Chad aims to co-opt rebels to reduce their threat

Significance The government’s attention is now shifting to rebels. The authorities face threats from multiple sides -- rebel groups, Boko Haram, the turmoil in the Central African Republic and the transition in Sudan -- and placating at least some rebels would help the ruling Military Transition Council (CMT) to narrow its list of concerns. Impacts Further rebel incursions would swiftly draw the attention of France, which has intervened multiple times on behalf of Chadian governments. The authorities are likely to set a date for the inclusive national dialogue soon, especially if they can secure some rebel participation. The national dialogue will symbolise confidence in the transition, but not substantive unity.

Subject Outlook for the Central African Republic's peace process. Significance Three months after signing a peace agreement with the country’s main armed groups, President Faustin-Archange Touadera continues to emphasise his commitment to the deal. However, some rebel groups have denounced the government’s concessions as insufficient. For their part, rebels seem more interested in further negotiations than implementing peace. This raises the risks that the flaws in the agreement could become increasingly exposed. Impacts Armed violence will likely continue until the new government is respected by all parties, which may prove challenging to achieve. A sustainable transition to peace will require credible measures for restorative justice, security-sector reform and economic recovery. The government will look to secure more financial and technical assistance from its regional and international partners.


Significance On the instructions of President Idriss Deby, the Independent National Electoral Commission set April 11, 2021 for the next presidential elections and October 24 the same year for legislative elections that have been delayed repeatedly. Deby then partly reshuffled his cabinet on July 14, the most notable move being the appointment of Amine Abba Siddick as foreign minister. Siddick, previously ambassador to France, has been a key player in improving French-Chadian relations over the past three years. Impacts Deby's re-election will draw an outcry from various rebel groups, but none of them appears to pose a serious threat to him. The counter-strike against Boko Haram appears an effective deterrent, but the group's operations in Chad have long been intermittent. Deby, with close ties to Paris, will maintain his pre-eminence among political and security actors in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 441-452
Author(s):  
Amelia Setyawati ◽  
Helda Risman ◽  
Surryanto D.W

Since independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has never been free from conflict. Almost every turn of CAR leader begins with a coup d’etat. Resistance from the Seleka and Anti-Balaka rebel groups emerged and exacerbated the situation in CAR. The conflict that was originally an opposition-government conflict developed into a religious conflict. So the question arises regarding the efforts and involvement of third parties in maintaining peace in the CAR. The UN Security Council permits the spread of UN peacekeeping operations through The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on 10 April 2014 by protecting civilians as a top priority. The focus of this article is to analyze MINUSCA in carrying out its mandate in CAR. This article is analyzed with role theory and conflict theory. The data used in analyzing this article is secondary data. The data is obtained from books, scientific journals, dissertations or theses, official documents, and the internet. The results in this article find that the role played by MINUSCA in the CAR Conflict is as a peace facilitator. While carrying out their duties, MINUSCA plays a role in the protection of CAR civilians and the development of troop personnel in order to increase the effectiveness of missions in the CAR in order to create a peaceful and safe environment.


Author(s):  
Jun Koga Sudduth

Political leaders face threats to their power from within and outside the regime. Leaders can be removed via a coup d’état undertaken by militaries that are part of the state apparatus. At the same time, leaders can lose power when they confront excluded opposition groups in civil wars. The difficulty for leaders, though, is that efforts to address one threat might leave them vulnerable to the other threat due to the role of the military as an institution of violence capable of exercising coercive power. On one hand, leaders need to protect their regimes from rebels by maintaining strong militaries. Yet, militaries that are strong enough to prevail against rebel forces are also strong enough to execute a coup successfully. On the other hand, leaders who cope with coup threats by weakening their militaries’ capabilities to organize a coup also diminish the very capabilities that they need to defeat their rebel challengers. This unfortunate trade-off between protection by the military and protection from the military has been the long-standing theme in studies of civil-military relations and coup-proofing. Though most research on this subject has focused primarily on rulers’ maneuvers to balance the threats posed by the military and the threats coming from foreign adversaries, more recent scholarship has begun to explore how leaders’ efforts to cope with coup threats will influence the regime’s abilities to address the domestic threats coming from rebel groups, and vice versa. This new wave of research focuses on two related vectors. First, scholars address whether leaders who pursue coup-proofing strategies that weaken their militaries’ capabilities also increase the regime’s vulnerability to rebel threats and the future probability of civil war. Second, scholars examine how the magnitude of threats posed by rebel groups will determine leaders’ strategies toward the militaries, and how these strategies affect both the militaries’ influence over government policy and the future probability of coup onsets. These lines of research contribute to the conflict literature by examining the causal mechanisms through which civil conflict influences coup propensity and vice versa. The literatures on civil war and coups have developed independently without much consideration of each other, and systematic analyses of the linkage between them have only just began.


Significance The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of civilian and rebel groups have rejected the deal, but Hamdok has justified it on the grounds that (among other things) it will prevent the return of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), apparently responding to ongoing speculation over whether NCP-era Islamists influenced Burhan’s October 25 coup. Impacts Burhan will probably limit the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, which aims to dismantle NCP-era power structures. Any empowerment of Islamists will likely be selective, to avoid alienating regional powers or FFC figures who might be open to cooperation. A marked turn towards Islamism would undermine the chances of a peace deal with holdout rebel groups who seek a secular state.


Subject The fallout from the violence in Kokang. Significance On February 9, fighting broke out in Kokang between Myanmar's military ('Tatmadaw') and rebel group the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which fights for greater autonomy within Myanmar. Kokang, in northern Shan State, borders China. Most Kokang people are ethnic Chinese and many speak Mandarin. Myanmar's government faces two problems: a peace process with ethnic armed rebel groups that is now adrift, and a sudden spike in frictions with Beijing while large numbers of refugees seek sanctuary in China. Impacts Absent a change in the institutional culture, the Tatmadaw will be wary of negotiating with the rebels. In the near term, further bilateral government-rebel peace deals are more likely than a nationwide deal. The opposition National League for Democracy will try to avoid dealing publically with Kokang if possible.


Significance Mass protests took place yesterday in Niger's capital against the insurgency, while Chad's military announced training exercises with the United States to "warm up" for the fight. Over the past year, Boko Haram militants have encroached from north-east Nigeria into remote border areas of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The regionalisation of the insurgency and the response will see the intensity and impact of the conflict increase. Impacts Population displacements could become a significant problem, bringing added instability risks to the border region. The risk of attacks on international aid organisation personnel will grow as they seek to deliver aid to affected communities. The conflict will not yet impinge on oil operations in Chad and Niger; existing fields and infrastructure are not close to affected areas.


Significance Boko Haram has been severely weakened by the regional military offensive underway since February. With some assistance from Nigerian soldiers, troops from Chad, Cameroon and Niger have forced the insurgents to retreat from the majority of areas under their control. Completing the defeat of Boko Haram -- at least as a guerrilla force -- will be one of the incoming administration's first priorities. Impacts The incoming government will seek to fund pledges to accelerate reconstruction and rehabilitation of the north-east. However, it is set to inherit a cash-strapped economy, after one of Nigeria's most expensive elections. As laid out by the respected Borno state governor, substantial international aid assistance will be required. Such reconstruction work will also be important to allow the return of tens of thousands of refugees.


Subject Scenarios for Nigeria's presidential and legislative elections. Significance Presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for February 14, with governorship polls set for February 28. The ruling People's Democratic Party's (PDP) candidate is President Goodluck Jonathan, who is running for a second term. The opposition All Progressives Congress' presidential candidate is General Muhammadu Buhari. The presidential polls are expected to be the most competitive since 1999, laying the groundwork for several different outcomes. Impacts On one level, the security chief's call for electoral delay was designed to detract from the army's failure against Boko Haram. However, it also reflects valid concerns about voter card distribution challenges, particularly in the north. Yet a decision by the commission to delay the election at this stage would be highly controversial, likely to create a backlash. The commission called the election three months ahead of the constitutional requirement, although primarily to make time for a run-off. Yet low popular confidence in electoral administration will raise violence risks, particularly in the north.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document