Imperfect Duties to Oneself

2021 ◽  
pp. 183-205
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons

This chapter covers both the imperfect duties of natural and moral self-perfection and the positive duties of conscience and moral self-scrutiny—these latter duties partly constitutive of the duty of moral self-perfection. Regarding the duty of conscience, the following questions are addressed: 1. What is conscience—its nature and role in moral life? 2. How is conscience experienced? 3. Can it be mistaken? 4. What are the duties of conscience and how are they justified? 5. What is the connection between conscience and blameworthiness? The duty of moral self-scrutiny foregrounds the moral importance of sincerity and impartiality in assessing one’s moral character. The chapter also explores the fundamental duty of moral self-perfection and Kant’s puzzling claim that it is both narrow and perfect yet also wide and imperfect. Also discussed are Kant’s views on the ethical treatment of animals, concluding with remarks on Kant’s moral teleology.

Author(s):  
Knud Haakonssen

Richard Cumberland developed his ideas in response to Hobbes’ Leviathan. He introduced concepts of aggregate goodness (later used in utilitarianism), of benevolence (used in moral-sense theory), of moral self-obligation, of empirical proofs of providence and of the moral importance of tradition à la Burke. The philosophical basis for Cumberland’s views was a theory of natural law which was strongly anti-voluntarist and committed to objective moral values, but recognizing institutions such as governments of state and church as conventional or traditional. Cumberland was often seen as the third co-founder, with Pufendorf and Grotius, of modern natural law.


Arabica ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 609-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emin Lelić

Abstract In the tenth/sixteenth century six treatises on physiognomy (ʿilm-i firāsat)—a science widely considered able to predict inner moral dispositions (aḫlāq-i bāṭina) based on external appearances (aḥwāl-i ẓāhira)—were written for the Ottoman court. In a world in which statecraft and politics were ultimately based on questions of morality (aḫlāq), physiognomy was presented as a particularly useful skill for the Ottoman court due to its ability to evaluate inner moral character with scientific precision. Based on such knowledge, a partial conception of justice could be implemented with an instrumental coating of impartiality. Moreover, men with prized moral qualities could be selected for the ruling elite. The science also offered the sultan and his court a modus operandi for attaining self-knowledge and, if combined with moral self-disciplining (riyāḍat), a way to acquire divine characteristics.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter provides the motivation for the book by arguing for a need to address the question of the role and status of moral philosophy in light of the criticisms directed against the theory-based understanding of moral philosophy of the twentieth century. The chapter also presents the three main aims of the book, to discuss what form of moral theory—if any—can be a fruitful part of moral philosophy; to investigate the moral importance of the particular; and to offer an alternative descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. In addition, it identifies the context of the discussion which is that of contemporary analytical moral philosophy, broadly conceived, and it determines the central categories of the book, moral philosophy, moral theory, and moral life; all chosen to avoid the ambiguity of ‘ethics’ which covers both moral philosophy and what is investigated in moral philosophy, the moral. Finally, the chapter clarifies the philosophical approach adopted in the book which is modelled on an understanding of the dialogical structure and the conception of philosophy found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. The final section of the chapter offers a short summary of the remaining chapters and an overview of the overall argument of the book.


Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

The chapter presents a critique of the idea that morality is impersonal and an investigation of how and to what extent personal features of our lives may be morally relevant and shape us as moral agents. In doing so, the chapter explains why moral life resists theorisation of the form criticised in Chapter 2, and it provides a better understanding of the challenges involved in developing a form of moral philosophy that can take the particularities of moral life into consideration. The chapter opens with a clarification of the approach and the central concepts of chapters 5 and 6, before turning to two suggestions of how to account for the personal dimension of moral life in terms of agent-relativity and strong moral self-definition. As these suggestions are shown to be inadequate, this leads to an investigation of the role of personal particularities in the moral formation and the moral positions of individuals. The centrality of the personal in moral life furthermore creates a demand on the subject to engage in justification in relation to others and self-understanding in relation to oneself, where self-understanding in many cases is to be understood as a process of both self-discovery and self-determination; of striving to settle both who one is and who one wants to be.


2004 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Michael Maclean ◽  
Lawrence J. Walker ◽  
M. Kyle Matsuba

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-96
Author(s):  
Robert Sparling

This article considers Pablo Gilabert’s attempt to defend against libertarian critics his ambitious argument for basic positive duties of justice to the world’s destitute. The article notes that Gilabert’s argument – and particularly the vocabulary of perfect and imperfect duties that he adopts – has firm roots in the modern natural rights tradition. The article goes on to suggest, however, that Gilabert employs the phrase ‘imperfect duties’ in a manner that is in some tension with the tradition from which it is derived. Indeed, Gilabert’s novel deployment of the phrase contains a number of radical possibilities that are not pursued in his text. The article suggests that Gilabert would do better to break more decisively from a tradition that insists on the essential distinction between justice and charity.


2020 ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Larry R. Churchill

This chapter and the chapter that follows define and explore a select number of concepts that are central to ethics. The emphasis is on how these concepts operate in moral life, their uses, misuses, and limitations. A lifespan approach to these concepts is important to keep in mind. Concepts that seem remote at one life stage, such as death, take on central importance at a later stage. The concepts discussed in chapter 6 are the anchoring value of truth; forgiveness and freedom; the varieties of love; the moral uses of spirituality; and the persistence of hope. Forgiveness is described as a gateway to a less encumbered life. The varieties of love are enumerated and their relevance to various dimensions and stages of life explored. Spirituality, including religious beliefs and practices, is explored for its moral importance. Hope is distinguished from optimism and does not require an object or something hoped for.


1997 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Novak

Few centuries have been as sanguinary as the twentieth. Leaving behind as their monuments the ruins of concentration camps and the work camps of the Gulag Archipelago, temporarily discredited, fascism and communism may have slouched into the shadows. Still, the forces of liberty have not succeeded in laying the foundations for a world of free republics. During the twentieth century, both in Europe and in the United States, the moral life of the free societies has been severely weakened. Families are a shadow of what they used to be. Traditional virtues and decencies, a sense of honor, and respect for moral character have given way to vulgar relativism. Thus, the dark underground river of the twentieth century has not been fascism nor communism but their presupposition: nihilism. And nihilism has not yet been abandoned.


1998 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Fleck-Henderson

Social work, while rich in literature about practice with families, has largely ignored the moral dimensions of this work. Conceiving the family as a moral community draws our attention to this neglected dimension. A framework, drawn from the literature on moral behavior, is used to conceptualize the moral life of families. The components are: (1) moral sensitivity – interpreting the situation; (2) moral reasoning – deciding what to do; and (3) moral character – following through and doing what is seen as right. These are offered as conceptual tools for focusing our attention and providing practice direction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
Benjamin C. Ruisch ◽  
David A. Pizarro

Abstract We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.


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