Talking about the likelihood of risks: an agent-based simulation of discussion processes in risk workshops

Purpose This paper aims to explore drivers of the effectiveness of risk assessments in risk workshops. Design/methodology/approach This study uses an agent-based model to simulate risk assessments in risk workshops. Combining the notions of transactive memory and the ideal speech situation, this study establishes a risk assessment benchmark and then investigates real-world deviations from this benchmark. Specifically, this study models limits to information transfer, incomplete discussions and potentially detrimental group characteristics, as well as interaction patterns. Findings First, limits to information transfer among workshop participants can prevent a correct consensus. Second, increasing the required number of stable discussion rounds before an assessment improves the correct assessment of high but not low likelihood risks. Third, while theoretically advantageous group characteristics are associated with the highest assessment correctness for all risks, theoretically detrimental group characteristics are associated with the highest assessment correctness for high likelihood risks. Fourth, prioritizing participants who are particularly concerned about the risk leads to the highest level of correctness. Originality/value This study shows that by increasing the duration of simulated risk workshops, the assessments change – as a rule – from underestimating to overestimating risks, unraveling a trade-off for risk workshop facilitators. Methodologically, this approach overcomes limitations of prior research, specifically the lack of an assessment and process benchmark, the inability to disentangle multiple effects and the difficulty of capturing individual cognitive processes.

The steering effects of citations and metrics

PurposeThis paper aims to understand the nature of citations and metrics in the larger system of knowledge production involving universities, funding agencies, publishers, and indexing and data analytic services.Design/methodology/approachFirst, the normative and social constructivist views of citations are reviewed to be understood as co-existing conditions. Second, metrics are examined through the processes of commensuration by tracing the meanings of metrics embedded in various kinds of documents and contexts. Third, the steering effects of citations and metrics on knowledge production are discussed. Finally, the conclusion addresses questions pertaining to the validity and legitimacy of citations as data and their implications for knowledge production and the conception of information.FindingsThe normative view of citations is understood as an ideal speech situation; the social constructivist view of citation is recognised in the system of knowledge production where citing motivations are influenced by epistemic, social and political factors. When organisational performances are prioritised and generate system imperatives, motives of competition become dominant in shaping citing behaviour, which can deviate from the norms and values in the academic lifeworld. As a result, citations and metrics become a non-linguistic steering medium rather than evidence of research quality and impact.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the understanding of the nature of citations and metrics and their implications for the conception of information and knowledge production.

Habermas, Rorty, and the Problem of Competent Interlocutors

In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971, -surprisingly neglected in most approaches to the debate-, in which Habermas did include such a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are no such good reasons.

Communicative rationality

The concept of ‘communicative rationality’ is primarily associated with the work of the philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas, communication through language necessarily involves the raising of ‘validity-claims’ (distinguished as ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and ‘sincerity’), the status of which, when contested, can ultimately only be resolved through discussion. Habermas further contends that speakers of a language possess an implicit knowledge of the conditions under which such discussion would produce an objectively correct result, and these he has spelled out in terms of the features of an egalitarian ‘ideal speech situation’. Communicative rationality refers to the capacity to engage in argumentation under conditions approximating to this ideal situation (‘discourse’, in Habermas’ terminology), with the aim of achieving consensus. Habermas relies on the concept of communicative rationality to argue that democratic forms of social organization express more than simply the preferences of a particular cultural and political tradition. In his view, we cannot even understand a speech-act without taking a stance towards the validity-claim it raises, and this stance in turn anticipates the unconstrained discussion which would resolve the status of the claim. Social and political arrangements which inhibit such discussion can therefore be criticized from a standpoint which does not depend on any specific value-commitments, since for Habermas achieving agreement (Verständigung) is a ‘telos’ or goal which is internal to human language as such. A similar philosophical programme has also been developed by Karl-Otto Apel, who lays more stress on the ‘transcendental’ features of the argumentation involved.

Interview with Jürgen Habermas

This interview with Jürgen Habermas covers a number of crucial and hotly debated topics in deliberative democracy—such as the role of the ideal speech situation, the role of (rational) consensus, and the possibility of deliberation in the strategic realm of politics and in deeply divided societies. In addition, it sets outs his assessment of current developments in deliberative theory—such as the contribution of narratives, emotions and rhetorics to the deliberative process and the role of self-interest and bargaining in deliberation. Jürgen Habermas presents an integrative and optimistic vision of the deliberative program, stressing the importance of a systemic and long-term approach where the democratic process “as a whole is filtered through deliberation”.

Discussion and Deliberation

Virtually all of our knowledge is second-hand, learned from others. In ideal deliberative settings, such as Habermas’s ‘ideal speech situation’, learning from others works well because participants are challenged to provide evidence and be consistent in their arguments. Not all real-world deliberation lives up to such high standards, but even non-ideal deliberation can be epistemically advantageous. We investigate five ways how: by improving voter competence; by reducing positive correlation; by incentivizing more sincere voting; by making the decision problem more truth-conducive; and by changing the decision problem in epistemically beneficial ways. The chapter ends with the conjecture that the ‘Deliberation Effect’ will boost group competence at least a little.