USING MIND MAP IN TEACHING THE SUBJECT OF AGGREGATE STATES OF MATTER

The article discusses the factors that improve people’s intellectual abilities. To do this, it provides information about the physiology of the human brain and the mechanism by which the information it perceives is stored in memory. To develop students' 'creative thinking' skills, it is necessary to develop their 'imagination' skills. The imagination perceives information from the mind. “Indirect perception” is important for imagining physical processes. Data visualization is important for understanding processes. To do this, use the "Mind Map", which is an effective way to perform such a task. The article describes the opportunities for students to develop "creative thinking" skills in the teaching of "Aggregate states of matter." For the first time, "Aggregate Cases" are being published. Not only it stores a lot of information about physical processes, but it also helps students develop “full thinking” skills by activating the cerebral hemispheres.

Kumam

Kumam is a Western Nilotic language that is spoken in central Uganda. This chapter focuses on the formation of a double downstep high tone, the function of middle sentences, and evidentiality in complementation. Kumam is a tone language with a low and a high toneme, exhibiting a double downstep high tone as a feature. Aspect (imperfective vs. perfective) is marked obligatorily with a suprasegmental morpheme, while tense is not marked in verbal complexes. Tense is expressed lexically. Kumam has no passivization, but middle sentences function as a passive equivalent instead. Kumam has two types of complementation, “paratactic” and “hypotactic”, that are different syntactically and semantically. For instance, when perception verbs are followed by a “paratactic” clause, they express direct perception. When they are followed by a “hypotactic” clause, they express indirect perception. There is the relationship between the complement types and evidentiality.

I CAN’T SEEM TO FIND MY GLASSES–THE ENGLISH VERB SEEM AND ITS MACEDONIAN TRANSLATION

This paper discusses the verb seemand its translation equivalents in Macedonian. Seemis a multifunctional verb. As a copula verb, it is a verb of indirect perception. It may also mark the verb phrase for evidentiality and epistemic modality. In other cases, seemmay also function as a hedge, which is a pragmatic function of linguistic means that allows the speaker not to express the commitment categorically. Because of its multiple functions, seemhas different translations in Macedonian. The most widespread are congruent correspondences,when seemis translated with a corresponding verb (се чини, изгледа, личи), and zero correspondences, when it is dropped. This variety may also appear due to different cultural attitudes towards evidence.

Revisit adjective distribution in Chinese

This study re-classifies Chinese monosyllabic adjectives and verbs in light of ‘scale structure’. It examines how various adjectives are associated with different scalar layers of verbs. The investigation focuses upon direct perception expressions and resultatives. The finding reveals that the closed-scale perceptual verb jiàn ‘see’ does not tolerate open-scale APs. This is because, (a) syntactically, Chinese perception verb complements do not represent a result state as the AP-complement is encoded into the perception verb root; (b) semantically, jiàn ‘see’ not only represent an accomplishment predication but contributes to a potential indirect perception, describing the observer’s evaluation of the perceived event.kàn ‘look’ is open-scale and is likely to render a direct perception report. The degree of kàn’s associations with different APs runs from ‘Totally open-scale AP’, down to ‘Upper closed-scale AP’, ‘Lower closed-scale AP’, ‘Totally closed-scale AP’. Resultatives seem to welcome all layers of adjectives. Various APs may match with a transitive verb, an unergative verb, a light verb or an unaccusative verb. This is down to the fact that, resultative complements are framed outside the verb roots and thus, do not receive restriction from the verb.

Non-specific, specific and obscured perception verbs in Baltic languages

Opportunistic perception verbs (‘see’, ‘hear’, as opposed to explorative perception verbs, ‘look’, ‘listen’) express the opportunity for perception and are condition-oriented (exposure, i.e. the perceiver’s exposure to a stimulus), not participant-oriented, in their aspectual structure. The Baltic languages, as other languages in Central, East, and Northern Europe, have specific perception verbs, which are a subtype of opportunistic perception verbs, for the expression of restricted exposure. The lexical character of specificity in Baltic—unlike Russian where it is integrated into a rigid grammatical aspect system—is more favorable for uncovering the underlying semantic factors of specificity, which differ across perceptual systems. Restrictedness of exposure is a scale rather than a dichotomy, and cross-linguistic comparison in parallel texts reveals that specificity is a scale with much variation as to where the borderline between specific and non-specific perception verbs is drawn in the languages of the area. Obscured perception verbs, which emphasize difficulty in discrimination, are another set of condition-oriented perception verbs in Baltic and Russian and are closely related to specific verbs synchronically and diachronically. This paper describes non-specific, specific, and obscured perception verbs in the Baltic languages and attempts to capture their variability within six dimensions (morphology, area, diachrony, specificity, modality, obscured verbs). A precondition for this endeavor is a critique of earlier approaches to the semantics of perception verbs. Nine major biases are identified (nominalism, physiology, discrete features, vision, paradigmatic modelling, aspectual event types, dual nature models, participant orientation, and viewing activity as control). In developing an alternative, the approach greatly profits from Gibson’s ecological psychology and Rock’s theory of indirect perception.

Malebranche’s Neoplatonic Semantic Theory

This paper argues that Malebranche’s semantics sheds light on his metaphysics and epistemology, and is of interest in its own right. By recasting issues linguistically, it shows that Malebranche assumes a Neoplatonic semantic structure within Descartes’ dualism and Augustine’s theory of illumination, and employs linguistic devices from the Neoplatonic tradition. Viewed semantically, mental states of illumination stand to God and his ideas as predicates stand in Neoplatonic semantics to ideas ordered by a privative relation on “being.” The framework sheds light on interpretive puzzles in Malebranche studies such as the way ideas reside in God’s mind, the notion of resemblance by which bodies imitate their exemplar causes, and the issue of direct vs. indirect perception through a mechanism by which agents can see bodies by “seeing” ideas. Malebranche’s semantics is of interest in its own right because it gives a full (if implausible) account of the mediating relations that determine indirect reference; lays out a correspondence theory of truth for necessary judgments; defines contingent truth as based on an indirect reference relation that is both descriptive and causal but that does not appeal to body-mind causation; and within his theory of perception, works out an account of singular reference in which singular terms carry existential import, refer indirectly via causal relations, but describe their referents only in a general way.

Seeing Objects and Surfaces, and the ‘In Virtue Of’ Relation

Frank Jackson in Perception uses the ‘in virtue of’ relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the ‘in virtue of’ relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that we don't, ‘strictly speaking’, see objects, are also false.