Challenges in Nuclear Posture and Deterrence from Pakistan’s Perspective

India and Pakistan are engaged in a nuclear arms competition with new technologies and systems that have a direct bearing on their respective doctrines and nuclear postures. The statements by senior Indian leadership over the past few years throw into question the viability of India’s no-first-use posture and have placed further stress on the deterrence relationship between these two regional adversaries. India’s efforts to explore space for a limited war in a nuclearised environment have encouraged Pakistan to introduce remedial measures in the form of short-range ballistic missiles. These are part of its full spectrum deterrence, which aims to deter an entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear threats. India’s work to operationalise its second-strike capability, acquisition of ballistic missile defences and development of hypersonic weapons could undermine regional strategic stability. These efforts require countermeasures on the part of Pakistan to ensure deterrence stability between the two nuclear armed neighbours.

Challenges in Nuclear Posture and Deterrence from India’s Perspective

South Asia comprises eight countries, among which India and Pakistan are two nuclear weapon powers marked by strained relations. Within this dynamic, this essay examines India’s nuclear path, in spite of its staunch support for a nuclear-weapon-free world. It covers Pakistan’s nuclear journey through proliferation and the logic for it to perpetrate state-sponsored terrorism against India, arguing that this serves as a major factor that could lead to war. Despite this potential, it also explains why South Asia is not the most dangerous nuclear flashpoint in the world. In addition to India and Pakistan, five other nuclear nations are present in the region, namely China, Russia, Israel, North Korea and the United States. As such, this essay discusses positive and negative effects of each of these powers on nuclear dynamics of the region. It concludes with recommendations for fostering strategic stability in South Asia.

Developing a Framework for Evaluating Nuclear Risks in South Asia

A new framework is essential for evaluating nuclear risks in South Asia. This region is marked by perennial disputes, emerging rivalries and long-standing extra-regional interferences, suggesting that it must be considered as a complex geostrategic frame of reference, rather than as a mere geographic construct. As key variables, postures such as no first use and escalate to de-escalate, as well as technological advances may either mitigate or exacerbate nuclear risks. Due to this complexity, causes of instability, risks of conflict, escalation to nuclear use and prospects of restraints and risk reduction will need to engage key players. This must occur not simply in dyadic, but also in multilateral contexts, due to the cascading effects of interactions among them. Within this framework, this essay will explore the erosion of no first use, the potential pitfalls of escalate to de-escalate and technological advances pose significant and worrying challenges for nuclear risk reduction.

The South Asia Stability-Instability Paradox Under the Nuclear Shadow

Cross-border clashes between India and Pakistan in 2019, and between India and China in 2020, have placed a spotlight on theories about the stabilising and destabilising effects of nuclear weapons. The experience of the India-Pakistan dyad, and now that within the India-China dyad, is that despite the apparent risks of nuclear escalation, nuclear-armed adversaries may still be prepared to engage in limited, but deadly conventional or sub-conventional conflicts under the nuclear shadow. This paper uses stability-instability paradox theory to explain the mechanics of this apparent paradox and to discuss how these relationships may evolve in future.

Quantifying the Cost of Drone-Related Threats in New Zealand

This article provides initial estimates of the most significant threats from drones in New Zealand. An economic approach is adopted with risks expressed as an expected annual cost, which is consistent with the adoption of a cost-benefit frame-work for policy development. It will be demonstrated that the expected annual cost of drone misuse are greater than that of a mass shooting, with the risks in the prison system alone exceeding the expected cost of a mass shooting. The expected annual cost of a terror attack exceeds that of the risks to the aviation industry. However current government proposals for registration of drones and licensing of pilots will do little to address the potential threats, which generally – though not exclusively – arise from individuals who have no intention of complying with the law. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Ministry of Transport’s proposed policies will be effective in countering the most significant threats – those policies are likely to cost more than the risk that they might avert. Consequently there is a need to develop a strategy for countering the misuse of drones by those engaged in illegal activities.

Reconfiguring the Relationship Between Intelligence Professionals and the Public: A First Step Towards Democratising New Zealand’s National Security?

The secrecy surrounding intelligence work has meant the relationship between New Zealand intelligence professionals and the public they serve has always been somewhat problematic. Over the past decade, leaks, scandals and a deadly act of terrorism have certainly not improved the public’s trust and confidence in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau. While the Government has undertaken several measures to strengthen the credibility of those agencies, including initiating public inquiries and bolstering governance arrangements, its current approach is rather limited, has reached those limits and could now be counterproductive. In light of the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 to increase public involvement in New Zealand’s counterterrorism effort, we argue that it is time for this problematic relationship between intelligence professionals and the public to be rethought and reconfigured. To that end, we identify several concrete actions that parliamentarians and university leaders could consider taking to actively support intelligence professionals as they foster a society of informed citizens and create new opportunities to bring national security matters into the heart of democracy’s deliberative processes.

Reconfiguring the Relationship Between Intelligence Professionals and the Public: A First Step Towards Democratising New Zealand’s National Security?

The secrecy surrounding intelligence work has meant the relationship between New Zealand intelligence professionals and the public they serve has always been somewhat problematic. Over the past decade, leaks, scandals and a deadly act of terrorism have certainly not improved the public’s trust and confidence in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau. While the Government has undertaken several measures to strengthen the credibility of those agencies, including initiating public inquiries and bolstering governance arrangements, its current approach is rather limited, has reached those limits and could now be counterproductive. In light of the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 to increase public involvement in New Zealand’s counterterrorism effort, we argue that it is time for this problematic relationship between intelligence professionals and the public to be rethought and reconfigured. To that end, we identify several concrete actions that parliamentarians and university leaders could consider taking to actively support intelligence professionals as they foster a society of informed citizens and create new opportunities to bring national security matters into the heart of democracy’s deliberative processes. Keywords: terrorism, public inquiries, official secrecy, transparency, expertise.

Reconfiguring the Relationship Between Intelligence Professionals and the Public: A First Step Towards Democratising New Zealand’s National Security?

The secrecy surrounding intelligence work has meant the relationship between New Zealand intelligence professionals and the public they serve has always been somewhat problematic. Over the past decade, leaks, scandals and a deadly act of terrorism have certainly not improved the public’s trust and confidence in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau. While the Government has undertaken several measures to strengthen the credibility of those agencies, including initiating public inquiries and bolstering governance arrangements, its current approach is rather limited, has reached those limits and could now be counterproductive. In light of the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Mosques on 15 March 2019 to increase public involvement in New Zealand’s counterterrorism effort, we argue that it is time for this problematic relationship between intelligence professionals and the public to be rethought and reconfigured. To that end, we identify several concrete actions that parliamentarians and university leaders could consider taking to actively support intelligence professionals as they foster a society of informed citizens and create new opportunities to bring national security matters into the heart of democracy’s deliberative processes. Keywords: terrorism, public inquiries, official secrecy, transparency, expertise.

Book Review [Mosul: Australia’s Secret War Inside the ISIS Caliphate]

This is a book review of the book by Ben McKelvey (2020), Mosul: Australia’s Secret War Inside the ISIS Caliphate, Hachette Australia. Published by - Hachette Australia (Sydney, 2020) Format - Paperback ISBN - 978-0-7336-4541-9 339 pages Reviewed by John Battersby 'Mosul: Australia’s Secret War Inside the ISIS Caliphate' looks at parallel paths in the Al Qaeda (AQ) and ISIS inspired conflicts of the 2000s. On the one hand, it looks at those who were lured by AQ and ISIS propaganda into conceiving plots in Australia (a number were caught in the Pendennis operation), while another killed a civilian employee in October 2015 and several others left Australia to fight in Iraq and Syria in the period of ISIS’s ascendency. At the same time McKelvey relates the coinciding story lines of a number of Australian special forces personnel who were deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 and after 2003 (including the mid-2010s) to Iraq. Their exploits are detailed, the rationale for their deployment and operations is given, and light is shone on the consequences for those individuals personally. It is too often the fate of those who give their loyalty and commitment to their country, to discover that their country seldom reciprocates in equal measure. The inconsequential occasional mis-demeanours by highly disciplined servicemen that offend the sensibilities of their higher commanders were punished harshly, and the enormous personal and psychological toll that inevitably falls on individuals deployed to war-zones has not been adequately addressed by Australia. Service personnel surviving war zones to commit suicide when they come home is not an acceptable outcome of these deployments.