scholarly journals Nuclear warfare beyond counterforce

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Gallagher ◽  
Michael Cevallos
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear Targeting ◽  
Nuclear Arsenal ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Economic Infrastructure ◽  
Potential Damage ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Multiple Actors

Abstract A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent's nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when hardening and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make executing a counterforce strategy against an adversary's nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multiple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary's nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider striking with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country's remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from responding. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be controlled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes.

Nuclear Deterrence during the Period of Confrontation

2015 ◽  
pp. 30-39
Author(s):  
A. Savel'ev
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Problem Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear Targeting ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Security Problem ◽  
Massive Retaliation

The article focuses on the main aspects of nuclear deterrence concept, including the mechanism of its application during the period of international tension. The author pays attention to the strategic triad configuration which makes nuclear deterrence more effective and reliable. Along with it the credibility of nuclear deterrence is also under consideration as a very important element of the overall problem analysis. The central part of the article is devoted to the problem of nuclear targeting and possible application of nuclear weapons in case the deterrence failed, and the decision to use these weapons were taken. The author argues that there is no rational variant to apply nuclear weapons without unpredictable and deadly reaction from the opposite side. There is no hope to achieve any positive result after the first use of nuclear weapons – whether strategic or tactical. Thus, a massive counterforce strike cannot prevent from a massive retaliation resulting in the complete annihilation of the rivalries. A limited strike against strategic offensive forces of the opponent can be interpreted as a massive strike ending with massive retaliation. A single strike cannot solve any military problem and, moreover, may give strategic initiative to the opponent. Tactical nuclear forces can be used in different, but generally “unproductive” ways – whether against the own territory, or by solving only limited tasks, while producing an unpredictable reaction from the opponent. The author comes to a conclusion that the nuclear weapon is only an instrument of self-destruction which cannot solve any security problem. It can only play a symbolic role in terms of the country's prestige, and nothing else. Finally, the author insists that the strategic stability concept started to play a counter-productive role in the U.S.-Russia strategic relations, and must be substituted by a new approach to security. This approach should reject the central idea of strategic stability which calls for preserving a powerful retaliatory potential. Acknowledgements. The publication is prepared with financial support of the Russian Foundation for Humanities; Project № 15-37-11136 “The Influence of Technological Factors on the Spectrum of Threats to National and International Security, Military Conflicts and Strategic Stability”.

Mulled US nuclear posture shift would lack credibility

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Nuclear Arsenal ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
And Shifts

Subject Potential US adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons policy. Significance The administration of US President Barack Obama is reportedly considering the adoption of a 'no first use' nuclear weapons posture in his final months in office. A no first use policy would involve the United States declaring that it would only use its nuclear arsenal in response to a nuclear attack, never as a preliminary move in escalating tensions. This shift would be a significant departure from Washington's earlier posture, which maintained ambiguity as to whether nuclear weapons would be used in a hypothetical conventional attack on the United States or its allies. Impacts Arsenal upgrades and shifts in doctrine favouring tactical nuclear weapons would counteract the benefits of a restrained declaratory policy. Technological breakthroughs with hypersonic missiles are likely to undermine existing legal and diplomatic arms control arrangements. Obama may take up the pursuit of nuclear arms reductions with an ex-president's public profile. Eastern NATO allies will react strongly against any hint that their security does not fall under the US nuclear umbrella.

The Defense Budget

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Defense Spending ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Defense Budget ◽  
Nuclear Arsenal ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cost

This chapter analyzes the cost of the US nuclear arsenal. Many analysts have argued that a robust nuclear arsenal is unaffordable, but this chapter shows that this view is incorrect. It reviews the arguments made by those in favor of reducing spending on US nuclear weapons and moves on to present the counterargument about why the US nuclear force is affordable. It shows that nuclear weapons represent a small percentage of overall US defense spending and that roughly five percent of the US defense budget is not too much to spend for a strategic deterrent. The United States can afford to maintain and modernize its nuclear forces and, indeed, they come at a good value.

The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed Conflict: Proportionality and Precautionary Measures

2000 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 109-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Desgagné
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Scant Attention ◽  
Precautionary Measures ◽  
Potential Damage ◽  
Nuclear Warfare

The law of war historically paid scant attention to the protection of the environment. Its main focus was to regulate hostilities so as protect combatants from unnecessary injury. Since World War II, it has turned to the protection of the civilian population and individual civilians. It does not follow that the environment did not receive any protection at all. In as much as international humanitarian law places constraints on the use of means and methods of warfare, the environment was indirectly protected. Thus, the provisions of the Hague or the Geneva Conventions, through the protection of civilian property and objects, offer indirect protection of the environment. Similarly, the banning of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological and chemical weapons, or the restraints on activities related to nuclear warfare, such as the testing of nuclear weapons, also ultimately limit potential damage to the environment caused by armed conflicts.

scholarly journals Preventing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation as Nuclear Power Expands

MRS Bulletin ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 340-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siegfried S. Hecker
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Global Climate Change ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Global Climate ◽  
Energy Sources ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
The Cold War

Raj et al. describe the promise of nuclear energy as a sustainable, affordable, and carbon-free source available this century on a scale that can help meet the world's growing need for energy and help slow the pace of global climate change. However, the factor of millions gain in energy release from nuclear fssion compared to all conventional energy sources that tap the energy of electrons (Figure 1) has also been used to create explosives of unprecedented lethality and, hence, poses a serious challenge to the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide. Although the end of the cold war has eliminated the threat of annihilating humanity, the likelihood of a devastating nuclear attack has increased as more nations, subnational groups, and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

Child advocacy in the nuclear age

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 802-804
Author(s):  
Lawrence R. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Child Advocacy ◽  
World War ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Second World

In 1943, amidst the nation's mobilization for the Second World War, there appeared an article by Dr. William Schmidt of the Children's Bureau on the susceptibility of young people to the hazards of radioactive materials.1 Reviewing the literature, and invoking generally accepted pediatric principles, Dr. Schmidt concluded that young people possess special vulnerability to the hazards of radiation, and that this warranted their exclusion from employment in the gas mantle and radium dial industries. Now, more than 30 years later, there again exists an urgent need to review the topic of radiation and children. With the spread of nuclear weapons technology to many countries, the spectre of nuclear test fallout (not to mention nuclear warfare!) is once again upon us.

Getting to Stalemate

2020 ◽  
pp. 31-65
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter analyzes how much nuclear retaliatory capability must countries build to reliably deter nuclear attack and how easy is it to establish nuclear stalemate. It discusses competing views and explains why the outcome of the debate is crucial for understanding the central puzzle of the nuclear age. One view holds that even minimal nuclear arsenals are “enough” to create stalemate, while another contends that stalemate requires far more robust nuclear forces and the virtual certainty of retaliation. However, the chapter also shows that minimal arsenals have not been enough. It looks into the intense rivalry of the Cold War, in which the threshold of nuclear capability required to generate deterrence was higher than the capability to create the mere possibility of retaliation.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

2019 ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Strategic Defense Initiative ◽  
The West ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
Nuclear Arms

This chapter debunks the triumphalist claim that President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative so as to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, if not collapse. In fact, the president hoped SDI would protect civilians from nuclear attack and considered the program a key part of his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. Reagan repeatedly offered to share SDI with the Soviets in the belief that if both sides had defenses nuclear weapons would become obsolete. Thus, they could be eliminated. President Reagan’s revolutionary ideas about nuclear security caused deep rifts within the administration. His advisers rejected the notion that nuclear arms should or could be eliminated, believing instead that the threat of nuclear annihilation had successfully deterred the Soviets from attacking the West. With the exception of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, they opposed the costly SDI. However, they grudgingly came to support it in the belief that they might be able to trade it away in exchange for a Soviet pledge to reduce its arsenals. However, Reagan’s advisers were universally against the idea of sharing SDI with Moscow. If Reagan’s objective had been to compel Moscow to surrender the arms race, he would not have repeatedly offered to share SDI.

Deterrence Then and Now.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
James A. Thomson
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International System ◽  
Initial Attack ◽  
Extended Deterrence ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Cold War

Abstract: Against the backdrop of an international system becoming more confrontational in nature, the subject of deterrence is back again. This article provides an overview of the nature of the deterrence problem during the Cold War period and today. While the broader circumstances have changed markedly, today, the central issue of deterrence remains the same as in the Cold War: how to maintain the credibility of the American threat to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of allies in the face of adversaries that can retaliate with devastating nuclear attacks against the US itself. There is little doubt about the threat of the US or other nuclear powers to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack against their own homelands, so long as those retaliatory forces can survive the initial attack. The problem is the credibility of US extended deterrence.

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