This paper discusses the relationship between Axel Honneth?s intersubjective
theory of recognition and his political theory of democratic ethical life by
addressing the potentials and difficulties attached to the notion of social
pathology. Taking into account the diverse uses of this concept throughout
Honneth?s oeuvre, it focuses initially on two of its formulations: first, the
more recent discussions presented in ?The Diseases of Society?, some of which
can be read in continuity with arguments presented in Freedom?s Right;
second, an implicit conception of social pathology that can be found in
Struggle for Recognition. These formulations involve contrastingly different
premises with regard to phenomenological, methodological, social-ontological
and etiological matters. I argue that such differences can be better grasped
if one bears in mind two distinctive ways of understanding the fundamental
intuition at the basis of the notion of social pathology: either as an
analogy or as a homology. By disclosing the actual or potential discrepancies
between both conceptions, the aim is to outline the grounds on which they
could be brought together within the framework of a comprehensive concept.
With this purpose, I then critically examine a third conception of social
pathology which was first presented in Suffering from Indeterminacy and later
developed, with some restrictions, in Freedom?s Right. Finally, a definition
of social pathology is suggested which can bring together the different
contributions of each conception while avoiding their pitfalls.