equalization transfers. In addition, we explicate the steps required to operationalize a subsidiarity-based grant system and conclude with a consideration of some of the difficulties that might be encountered in doing so.

Prospects for the use of the “model budget” in the distribution of equalization grants in Russia

The paper analyzes the impact of the “model budget” on the problems of intergovernmental relations in the Russian Federation: a high proportion of expenditure obligations of regional and local budgets and a high degree of interregional inequality in fiscal capacity and socio-economic development. It was concluded that the planned broader use of the “model budget” will not solve the problem of unfunded mandates and will lead first to a significant reduction in incentives for regional authorities to develop the territorial revenue base, and then to economic slowdown in the country. As an alternative approach to improving intergovernmental relations, options are being considered for adjusting the parameters of the equalization transfers distribution formula, the procedure for determining their total volume and calculating the budget expenditure index. In solving the problem of unfunded mandates, an equally important role is given to the procedure for preparing a financial and economic rationale for draft laws.

The Incentive Effects of Equalization Grants on Tax Policy

This article provides an empirical analysis of the incentive effects of equalization grants on business and personal income tax rates using panel data from Canadian provinces. We exploit the discontinuity in the equalization grant allocation formula to identify the exogenous income and incentive effects of equalization grants on tax policy. Our empirical results indicate that equalization grants provide provincial governments an incentive to raise their business and personal income tax rates. The results also suggest that if the equalization program in its current form was abandoned, then business and personal income tax rates would be lower in the grant receiving provinces.

The Incentive Effect of Equalization Grants on Tax Collection

Equalization grants that are inversely related to collected revenue increase the marginal cost of collecting because they tax the collection itself. The main finding is evidence for Chilean municipalities that equalization grants have this incentive effect on local revenue. In order to identify this effect, we exploit that today’s collected revenue could affect grants received 2, 3, or 4 years later, as determined by the equalization grant’gs distribution formula. This formula has undergone changes in the 1990-2006 period. We find a negative relationship between the equalization grant’s implicit tax and collected local revenue, and this effect is greater when the period of time between collection and the corresponding distribution of grants is shorter and when the political coalition to which the incumbent mayor belongs has a high likelihood of winning the next election and therefore paying this implicit tax in the coming years.