Direito e ciência na teoria pura do direito E o problema da liberdade em Kelsen

O estudo destina-se a abordar a relação entre o direito e a ciência na Teoria Pura do Direito e o problema da cientificidade na literatura de Hans Kelsen, inicia-se a abordagem com a análise entre a norma jurídica e a proposição jurídica, após uma realiza-se uma abordagem entre a causalidade (ser) e a imputação (dever-ser), expõe-se a ideia kelseneana de norma fundamental e por fim, coloca-se o complexo problema da liberdade na obra deste importante autor da literatura jurídica concluindo que o respostas a este problema só serão encontradas quando atendidas as exigências da ciência. O que se observa é que a norma fundamental defendida por Kelsen é necessária sim para o teórico do direito, aquele que tem a função de explicar a validade do direito, explicar de onde vem a força do direito - se do ser ou do dever-ser, ou seja, de um fato ou de uma norma -, mas não para o prático do direito, pois a norma fundamental, como já frisado, é uma norma hipotética, não tem conteúdo, e é justamente disso que precisam os operadores do direito para aplicarem a norma. The study is intended to address the relationship between law and science in the Pure Theory of Law and the problem of scientificity in Hans Kelsen's literature. an approach is made between causality (being) and imputation (should-be), it exposes the Kelsenean idea of ​​fundamental norm and, finally, the complex problem of freedom in the work of this important author of legal literature is presented, concluding that the answers to this problem will only be found when the demands of science are met. What is observed is that the fundamental norm defended by Kelsen is indeed necessary for the legal theorist, who has the function of explaining the validity of the law, explaining where the force of law comes from - whether of being or of the should-be , that is, of a fact or a norm -, but not for the legal practitioner, as the fundamental norm, as already emphasized, is a hypothetical norm, has no content, and this is precisely what the operators of the law need to apply the standard..

The x and society syndrome

Half a century of behavioral, practice-oriented research in fields as diverse as politics, economy, law, and science has generated insights that improve our understanding of these fields’ workings considerably. Surveying the pertinent literature, however, also leads to a baffling finding: the social that this research sought to vindicate is not there. And this, the article shows, is no coincidence. Rather, it is a direct consequence of the middle range approach of theorizing this research both adopts and reflects; an artefact of a mode of analysis which makes the social into a derivative of an essential other: the topic under investigation. As a result, its meaning changes every time the analysis switches to a new field, to some other ‘x’. A proposal is made to fix this problem by drawing on general sociological theory, with whose help it can be easily avoided.

Science and Technology and Intellectual Property Research

This chapter examines science and technology as a subject of legal research and regulation. Rather than reflecting on the regulatory challenges presented by science and (new) technologies intrinsically and generally, this chapter aims to contribute to the methodological debate when conducting legal research on science and technology. The chapter explores the different types of research objectives and related methodological features that legal scholars can pursue in their research on law and science and technology: descriptive, classifying, comparative, theory-building, explanatory, evaluative, and recommendatory research objectives. The analysis is made more exacting by providing concrete examples from research projects in the area of patent and copyright law and technology, ranging from biotechnology, over 3D-printing, to functional design.

Law and the Laboratory: The British Vivisection Inspectorate in the 1890s

The 1876 British Cruelty to Animals Act introduced an unprecedented administrative system to supervise any experiment “calculated to give pain” to a living animal. The act, which was in force for a hundred years, established a tight system of control over animal experimentation, including a small, but vigorous, inspectorate. This article explores the relations between bureaucracy and the production of knowledge through the correspondences, memos, and notes taken by two principal inspectors under the act. The inspectors belonged to the worlds of both law and science. Coming from within the scientific profession, their close ties to medical social circles not only evoked critique but also helped them fulfill their tasks and gain access to research laboratories. Archival records examined here for the first time show that, although the inspectors downplayed animals’ pain in physiological laboratories, the inspectorate played an important role in shaping the experimental space and practice, thus facilitating the production of “ethical scientific facts.” The inspectors’ work modeled the new legal regime of animal experimentation regulation, making them indispensable agents in the act’s coproduction of knowledge and public order.