Why Islamist Opposition Groups Change Their Tactical Outlooks
This chapter develops a theory of principled and pragmatic adjustment to explain tactical shifts in Islamist organizations. It argues that Islamist groups shift between nonviolent and violent tactics depending on the perceived need for activism, the cost of violent resistance or nonviolent resistance, and the internal and external pressures they face. Groups legitimize violence when their grievances are escalating and violent norms of resistance are prevalent. External pressures from the state or internal pressures arising from competition for authority trigger the shift from violent rhetoric to violent behavior. Once groups engage in violence, their decisions on tactical shifts are no longer about relative grievances, but about organizational imperatives and the cost of violence. Organizational weakness and public opposition to violence raise the cost of aggressive tactics and drive groups to put armed campaigns on hold, or to focus on rebuilding capacity. However, for a group to permanently move away from violence, the organization must be faced with an existential crisis and with public condemnation.