The Psychology of Satire

Chapter 4 explores the internal structure and logic of satire, offering a deep dive into how satire and irony are comprehended and appreciated in the brain. Using various examples, the chapter unpacks, step by step, the way humor is processed by audience members. It defines the concepts of satire and irony and explores the cognitive complexity of these unique forms of humor, offering several competing theories to account for how and why they reduce the level of counterargumentation by audience members. The chapter also considers recent research on the impact of humor on affect and cognition, in particular how humor might affect persuasion.

Outrage and Satire as Responses and Antidotes

This chapter illustrates how conservative outrage programming and liberal satire were articulated as reactions to perceived problematic aspects of the political information environment in the 1990s. Both genres were fueled by the political polarization and media distrust that had exploded in the last third of the twentieth century. And both genres were made possible by new media technologies of the late 1990s. In the face of political polarization and a reduction of trust in journalism, conservative talk radio’s Rush Limbaugh and Fox News’s Roger Ailes created programming to deconstruct the ideological bias they perceived in mainstream news. Meanwhile, comedians worked to deconstruct the bias that they saw in the profit-driven news of that era; not an ideological bias but a bias in favor of strategy, spin, and partisan jargon.

Political and Technological Changes That Created Jon Stewart and Bill O’Reilly

This chapter describes the regulatory, political, and technological changes in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s that set the stage for the television satire and outrage programming of the early 2000s. It summarizes the story of the deregulation of the American media industry and argues that the resulting increased demand for profits from television news eroded the journalistic mission. It also explains the roots of political polarization in the United States, from social and cultural shifts to changes in the party nominating processes and to the increased role of soft (and dark) money in elections. The chapter chronicles the history of the cable television industry and how the proliferation of channels in the 1980s upended the economics of media, erasing the concept of the “mass audience” in favor of smaller niche audiences defined by psychographics and sociodemographics.

Who Gets the Joke?

Using humor scholar Salvatore Attardo’s criteria for humor appreciation as a framework, this chapter describes the kinds of people who might be expected to have the greatest appreciation of humor. It explores joke difficulty, the level of threat a joke may activate in a listener, the available knowledge in the minds of the audience, and their processing motivation as factors that affect humor appreciation. The chapter links the traits of tolerance for ambiguity and need for cognition to humor appreciation, as both enhance an individual’s motivation and ability to process and appreciate a joke. It also includes a deep dive into the strange case of irony (with reference to All in the Family and The Colbert Report), which audiences can appreciate even when their interpretation is the opposite of the intended meaning of the joke’s producer.

The Counterculture Comics versus the Hate Clubs of the Air

This chapter describes what is referred to as the first generation of American irony and outrage of the 1960s: the radical counterculture comedy of the 1960s versus conservative talk radio programming. While conservative voices on limited-circulation radio stations around the country were railing against the United Nations and a liberal United States Supreme Court, liberal activists in New York and San Francisco were producing a very different kind of political information that was antiwar, antisegregation, and anti–status quo: ironic social and political satire in smoky underground comedy clubs and coffeehouses. The chapter provides historical details about conservative radio shows hosted by people like Clarence Manion and Dan Smoot, and contrasts these shows’ voice and approach with that of radical satirists of that same era, particularly that of the improvisational political comedy theatre company The Committee, including insights from interviews with members of the group.

Irony and Outrage

This chapter summarizes the book’s main arguments: that irony and outrage are the logical extensions of the psychology of liberalism and conservatism; that the two genres have parallel histories and serve similar political functions for their audiences. It also argues that satire and outrage are not the same. They look, feel, and sound different due to the distinct needs and psychological and physiological profiles of their creators and audiences. The book concludes with a proposition that the distinct psychological profiles of the left and right are equally necessary for a functioning democratic society. However, it highlights how the symbiosis between outrage programming and the psychology of the right makes conservative outrage a fruitful mechanism for elite propaganda and mobilization—in a way that satire simply is not. If outrage is a well-trained attack dog that operates on command, satire is a raccoon—hard to domesticate and capable of turning on anyone at any time.

Prologue

When liberal satirist Samantha Bee and conservative outrage host Glenn Beck appeared on Bee’s program in 2016 to discuss the ways their political rhetoric might be similar, it provided an opportunity to think about how some the functions and outcomes of the genres of liberal satire and conservative opinion (outrage) may overlap. This chapter describes this conversation between the two show hosts and uses it as a springboard for the book. The chapter introduces the two questions at the heart of this book: Why is political satire so liberal? Why do liberals seem unsuccessful at talk radio and outrage programming? The chapter also chronicles how and why the author came to ask these questions and summarizes the remaining chapters of the book, providing a roadmap for readers.

Playing against Type

Chapter 10 considers what it looks like when liberals and conservatives play against type—when liberals attempt to create outrage programming and conservatives attempt to create satire. It summarizes the story of the liberal “outrage” radio network Air America and the short-lived Fox News satire show The 1/2 Hour News Hour, illustrating the ways in which each failed to deliver on some of the central defining features of the genre it was intended to fit. The chapter argues that these failings stem from unique psychologies of the left and the right that make it challenging for the left to create “outrage” and for the right to create “satire.” The chapter ends with a consideration of how late-night comedy and satire changed under the Trump administration, suggesting that when progressive values are perceived to be under threat, some liberal comics might find it more difficult to remain in the state of play.

Satire and Outrage

Chapter 9 summarizes decades of research on the functions and impact of exposure to outrage programming and satire programming to make the case that these two different genres do serve parallel functions for their viewers. It first explores the reasons why viewers consume outrage and satire, then shifts to explore what happens to them when they do. The chapter argues that the roles of both of these genres in the lives of their viewers are quite similar: contributing to political knowledge and beliefs, influencing viewers’ issue agendas, shaping trust in leaders and institutions, and motivating political discussion and participation.

The Aesthetics of Outrage

Chapter 8 describes the kind of programming and political aesthetics that ought to be most appealing to conservatives based on their psychological—and even physiological—characteristics: political content that offers explicit, unambiguous, emotionally charged, threat-oriented argumentation. This chapter builds on prior work of Jeffrey Berry and Sarah Sobieraj (2014) to suggest that the genre of outrage has been more successful on the right than the left because of these underlying differences in the psychology and physiology of liberals and conservatives. It presents data illustrating the ideological leaning of outrage and satire shows and original data on the tolerance for ambiguity among viewers of outrage and satire, split by audience party and ideology. Finally, the chapter argues that conservatives’ preference for outrage over satire is also enhanced by the moral certainty of the former and the ambiguous hybridity of the latter.