Making Sense of Japan’s Export Restrictions against South Korea

Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-710
Author(s):  
Ji Young Kim ◽  
Wenxin Li ◽  
Seunghee Lee

Why did Japanese Prime Minister Abe impose controversial export restrictions after rulings by the South Korean Supreme Court on wartime forced laborers? This article answers this question through the lens of domestic symbolism in economic sanctions studies. We argue that domestic political calculations led the Japanese government to adopt hawkish measures against South Korea. Abe wanted to ensure continued support from his constituents and to win the upcoming election. A series of political reforms since the early 1990s have empowered the prime minister and made LDP politicians pay more attention to public opinion than to factional topography. Strong anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public reduced the leadership’s concerns about the audience costs of economic countermeasures. Through an examination of the interplay among various domestic actors over the policy measure, this study provides insights on how domestic symbolism can serve as an origin of foreign policy decision-making in democracies.

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Susumu Kamimura

Japan’s central government reforms in 2001 introduced a new approach to policy decision making, by implementing institutional measures that gave the Prime Minister a genuine center of power. These measures included legal clarification of the Prime Minister’s power to make proposals at Cabinet meetings, reinforced the Cabinet Secretariat’s planning function, and created the Cabinet Office (in particular, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy). This paper examines the context behind this drastic transformation, and how these changes were implemented. It also documents the consequences of this power shift, by providing numerical evidence of increases in the Prime Minister’s staff complement, the augmentation of administrative bodies that report to him, and the extent of the legislative power now under his direct authority. Based on these analyses, this paper concludes that this strengthening of the Prime Minister’s power represents a Japanese version of the well-known “presidentialization” framework described by Poguntke and Webb.


Significance A lengthy meeting on July 12 failed to resolve the dispute. Tokyo may activate a much wider range of export restrictions later this month, when Seoul will also bring a complaint to the WTO. Impacts The Trump administration, seemingly unconcerned so far, may now be about to attempt mediation, which would improve the outlook. Pyongyang and Beijing are the greatest beneficiaries of the row. Adopting the Trump playbook undermines Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s professed stance as defender of a liberal global trading regime.


Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-60
Author(s):  
Brian Woodall

In 2019, Japanese Prime Minister Abe grappled with domestic dilemmas and diplomatic strains, highlighted by inflamed relations with South Korea. The economy continued to grow slowly, the depopulation bomb continued ticking, and demands for gender equality grew louder. The year also brought the enthronement of a new emperor and genesis of a new imperial era.


2021 ◽  
pp. 117-132
Author(s):  
Hyunjin Seo

This chapter covers several issues South Korea has dealt with following President Park’s removal from office: the election of Moon Jae-in as president in May 2017, pro-Park groups’ anti-government rallies, and a public divide on potentially pardoning Park in 2021. In addition, it considers citizens’ evaluations of the impeachment candlelight vigils three years after Park’s impeachment. There is now a growing sense that the momentum for change ignited by the vigils may have been lost and that real systemic change has not been achieved. This chapter looks at how some actors within society are striving to sustain momentum for social change. While political parties and civic organizations in South Korea are experimenting with different strategies to engage citizens, some people are already demanding new forms of participatory democracy. Grass-roots organizations such as WAGL and Parti Co-op have emerged to design and implement alternative ways of incorporating citizens’ direct participation in policy decision-making processes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Eryan Ramadhani

China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China’s assertiveness. I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy originates in leaders’ domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders’ crisis behaviour. China’s non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China’s assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 377-405
Author(s):  
Seung-young Kim

In the mid-1970s, Japanese Prime Minister Miki Takeo actively promoted mediation diplomacy and passionately worked for a solution to the Korean question through great power guarantees from the United States and China. He sent his intermediary to Pyongyang and advocated dialogue between the United States and North Korea as well as between South and North Korea. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, however, worried that Miki’s initiative could destabilize the favorable equilibrium for the United States and South Korea by either isolating the South Koreans or making them seem American puppets. Particularly, after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Washington remained receptive to South Korea, which worried that Japanese support would strengthen North Korea. The Chinese, while supporting Pyongyang’s diplomatic stance, also remained reluctant to join any bold diplomatic initiative. Miki made little significant progress apart from several rounds of frank exchange of views with American leaders. Still, these discussions between American and Japanese leaders demonstrate the nature and persistence of Japan’s concerns on the Korean question.


Author(s):  
Maksym Prykhnenko

The present article is devoted to the problem of particularities of Tony Blair’ governments’ foreign policy decision-making process. The aim of the paper is to analyze the decision-making model formed by Tony Blair as well as to identify key factors which impacted the process of creation and implementation of foreign policy decisions in the framework of Tony Blair’ leadership model. It was concluded that Tony Blair had formed tree level decision-making system. Rolls of the Parliament and the Government in the deliberation process were frustrated. On the other hand, special advisers and so called selective committees impacts were strengthened. This institutes played the role of consulting bodies on specific issues of the agenda. Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs were the driving force of all process. But usually the second one was like the executor of Prime Minister’ decision. Keywords: Leadership model, decision-making process, blairism


Significance The agreement, once ratified, will create a new trade bloc that encompasses 36% of global GDP. Impacts US congressional politics could quickly undo years of diplomatic work. Malaysian domestic politics could be another stumbling block. South Korea may be the next economy to join; Taiwan's entry will be much slower. The political benefits will probably outweigh the costs for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.


1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 136, 138
Author(s):  
RICHARD L. MERRITT

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