What is the Difference Between Philosophical Ideas and Concepts?

Introduction. The paper attempts to clarify the relation between ideas and concepts in philosophy seen as science and worldview. The author analyzes these forms of philosophical thought and reveals their epistemological similarities, as well as their essential and notional differences.Materials and Methods. The paper draws upon monographs and papers by Russian and foreign scholars focusing on issues connected with the analysis of philosophical ideas and notions. The methods implemented are comparative analysis, historico-philosophical synthesis, generalization, idealization, abstraction, and interpretation.Results. The central issue explored in the paper concerns similarities and differences between philosophical ideas and concepts. Philosophers do not have serious disagreements over the notion of a concept, but there is no consensus on what an idea is. While many thinkers seem to reduce ideas to representations, a philosophical idea is clearly different from a common opinion. Most notably, it must be expressed in form of a concept – the fact that characterizes it as an act of thinking. Analyzing these forms of thinking, the author arrives at the following conclusions: 1. Concepts reflect essence, ideas reflect aim (an ideal). 2. Concepts are a form of knowledge and are limited to the cognitive sphere; ideas pertain to understanding and are impactful. 3. Concepts are value-neutral, ideas are value-oriented. 4. Concepts are more static, ideas are more dynamic. 5. Philosophical concepts are usually anonymous, ideas are authorial. Ideas endow concepts with their original essence, while concepts endow ideas with their theoretical form. Without the creative power of ideas concepts degrade into banal epigonic thoughts. Thus, ideas and concepts are forms of thinking that have different purposes, but are still deeply connected and interchangeable.Discussion and Conclusions. The understanding of ideas proposed in the paper goes against the currently dominant epistemological tradition which regards ideas as opinions, views, or representations and in doing so renders the term conceptually indeterminable. The heuristic and creative potential possessed by ideas that influence and stimulate the development of philosophy should be adequately evaluated. The essential role that ideas play in history should not be ignored as well. While ideas express interests of different social groups, they should not be equated with interests, as philosophical ideas are meant to express fundamental issues of human essence and existence.

Features of the interpretation of physical knowledge on the example of the works of K. F. von Weizsäcker and H.-P. Dürr

The article is devoted to the interpretation of physical knowledge in the works "Structure of Physics" by K. F. von Weizsäcker and “Matter does not exist” by H.-P. Dürr. These works reveal a special understanding of matter in quantum mechanics. In the interpretation of physical knowledge H.-P. Dürr and K. F. von Weizsäcker postulate a special interpretation of matter within the framework of quantum theory, namely the inseparability of consciousness from matter. At the same time, we emphasize the fundamental difference between these approaches. H.-P. Dürr remains in the position of Advaita-Vedanta, his approach is closer to Eastern metaphysics, Weizsäcker adheres to the Western epistemological tradition, presenting physics as what we can know about matter. Heidegger also touches this issue, he criticizes the concept of "object" and "subject" in modern science, but does not say that both concepts must somehow be combined.

Utopian universals in the context of the concept of “information society”

This article explores the problem of utopian universals applicable to the concept of “information society”. The author interprets utopian universals as most general representations on the best social structure that became widespread within a particular epistemological tradition. The subject of this research is the determination and evolution of the universal social attributes characteristic to projects of best social structure within the epistemological tradition of scientific rationality developed throughout the XVI – XXI centuries. From T. Mohr's "Utopia" to D. Bell's "post-industrial Society" and M. Castells '"Information Age", the author traces the universal features of social attribution. The researcher comes to the conclusion that projects of an optimal or ideal social structure, changing their concrete form of expression, retain a utopian character throughout the entire line of development of the epistemological tradition of scientific rationality. Utopian universals of aggregation and codification of theoretical knowledge, transformation of science into the major driving force of political and economic development, transition of power to the wisemen-philosophers, collective maximally egalitarian and democratic participation in decision-making is the attributes that to greater or lesser degree are inherent to the utopias of Western civilization, beginning with the work of T. More. These same attributes retain in the concept of information society, which allows raising the question of the need for critical revision as a theoretical scientific concept and practical political project of the information society.

Preliminaries

This chapter lays the foundation for the remainder of the book. It provides a brief historical overview of the most central figures in the Buddhist epistemological tradition and emphasizes the importance of two figures in particular, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The chapter additionally provides an overview of several of the most important terms and concepts that are employed within Buddhist epistemological treatises. In particular, an extensive discussion is provided of the notion of a pramāṇa, which is the most important concept in all of Buddhist epistemology. Multiple different understandings of the term pramāṇa are elucidated, including those of a pramāṇa as an “instrument of knowledge” and as an “episode of knowledge.”

Perspective as a threshold concept for learning history

The epistemological concept of perspective meets all the conditions set by Meyer and Land (2003, 2006) to be considered a threshold concept for history learning. Following this initial hypothesis, this paper analyses the concept and the ways in which it constitutes a threshold: grasping perspective not only transforms one’s understanding of history, but it is also necessary for many aspects of historical thinking. Yet grappling with perspective is no easy feat, since understanding it requires the learner to confront other deeply rooted concepts and beliefs. Accordingly, the article explains how naive realism and the engrained epistemological tradition embodied in the expression ‘facts first’ make it difficult to understand history through perspective. Finally, a four-part model outlining different ways of understanding perspective is proposed, thus providing a framework within which we can think about what it means to cross the threshold from naive realism to a perspectivist vision of history.

Decolonization and Globalization in Communication Studies

Decolonial scholars are guided by alternative ways of thinking about language and communication that have existed for millennia but have gone unnoticed in scholarship. An approach to communication underwritten by the decolonial approach must be grounded in concepts that expand the repertoires of social emancipation that can constitute alternatives to neoliberalism through emancipatory scripts or social emancipation tropes. There are recent pockets of research in communication studies already working within or advocating decolonial, but such engagement with decoloniality within communication still lies at the fringes of the discipline, even though decolonial approaches can add rich lines of analysis to communication studies. The decolonial turn has the main goal of not only moving beyond, but also inviting relationality with the Western epistemological tradition, putting the Western canon into dialogue with non-Western epistemologies, and decolonizing the assumption of one single epistemic tradition from which to arrive at truth or universality. The decolonization of knowledge is active scholarship (praxis) that seriously considers subaltern racial, ethnic, gendered, and sexual spaces and bodies from the Global South to stop indigenous and subaltern epistemicide. To clarify, decolonial scholars of language and communication do not propose a decolonial universal truth against a modern/colonial one, nor do they adopt varying epistemologies and ontologies into theirs. Instead, they have the goal of building understanding across geopolitical relations. A non-ethnocentric decolonization of communication, then, would require engaging with the processes and products of globalization as entry points into acknowledging the communicative integrity of all positions held by humans within these processes.

Mipam

Mipam (or “Mipham”; ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) was one of the most influential figures in the Tibetan Buddhist world in the last 500 years. In his writings, he integrates aspects of the Buddhist epistemological tradition with a view of tantra and associates the view of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. The Great Perfection is for the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition its highest esoteric teachings, and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka is the philosophy commonly accepted in Tibet as the highest exoteric view. Buddhist epistemology, as a system that delineates the means of reliable knowledge, in particular plays an important role in both esoteric (e.g., sutra) and exoteric (e.g., tantra) domains by outlining the authentic means of knowing reality. By integrating the esoteric teachings of Nyingma tantra with Buddhist epistemology and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, Mipam affirms the Nyingma not only as a tradition of tantric exegesis and ritual practice, but also as grounded within the rigorous intellectual traditions of Buddhist exoteric philosophy. Mipam systematized the Nyingma tradition’s view of the Great Perfection within his writings on the Buddhist literature that had become the predominant topic of study in the curriculum of monastic education. Central to Mipam’s writing is the prominent place of reasoned inquiry as a means to arrive at the view of the Great Perfection. This is a feature that distinguishes the character of his works and is a significant contribution to Nyingma philosophy. Indeed, the interplay of reason and the transcendence of reason is a central theme in his writings. His skill in engaging the Great Perfection within a rational, dialectical exchange underscores that the Great Perfection is not naive anti-intellectualism, but involves a subtly profound view that, at least in Mipam’s presentation, incorporates reason and transcends it. In his writings on Madhyamaka and other works, Mipam developed a platform for Nyingma monastic education by formulating a systematic presentation drawn from an interpretative framework based on the Great Perfection. This was his unique contribution to the Nyingma, but not all in the Nyingma tradition were ready or willing to adopt his interpretation. It did not take long, however, for this interpretative framework, forged for the Nyingma monastic colleges, to dominate the curriculum in these colleges in Tibet, India, and Nepal. His works continue to be widely studied in such institutions up to the present day.

From Templates to Heuristics: How and Why to Move Beyond the Gioia Methodology

Researchers are exposed to multiple interpretive challenges in the journey from field data to theoretical understanding. A common response to these challenges is to turn to the guidance of templates such as the Gioia methodology—currently a preferred template for interpretive management research. Given its popularity, we examine how this methodology approaches the interpretive process of fieldwork. We find that the inductive route to theory that it offers does not address the challenges of interpretation. As an alternative, we propose a return to the epistemological tradition of hermeneutics. We argue that fieldwork informed by a hermeneutic orientation is able to generate credible and novel theory by confronting the challenges of interpretation head on. This process cannot be represented by the orderly steps of a template. We argue that a return to a hermeneutic orientation opens the way to more plausible and insightful theories based on interpretive rather than procedural rigor, and we offer a set of heuristics to guide both researchers and reviewers along this path.

Islam als Problem: Celal Nuri und Ahmed Hilmis (Filibeli) spätosmanischer Materialismusstreit

The so-called Materialismusstreit evolved in the second half of the 19th century as a new genre of popular literature and was carried out as a public debate mainly by German popularisers. In the Ottoman context, however, the reception of the Materialismusstreit demonstrates how a universalised perception of the West had already become the main frame of reference among secularly educated Ottoman intelligentsia in the course of late Ottoman modernity. This fact not only constitutively shaped their modern discourse on Islam. Moreover, it brought about at the same time fundamental semantic shifts in concepts holding a prominent role within the Islamicate epistemological tradition. Consequently, the entanglement between this abovementioned frame of reference and concepts inherited from a traditional knowledge order resulted in a conceptual rupture with the traditional epistemologies. In an attempt to exemplify the argument, this paper builds on a less-known dispute on materialism between Celal Nuri and Ahmed Hilmi (Filibeli), and shows the transformation in their usage of epistemic concepts such as ʿilm, fenn, and dīn, as well as their reception of the Orientalist Islam discourse. Prior to the analysis of two core primary sources, the first part of this paper elaborates on the theoretical and methodological modalities of making fruitful the intellectual output of late Ottoman modernity for a globally entangled intellectual history.