Getting to Yes in the cross-cultural-context: ‘one size doesn’t fit all’ – a critical review of principled negotiations across borders

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implicitly assumed universality of the best seller negotiation literature Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury. Design/methodology/approach Existing cross-cultural negotiation literature was systematically searched for findings indicating either a higher or lower likelihood of successfully applying the authors’ advice in different cultural environments, as defined in the Hofstede framework or The Globe Study. The findings were aggregated, categorized into a matrix, synthesized and analyzed. Findings This paper finds that the assumed universality of the method of Getting to Yes and its single principles is not supported by research. Instead, a dichotomy of the four principles’ applicability along the Individuality dimension of Hofstede was found. Hence, the western orientation of Getting to Yes is reality, inhibiting its use in non-western cultures. However, in one principle – Invent options for mutual gain – the findings refute a successful application in western cultures. Additional findings and research gaps are presented. Practical implications Practitioners should apply Getting to Yes with caution, if at all, in a non-western environment. For the teaching of negotiations, alternative approaches for conducting negotiations in the non-western world are needed. Originality/value Although widely used in research, scholars only addressed sporadic comments concerning the limitations of Getting to Yes across cultures. Often the universality of Getting to Yes is either implicitly or explicitly assumed in research and practice. This paper approaches this topic systematically by providing evidence that Getting to Yes is not universal and conceptually sees negotiations through a western shaped perspective that provides considerable implications for research, practice and teaching.

The Three Conditions: Solving Complex Problems through Self-Governing Agreements

Grounded in peacebuilding and negotiation literature, we propose a Three Conditions Model that promotes collaborative engagement and can help advance sustainable solutions to complex problems – domestic and international – through self-governing agreements based on the following three conditions: (1) inclusion of, (2) common understanding among, and (3) trust between all prime actors. Collectively, these conditions make the management of complex problems, and of the conflicts arising from them, more effective and sustainable. Using the coronavirus pandemic as an example, we briefly illustrate the nature of complex problems and self-governing agreements, address the inclusion-trust dilemma that mars many negotiations and assess the utility of each condition to address the coronavirus response in the United States more effectively.

Power Asymmetry, Negotiations and Conflict Management in Organizations

Relationships are seldom equal. In fact, social interactions involve most of the times power asymmetric relationships. Especially in organizations people are daily faced with situations where they are either in a powerful or in a powerless position compared to others. Power stems from various sources and takes several forms. For instance, people are powerful when they can administer punishments or rewards, when they are in a hierarchically higher position than others, when they have knowledge and expertise, when they are admired and respected, and when they have alternative options which enable them to make choices. Importantly, power determines the way people interact with each other and subsequently, the way they engage in conflicts and conflict resolution. Power-holders are best able to asymmetrically enforce their will and therefore, they have the capability to determine the process and the outcome of a conflict. In this chapter, I present the major sources of power and the main differences between them. Consequently, I elaborate on the impact of power on conflict management based on the negotiation literature. I conclude by touching on the necessity to distinguish between two contradictory faces of power: power as opportunity and power as responsibility.

The ‘linguistic ceasefire’: Negotiating in an age of proscription

Villains need to be de-villainized for talking to begin; this is a cornerstone of negotiation literature. But what happens when villains are proscribed, or listed as terrorists? While an emerging body of work has started to explore the effects of proscription by emphasizing aspects of demonization and banishment, it has not so far explored how banishment ends. This article offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to this discussion by exploring the effects of proscription on the dynamic interaction between conflict parties and how negotiations still do take place with armed groups listed as terrorists. To do this it maps representations made by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia through a qualitative discourse analysis of 335 statements triangulated with 50 personal interviews. The article argues that proscription makes the initiation of negotiations impossible because it leads to a form of extreme vilification. This is especially true for the government, unable to switch directly to de-vilifying its proscribed enemy. First it has to normalize its vilification – a concept I describe here as a ‘linguistic ceasefire’. This helps explain how banishment can end and peace negotiations can be initiated in an age of proscription.

Political leadership for peace processes: Juan Manuel Santos – Between hawk and dove

Many studies have explored Colombia’s peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – guerrilla group (2012–2016). Conflict negotiation literature indicates that the impact of leadership is particularly relevant to peace processes as leaders have to find a balance between war and peace. Still, little is known about the political leaders in charge. This study deals with the development of a political leader’s leadership in peace initiatives. It uses an in-depth case study of Colombia’s former President Juan Manuel Santos combining leadership and conflict negotiation literature to trace back the origins of his leadership. Santos, a controversial figure, represented a policy of reconciliation to negotiate with the opponents while also appearing tough in order to maintain his political base. Between hawk and dove, he initiated and signed the peace negotiation and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016. I adopt a personal biography approach using biographical data to explore the origins of Santos’ beliefs and values, his competence and skills and the way others perceived him. Linking this leadership-centred argument with findings from the conflict negotiation suggests that a pragmatic and reconciliation-oriented leadership might be relevant to find solutions to protracted conflicts like the one in Colombia. Most importantly, it contributes to a significant claim: Leaders have at least some level of choice and their biographical factors are relevant for political outcomes.

Negotiation Inaction Inertia: A Dynamic Model of the Impact of Missed Opportunities on Negotiation Decisions in Multi-issue Disputes

Negotiations aimed at resolving international disputes often end in deadlock. In the current article, we focus on deadlocks triggered by missed opportunities. The consequences of missing an advantageous opportunity have been studied extensively in the field of psychology within the context of the inaction inertia effect. The concept was recently introduced into the negotiation literature. Forgoing an attractive action opportunity creates vulnerability to regret and increases the likelihood of forgoing subsequent inferior opportunities, even if they still have positive value. The current article deepens the applicability of inaction inertia to international negotiations, by adopting a new multi-step multi-issue paradigm, which better approximates real-life negotiations. Using the new platform, we demonstrate the inaction inertia effect in a dynamic negotiation setting and link an individual’s inertia mindset to the experience of regret. The methodology and analysis presented will help researchers and practitioners explain inertia-induced deadlocks, and facilitate interventions that expedite successful resolutions.

A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria

Why are armed conflicts involving warring parties with an Islamist agenda more difficult to resolve through negotiations? In previous research, two main explanations have been put forward; one that highlight the religious element of the parties’ conflict issue and one that emphasis the organizational character of these conflicts, in particular their transnational nature. Yet we still do not know which of these explanations that carry the most explanatory power. The purpose of this article is to test the empirical relevance of these theories through an in-depth study of five negotiation attempts between the government of Nigeria and the group known as Boko Haram during the time period 2011 to 2016. By doing so, this article both addresses one of the key theoretical debates in the scholarly field of religious conflicts and conflict resolution, and presents novel empirical material on a case not well covered in previous negotiation literature.

Turning points at the Round Table Talks

At the beginning of the 1990s the “winds of change” blew through Europe, leading to the fall of Communism and regime change in several Eastern-European countries. The domino effect started in Poland with the Round Table negotiations that ultimately led to democratization of the country. The context that allowed this historical event to occur has been studied, but the talks themselves have not been analyzed in detail. In this article, we undertake this task. Using several complementary analytical approaches – negotiation theory, turning points analysis and dynamical systems – we study the process of getting to an agreement, focusing on the seven key issues of the negotiations. We treat the Round Table Talks both as a unique case of negotiations, given its structure and the context in which it happened, as well as an event comparable to other negotiations and connecting to the broader negotiation literature. Results of our inquiries show the importance of procedures during the talks and highlight the role played by motivation in propelling the negotiating parties to an agreement. We discuss the implications of our findings for negotiation theory and for the broader context of the historical event.

What do I get? How do states’ negotiation alternatives influence the concessions they receive in multilateral negotiations?

When will states receive concessions in multilateral negotiations? And on which issues are those concessions likely to be received? I highlight two factors that influence the likelihood a state will receive concessions on an issue in multilateral negotiations: (1) the degree to which the issues linked together in the negotiation are “differently valued” by the negotiating states, and (2) the costliness of states’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” on each individual issue. The former creates the opportunity for an exchange of concessions; the latter creates the incentive for that exchange to occur. It is the interaction of having more differently valued issues on the table and having a more costly best alternative to a negotiated agreement on an issue that makes a state more likely to receive concessions on that issue. This argument stands in contrast to the standard negotiation literature, which has shown that having a more beneficial best alternative to a negotiated agreement will yield greater concessions. I argue that these contradictory assertions exist because there are two types of best alternatives to a negotiated agreement that must be taken into account – one at the negotiation level and those at the issue-specific level. The current literature has tended to focus on the former while I focus on the latter. I test my argument on an originally constructed dataset of concessions states received in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For each issue in the Round, I coded the costliness of each state's issue-specific best alternative to a negotiated agreement and the level of concessions it received on that issue. The results provide insights into the workings of multilateral negotiations.

Ripe for Renegotiation?

An international negotiated agreement is typically viewed as a major achievement, but it may not last forever. Sometimes agreements need to be adjusted – still based on the existing formulas – as a result of changed circumstances or because particular provisions prove not as effective as originally hoped. But other times, agreements need to be overhauled from scratch and renegotiated using new formulas and possibly involving new actors. Such renegotiations are an under-examined process in the negotiation literature. When and why are renegotiations called for, and what are the best tactics and strategies to ensure that they succeed for the mutual benefit of all stakeholders? This article presents basic research questions that need to be addressed.