Support Party Strategies on Important Policy Issues: Results from Swedish Minority Governments

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller

Abstract The survival of minority governments depends on support from non-cabinet parties that strive to safeguard government stability while also fulfilling their accountability to the electorate. This article argues that non-cabinet parties' propensity to support the government depends on their desire to uphold distinctiveness when accountability is at stake. This even applies to opposition parties that are officially committed to minority government support and, as a trade-off, receive policy pay-offs. By analysing opposition party voting in 23 years of Swedish minority governments (1991–2018), the article suggests that ideologically distant support parties are more likely to oppose the government on their core issues since compromise would involve too-large concessions. These results question our understanding of support party pay-offs as a trade-off for minority government support and highlight the rationality of entering a support agreement, which gives the support party a certain degree of policy influence while also keeping a distinct party profile.

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller ◽  
Marcus Höreth

Government stability in the German Bundestag is traditionally tied to a parliamentary majority and an opposition minority . Nonetheless, minority governments in other Western democracies show that, despite the lack of a parliamentary majority, they govern stable and effectively together with the opposition . In this article, on the Swedish case, we examine how opposition parties in parliament are involved in the legislative process in a minority government and what patterns they follow in order to maintain governmental stability without neglecting their alternative function . The paper combines theoretical and concep­tual considerations on the adequate understanding of the opposition in the Federal Repub­lic of Germany with empirical findings on cooperation and conflicts between opposition party groups and minority governments . The results show that opposition parties strategi­cally switch between confrontational (Westminster-style) and consensual patterns of behav­ior (republican) . Through this flexible majority finding, opposition parties in parliament can alternately present themselves as policymakers or as an alternative counterpart to the government . This opposition behavior is functionally adequate under the conditions of a pluralized and fragmented party system and the resulting difficulties in forming a stable government majority .


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Müller

Opposition parties in minority governments are partly responsible for government stability without being able to neglect their accountability to the electorate, a dilemma that, as this book shows, has many electoral as well as policy advantages for opposition parties. This book’s analysis of opposition behavior in the Swedish Riksdag (1991–2018) sheds light on the rationality of minority governments from an opposition perspective: receiving political influence without jeopardizing one's party profile. The author studies oppositional behavior in Swedish minority governments using quantitative and qualitative methods.


1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sutherland

AbstractPrevious literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.


Author(s):  
Kunkunrat Kunkunrat ◽  
Ade Priangani

Interesting events in the last 2 (two) elections, where there is a phenomenon of political parties contesting in the 2014 and 2019 elections trying to create an election that puts forward checks and balances between government support parties and opposition parties in the form of coalitions. In the 2014 elections there was a Great Indonesian Coalition (KIH) government, consisting of PDI-P, Nasdem, PKB, Hanura and PKPI, and the opposition Red and White coalition (KMP), consisting of Gerindra, Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP and the United Nations. It is hoped that the people will have checks and balances so that the minority government is controlled by a large opposition. But that hope vanished as Golkar, PAN and PPP joined the government, so the opposition was no longer helpless, because it only left Gerindra and PKS. The recurring incident in the 2019 election, in which the presidential election gave birth to 2 coalition supporters of Jokowi-Maruf Amien Coalition of Working Indonesia (PDI-P, Nasdem, PKB, Hanura, PKPI, Golkar, PPP, Perindo, PSI) and the Coalition supporting Prabowo-Sandiaga, named The Indonesian Coalition is just and prosperous (Gerindra, PKS, PAN, Democrat), it is very apparent that there is a desire from PAN and Democrats to be part of the government coalition, inconsistencies occur in coalition in Indonesia.


2012 ◽  
pp. 4-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mamonov ◽  
A. Pestova ◽  
O. Solntsev

The stability of Russian banking sector is threatened by three negative tendencies - overheating of the credit market, significant decrease of banks capital adequacy ratios, and growing problems associated with banks lending to affiliated non-financial corporations. The co-existence of these processes reflects the crisis of the model of private investments in Russian banking sector, which was observed during the last 20 years. This paper analyzes the measures of the Bank of Russia undertaken to maintain the stability of the banking sector using the methodology of credit risk stress-testing. Based on this methodology we conclude that the Bank of Russias actions can prevent the overheating of the credit market, but they can also lead to undesirable effects: further expansion of the government ownership in Russian banking sector and substitution of domestic credit supply by cross-border corporate borrowings. The later weakens the competitive positions of Russian banks. We propose a set of measures to harmonize the prudential regulation of banks. Our suggestions rely on design and further implementation of the programs aimed at developing new markets for financial services provided by Russian banks to their corporate and retail customers. The estimated effects of proposed policy measures are both the increase in profitability and capitalization of Russian banks and the decrease of banks demand for government support.


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