The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Potential for Violent Escalation

This chapter revisits the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood to understand why an organization that started out as a nonviolent religious movement came to be associated with violence. Many blame this on the harsh repression under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, the analysis shows that the drift toward violence started much earlier. Reconstructing the sequence of events between 1936 and 1948, the chapter reveals that what initially politicized the Brotherhood was the presence of British troops in Egypt and Palestine. The formation of an armed wing led to competition over authority within the group, which incentivized violent escalation. The chapter then focuses on the period between 1954 and 1970 and shows that repression had a dual effect. On the one hand, it inspired new jihadi interpretations, which were particularly appealing to younger members. On the other hand, the prisons were also the backdrop against which the Brotherhood became convinced that violence was futile.

Why Islamist Opposition Groups Change Their Tactical Outlooks

This chapter develops a theory of principled and pragmatic adjustment to explain tactical shifts in Islamist organizations. It argues that Islamist groups shift between nonviolent and violent tactics depending on the perceived need for activism, the cost of violent resistance or nonviolent resistance, and the internal and external pressures they face. Groups legitimize violence when their grievances are escalating and violent norms of resistance are prevalent. External pressures from the state or internal pressures arising from competition for authority trigger the shift from violent rhetoric to violent behavior. Once groups engage in violence, their decisions on tactical shifts are no longer about relative grievances, but about organizational imperatives and the cost of violence. Organizational weakness and public opposition to violence raise the cost of aggressive tactics and drive groups to put armed campaigns on hold, or to focus on rebuilding capacity. However, for a group to permanently move away from violence, the organization must be faced with an existential crisis and with public condemnation.

Jemaah Islamiyah and the Ambiguities of Disengagement from Violence

This chapter traces Jemaah Islamiyah’s complicated relationship with violence in Indonesia to explain why the group has temporarily disengaged from violence without permanently renouncing armed struggle. The organization first engaged in violence in the context of communal clashes. Members subsequently organized large-scale terrorist attacks, but these were largely the acts of factions, whose relationship to the group’s leadership remains contested. More recently, the organization has prioritized social activities over armed struggle. Yet despite internal debates and defections around the use of violence, the leadership has not officially abandoned armed struggle. The chapter reveals that despite political openings and widespread opposition to terrorism, public attitudes toward the group are more ambivalent than they were toward the Egyptian al-Gama’a. Combined with the availability of exit options, this social milieu enables the group to continue its activity without feeling the pressure to undergo a more drastic transformation.

Darul Islam in West Java: The Rise and Fall of an Islamist Insurgency in Indonesia

This chapter traces the evolution of the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java to explain how the group shifted from one fighting against colonial forces to one staging an insurgency against the Indonesian Republic that has inspired subsequent generations of Islamist activism. The group turned toward armed resistance against the government to protect its organizational interests and authority in the face of perceived external aggression. During the rebellion, however, Darul Islam was severely weakened by the combination of effective military campaigns waged against it, member defections, offers of amnesty, and the loss of public support. The rebellion eventually ran out of steam and withered away after the death of the main leader, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. However, though the West Java rebellion was defeated, the idea of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia persisted, and it continues to inspire Islamist activists to this day.

Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: From Terrorism to Nonviolence

In 1981, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Over the next two decades, the group transformed from one of the most active terrorist groups in Egypt to an Islamist group that officially renounced armed action. The chapter first traces the rise of the group and investigates what pushed it to resort to violence. The increased scale and scope of violence was generated by the same causal mechanisms that explained the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn to violence: politicization, mistrust of government, a sense of betrayal by the regime, desire for revenge, and a slippery slope of militarization. The chapter then looks at the transformation of the organization starting with the 1997 Nonviolence Initiative. The analysis reveals that the high audience cost of violence and growing public condemnation led al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s leaders to rethink the group’s mission and push for permanent disengagement from violence.

Introduction

Research shows that repression can lead to both radicalization and deradicalization. When does it drive groups to pick up arms, and under what conditions does it foster disengagement from violence? To answer these questions, it is important to trace tactical changes over time, and to parse the factors that push groups toward or away from violence. The introduction outlines some conventional explanations for understanding tactical choices and shows that recent developments in terrorism studies and in the research on nonviolent resistance leave several puzzles unanswered. It introduces a theoretical framework through which we can understand both escalation and de-escalation, and provides a typology of engagement with violence that can guide the investigation of tactical change. After considering whether Islamist groups are distinctive, the chapter outlines the case-selection strategy and the methodology employed in the book, and then concludes with an outline of the remaining chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the findings of the book and discusses their implications for our understanding of violence and nonviolence. Despite their differences, all four Islamist groups started legitimizing armed resistance when their grievances were high and violence was widespread. The groups turned to violent behavior once they began facing internal pressures from organizational fragmentation or external pressures from the state. Disengagement from violence does not occur when grievances cease to exist or groups no longer face pressures. Groups renounce violence when armed resistance becomes unsustainable, pressures turn to disillusionment, and leaders are willing to rethink tactics and strategies. The case studies examined in the book shed light on the contradictory findings on the effects of repression, by showing that that the impact of repression is filtered through organizational dynamics and social context. An effective long-term approach to terrorism should strive to design exit options from violence, resolve conflicts, and promote trust in the government.