In everyday perception, we experience a direct acquaintance with things in our surroundings, say, as I see this tennis ball before me. In everyday action, we also experience a direct acquaintance with things, as I grasp and pick up and hit this ball. Moreover, perception and action form a unified phenomenal intentional experience, as I consciously see-and-grasp-and-hit this particular ball. An experience of seeing-and-acting with regard to a particular object is a form of direct acquaintance, a paradigm of what Husserl called ‘intuition’. The phenomenology of perception-cum-action leads into the ontology of direct acquaintance. The structure of this form of embodied intentional experience cuts between internalist and externalist models of perception (and volition in action), clarifies embodiment and activity, and obviates disjunctivist models of perception, while avoiding reducing consciousness in acquaintance to a physical transmission of physical information, say, between my brain, my body, and this ball.