scholarly journals Solution of Traveler’s Dilemma

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Gabriela OSIECKA ◽  
Maciej JASIŃSKI

Aim: The aim of the article is to show: 1) that the reasoning of perfectly rational players presented in 1994 by the author of the Traveler's Dilemma Kaushik Basu is incorrect and therefore leads to wrong conclusions, 2) how the reasoning of these players should look like and what solution it leads to. Design / Research methods: Logical analysis. Conclusions / findings: Perfectly rational Traveler’s Dilemma players should use, according to game theory, so-called retrograde (iterative) induction. This is wrong, as in the set of Traveler’s Dilemma games results the principle of transitivity is not met. We believe that perfectly rational players will achieve a better result when they make a random decision from a suitably limited set of decisions. After applying this method of decision making, perfectly rational players will achieve a result similar to those obtained by real players in experiments. Thus, the paradox described in the theory of games disappears, that perfectly rational players achieve worse results than real players Originality / value of the article: A new way of making decisions in the Traveler’s Dilemma game. Implications of the research: A new way of making decisions in other games similar to the Traveler’s Dilemma may allow to find new solutions in these games. Limitations of the research: The described decision-making method can potentially be used in decision-making situations when the following five conditions are met: 1) the set of possible decisions of each player is greater than 2, 2) the winning matrix is known to both players and both know the purpose of their choices, 3) when it is played once with an unknown opponent, 4) when both players have to make their decision without knowing the opponent's choice, 5) when there is no decision, which is a stable balance point or when it is, but its choice means that the player does not achieve a satisfying result.

2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (148) ◽  
pp. 55-68
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Moro ◽  
Marcelo Auday ◽  
Fernando Tohmé

Kaushik Basu presents the Traveler’s Dilemma (TD) as a challenge to Game Theory. This challenge has been experimentally investigated. When faced with Basu’s version of the TD, participants (including experts in game theory) behave inthe way Basu suggests. However, a little change in the game turns out to reverse participants’ choices. The question is, then, whether it is possible to provide an account of the main empirical findings as consequences of rational choices (i.e., torationalize them). There are several proposals in the literature but none of them provides a satisfactory account for why experts in game theory playing against each other usually reject the only undominated option of the TD. The goal of this article is to suggest an alternative proposal that fixes this problem.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-589
Author(s):  
Gholamreza Askari ◽  
Madjid Eshaghi Gordji

In this paper, we provide an interpretation of the rationality in game theory in which player consider the profit or loss of the opponent in addition to personal profit at the game.‎ ‎‎The goal of a game analysis with two hyper-rationality players is to provide insight into real-world situations that are often more complex than a game with two rational players where the choices of strategy are only based on individual preferences. The hyper-rationality does not mean perfect rationality but an insight toward how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions. ‎‎The findings of this research can help to enlarge our understanding of the psychological aspects of strategy choices in games and also provide an analysis of the decision-making process with cognitive economics approach at the same time.‎ ‎‎‎


Author(s):  
Konrad RÓŻOWICZ

Aim: In the practice of awarding public contracts, sometimes the behavior of market actors, instead of competing with other entities, are aimed at illegal cooperation, including bid rigging. The above shows that healthy competition is not possible without efficient market control. In public procurement market this control is, primarily, carried out by public procurement entities: the President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) and the National Appeal Chamber (KIO), and furthermore by President od the Office of Competition (Prezes UOKiK) and Consumer Protection and the Court od Competition and Consumer Protection. and Consumer Protection (SOKiK). The interesting issue is how the activities of the President of Office of Competition and Consumer Protection targeted  to contend with bid rigging affects on the activities of President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) or the National Appeal Chamber (KIO). Design / Research methods: analysis and comparison decisions/ judgment issued by the President of the Public Procurement Office, National Appeal Chamber, the President of  the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection. Conclusions: The analysis has shown that the existence of specificities in the activities of the decision-making bodies and the judgments examined. However, in keeping with the specificity of the forms and objectives of control, these entities should cooperate, to a greater extent than before. Expanding the scope of cooperation would make it possible to better contend with bid rigging without changing the competition protection model. The introduction of institutionalized instruments for cooperation between the authorities seems to be valuable in terms of system solutions. Value of the article: The main value of the article is the comparison of selectively selected decisions and judgments representative of the problem under consideration and their comparative analysis in order to achieve the research objectives. The article deals with issues relevant to both public procurement practitioners and the state bodies dealing with procurement matters.


Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 1523
Author(s):  
Nikita Smirnov ◽  
Yuzhou Liu ◽  
Aso Validi ◽  
Walter Morales-Alvarez ◽  
Cristina Olaverri-Monreal

Autonomous vehicles are expected to display human-like behavior, at least to the extent that their decisions can be intuitively understood by other road users. If this is not the case, the coexistence of manual and autonomous vehicles in a mixed environment might affect road user interactions negatively and might jeopardize road safety. To this end, it is highly important to design algorithms that are capable of analyzing human decision-making processes and of reproducing them. In this context, lane-change maneuvers have been studied extensively. However, not all potential scenarios have been considered, since most works have focused on highway rather than urban scenarios. We contribute to the field of research by investigating a particular urban traffic scenario in which an autonomous vehicle needs to determine the level of cooperation of the vehicles in the adjacent lane in order to proceed with a lane change. To this end, we present a game theory-based decision-making model for lane changing in congested urban intersections. The model takes as input driving-related parameters related to vehicles in the intersection before they come to a complete stop. We validated the model by relying on the Co-AutoSim simulator. We compared the prediction model outcomes with actual participant decisions, i.e., whether they allowed the autonomous vehicle to drive in front of them. The results are promising, with the prediction accuracy being 100% in all of the cases in which the participants allowed the lane change and 83.3% in the other cases. The false predictions were due to delays in resuming driving after the traffic light turned green.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shion Maeda ◽  
Nicolas Chauvet ◽  
Hayato Saigo ◽  
Hirokazu Hori ◽  
Guillaume Bachelier ◽  
...  

AbstractCollective decision making is important for maximizing total benefits while preserving equality among individuals in the competitive multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problem, wherein multiple players try to gain higher rewards from multiple slot machines. The CMAB problem represents an essential aspect of applications such as resource management in social infrastructure. In a previous study, we theoretically and experimentally demonstrated that entangled photons can physically resolve the difficulty of the CMAB problem. This decision-making strategy completely avoids decision conflicts while ensuring equality. However, decision conflicts can sometimes be beneficial if they yield greater rewards than non-conflicting decisions, indicating that greedy actions may provide positive effects depending on the given environment. In this study, we demonstrate a mixed strategy of entangled- and correlated-photon-based decision-making so that total rewards can be enhanced when compared to the entangled-photon-only decision strategy. We show that an optimal mixture of entangled- and correlated-photon-based strategies exists depending on the dynamics of the reward environment as well as the difficulty of the given problem. This study paves the way for utilizing both quantum and classical aspects of photons in a mixed manner for decision making and provides yet another example of the supremacy of mixed strategies known in game theory, especially in evolutionary game theory.


2014 ◽  
Vol 986-987 ◽  
pp. 400-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuan Lu ◽  
Wen Shan Gao ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
Wan Lei Xue ◽  
Wen Xue Sun

First, behavior models of the station operator and consumer are established considering all the main factors. Second, an optimized EV charging pricing method using Game Theory is introduced based on benefit-cost analysis. The calculation of government subsidies is also proposed in order to reach an equilibrium charging price. Finally, actual data of Hebei is used and results are shown to give supports to local government and charging station operator’s decision making.


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