The relevance of Gandhian ideas and his technique of satyagraha in resolving global problems is even greater today. The economic disparity, social divisions, ecological catastrophe and growing social intolerance are global challenges in the age of capitalist and technological globalisation. Globalisation as an economic model with neo- liberal ideology is inconsistent with Gandhian economic and political philosophy. Globalisation per se does not seem to be not be reversible as the hegemony of the global capital is deeply entrenched. However, its malaise can be better managed with Gandhian prescriptions.
Gandhi stands for pursuit of truth, incessant enquiry, nonviolence, human values, dignity of labour, and respect for the plurality of views, economic and political decentralisation with substantial decrease in the power of the state. Gandhian vision stands for mobilisation of the people’s power through nonviolent active participation against all kinds of injustices and making the political power accountable in the service of the society. Gandhi had deep faith in the intrinsic goodness of individual human beings and he staunchly believed and demonstrated that truthful and moral means are superior to immoral means in redressing the social and political problems confronting mankind. Gandhian economic and political vision is for a decentralised, just and nonviolent society which is indispensable for spiritual and moral upliftment of individual human beings. Gandhian prescriptions are for common masses and practical. It only requires pursuit of truthful and moral means without any hatred and ill will for anyone in the struggle against domination and injustice.
Keywords: Satyagraha, Ahimsa, Dharna, Hindu, Inter-faith, Decentralisation, Moksha, Spiritual
AbstractIn this article I argue for the thesis that Alexander's main argument, in Ethical Problems I, is an attempt to block the implication drawn by the Stoics and other ancient philosophers from the double potential of use exhibited by human life, a life that can be either well or badly lived. Alexander wants to resist the thought that this double potential of use allows the Stoics to infer that human life, in itself, or by its own nature, is neither good nor bad (what I call the Indifference Implication). Furthermore, I shall argue that Alexander's main argument establishes that human life, despite exhibiting a double potential of use, is by its own nature or intrinsically good. Finally, given that this is not a conclusion that the Stoics are likely to accept, I shall also contend that the argument should be regarded as conducted for the most part in foro interno, as a way of persuading the Peripatetics themselves of the falsity of the Indifference Implication, precisely because of the risk that such an implication be derived from their own theoretical framework.
Consequentialist theories of the right connect the rightness and wrongness (and related notions) of actions with the intrinsic goodness and badness of states of affairs consequential on those actions. The most popular such theory is maximization, which is said to demand of agents that they maximize the good, that they do the best they can, at all times. Thus it may seem that consequentialist theories are overly demanding, and, relatedly, that they cannot accommodate the phenomenon of going above and beyond the demands of duty (supererogation). However, a clear understanding of consequentialism leaves no room for a theory of the right, at least not at the fundamental level of the theory. A consequentialist theory, such as utilitarianism, is a theory of how to rank outcomes, and derivatively actions, which provides reasons for choosing some actions over others. It is thus a purely scalar theory, with no demands that certain actions be performed, and no fundamental classification of actions as right or wrong. However, such notions may have pragmatic benefits at the level of application, since many people find it easier to guide their conduct by simple commands, rather than to think in terms of reasons of varying strength to do one thing rather than another. A contextualist semantics for various terms, such as “right,” “permissible,” “harm,” when combined with the scalar approach to consequentialism, allows for the expression of truth-apt propositions with sentences containing such terms.
A Franciscan philosopher and theologian, Vital du Four was noted for denying the distinction between a thing’s essence and its existence, for expounding an Augustinian theory of perception and for emphasizing the absolute power and contingency of God’s will in creating the universe. One interpretation of his views holds that created things have no intrinsic goodness, only that which has been conferred upon them by God.
Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim that even if Moore does not need Thomson's concept, he still requires the objectionable notion of absolute goodness. I undermine both these replies. I first show that we may dispense with generic goodness without losing Moorean intrinsic goodness. Then, I argue that though intrinsic goodness is indeed a kind of absolute goodness, the objections marshalled against the concept are unsound.
This chapter considers how perception is central in epistemology, and the concept of perception is among the most important in philosophy. If the psychological authority of perception—chiefly, its power to compel belief under varying conditions—is not in general contested, its epistemic authority—chiefly, its power to yield knowledge and justified belief—is often taken to be limited to certain realms and to hold for descriptive rather than normative propositions. Paradigms of the former are propositions ascribing observable properties, such as color and shape, to macroscopic objects. Whereas paradigms of normative propositions are those ascribing obligations to persons, wrongness to actions, or intrinsic goodness or badness to states of affairs.