scholarly journals Tax avoidance in New Zealand: in search of principles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Harriet Bush

<p>This paper analyses the judicial application of New Zealand’s general anti-tax avoidance rule contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 in the light of three 20th Century jurisprudential theories of legal reasoning. It focuses specifically on the role of moral principles in the process of judicial decision-making and explores whether existing case law on the avoidance provision can be seen as supporting the hypothesis that judges apply moral principles when reaching decisions. Following the test laid down for tax avoidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the paper concludes that judges have the ability, in some cases, to reach their decision about whether there has been tax avoidance by applying the moral principle that tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Harriet Bush

<p>This paper analyses the judicial application of New Zealand’s general anti-tax avoidance rule contained in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 in the light of three 20th Century jurisprudential theories of legal reasoning. It focuses specifically on the role of moral principles in the process of judicial decision-making and explores whether existing case law on the avoidance provision can be seen as supporting the hypothesis that judges apply moral principles when reaching decisions. Following the test laid down for tax avoidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis Ventures Ltd & Others v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, the paper concludes that judges have the ability, in some cases, to reach their decision about whether there has been tax avoidance by applying the moral principle that tax should apply uniformly to all cases that are economically similar.</p>


Author(s):  
Linda Tvrdíková

If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.


2019 ◽  
pp. 13-37
Author(s):  
Antoine Buyse

This article explores the role of the European Convention on Human Rights in addressing the issue of attacks on civic space, but also the potential effects of shrinking civic space on Strasbourg’s work. First, an overview of the notions of civil society and civic space is given, linking these concepts to democracy and human rights. Subsequently, the formal and informal roles for civil society in the judicial decision-making are discussed. Finally, the substantive protection offered to civil society and civic space under the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is analysed. This article argues that the differentiations in theory on the varying contributions of civil society to democracy and human rights are to a large extent reflected in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Even more importantly, the ECHR system and civil society benefit from each other. This is why the current attacks on civic space are not just a problem for civil society itself, but also for the work of the European Court: it is submitted that a shrinking of civic space can also negatively affect the Strasbourg system, as the two are intertwined to a considerable extent.Received: 06 July 2019Accepted: 10 October 2019Published online: 20 December 2019


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1005-1032 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Jacob

This paper deals with the role of judicial decisions in international adjudication. It is impossible to fail to notice the abundance of prior cases invoked in decisions of international tribunals and that, in order to find out what the law actually is, reference to previous cases is all but inevitable in practice. In some areas of international law, judicial or arbitral decisions have even been said to be the centre of progressive development. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable and deeply-rooted professional trepidation in many parts of the world regarding this enduring phenomenon. Even absent a fully articulated theory of adjudication or legal reasoning, the very idea of “judicial lawmaking” tends to arouse instinctive suspicion, especially when coupled with a denial of any restraining force of prior cases. Be that as it may, observations to the extent that judicial decisions are not veritable sources of international law or only binding between the parties in a particular dispute are only the beginning, and far from the end, of the present inquiry. Several interrelated and intricate questions need to be disentangled and dealt with in order to get a better grasp on what is commonly, and often rather unhelpfully, lumped together loosely under the vague label of “judicial precedent.” The paper is hence partly descriptive and partly revisionary. I do not however intend to rehash general criticisms or defences of precedent. Instead, I aim to present precedent as a general and omnipresent jurisprudential concept that enables and constrains judicial decision-making even in seemingly ordinary cases and to then showcase the specificities of one particular legal system in this respect, namely public international law. Hopefully this provides some of the methodological groundwork for other questions central to the present project, not least concerning the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking.


Sociologija ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-619
Author(s):  
Tilen Stajnpihler

The article attempts to verify a common conception that has by now become an integral part of legal culture in civil law jurisdictions, namely, the conception that despite its unresolved legal status, case law (i.e. the body of past judicial decisions) is widely used by the courts when they are justifying their interpretative choices. For this purpose, an exploratory empirical study of court citation practices was conducted. The study focused on a sample of the officially reported decisions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia and the appellate (Higher) courts on civil matters in 2011 that were publicly accessible on the official internet database of the Slovene courts. The aim of the study, which provides the first systematic outline of the use of case law in the judicial decision making process within the Slovene legal system, was to verify whether case law in fact constitutes an important factor in judicial decision-making. It did so by focusing on the extent and the manner in which Slovene courts refer to case law, as these may be inferred from the reasoning of their decisions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 587-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laure Clément-Wilz

AbstractIt is argued that the Advocate Generals have helped to create a distinct and identifiable body of EU law. In the context of increasingly complex legislation and legal structures, the Advocate Generals have also contributed to improving the coherence of legislation and case law. It is also argued that the legal texts and practice firmly place the Advocate General at the same time within the CJEU and yet outside the Court. The institutional and functional rules governing the role of the Advocate General do have an impact on the judicial decision-making process. Some suggestions for reforming the role of the Advocate General in order to integrate the Advocate General more fully within the Court and to strengthen the role are also made.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-31
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Grzelak-Bach

Following a brief introduction of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the author begins by analyzing case law from the European Court of Human Rights regarding the legal reasoning in judicial proceedings. The main premise of this paper is to present a formula for preparing legal reasoning in administrative court proceedings. The author draws attention to the role of judges who, in the process of adjudication, should apply creative interpretation of the rules of law, when they see errors or omissions in legislative provisions, or blatant violations of the European legal order. The conclusion of those deliberations finds, that the process of tailoring the approach to meet Strasbourg’s requirements should, on a basic level, be at the discretion of judges rather than the legislators.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-249
Author(s):  
Anna Esselment

Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine in the United States, Australia, and Canada, Gerald Baier, Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006, pp. 207.Is everything old new again? Gerald Baier's insightful book brings back into the mainstream a long neglected examination of federalism from the perspective of judicial review. His analysis of the courts' impact on the development of federalism involves a detailed study of division of powers jurisprudence in the United States, Australia, and Canada. In each of these countries, Baier argues, the decisions of the highest courts continue to affect the shape of federalism, but his central claim turns on how these decisions are made. For Baier, judicial doctrine plays a significant role in influencing the reasoning of the courts and must be considered an independent variable worthy of study in its own right. Many scholars have debated the significance of doctrine on judicial decision making. However, Baier takes issue with scholars who, on the one hand, have characterized doctrine as a tool of objectivity and certainty, and those, on the other hand, who view doctrine as entirely political in nature (27). For Baier, doctrine is neither of these but it is “distinctly legal in character” and it is this legal reasoning that shapes outcomes (27).


2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Guy Davidov ◽  
Maayan Davidov

Research on compliance has shown that people can be induced to comply with various requests by using techniques that capitalise on the human tendencies to act consistently and to reciprocate. Thus far this line of research has been applied to interactions between individuals, not to relations between institutions. We argue, however, that similar techniques are applied by courts vis-à-vis the government, the legislature and the public at large, when courts try to secure legitimacy and acceptance of their decisions. We discuss a number of known influence techniques – including ‘foot in the door’, ‘low-balling’, ‘giving a reputation to uphold’ and ‘door in the face’ – and provide examples from Israeli case law of the use of such techniques by courts. This analysis offers new insights that can further the understanding of judicial decision-making processes.


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