Conclusions and Policy Implications

This chapter addresses policy recommendations and also summarizes and assesses the results of the research presented in this book, results that have the potential to be useful to policy makers, the general public, and academics and specialists who have an interest in the region. By providing details on what types of weapons systems and how much money is generated by illicit deals with other rogue nations such as Iran and Syria (as well as terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas) as well numerous states in Africa, this work contributes to more than just the scholarship—it contributes to the evidence chain. This evidence will be entirely unclassified and thus also releasable to an often uniformed or underinformed public.

North Korea and Military Proliferation to Iran

Evidence of Pyongyang’s arms sales to Iran begins with the evidence that North Korea has been proliferating conventional and unconventional weapons to Iran since the early 1980s. Since that time, North Korea has shipped nearly every kind of ballistic missile it builds, not to mention related military advisers, engineers, technicians, and trainers, to Iran. It has proliferated nuclear technology, missile technology, conventional weapons, and numerous spare parts to Iran. But it has also shipped conventional weapons and spare parts to Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. This has been going on for years. I also reflect—in detail—on what North Korea has proliferated to Iran in the Kim Jong-un era, beginning in December 2013.

How Do They Do It?

North Korea has always been able to get around sanctions using some very clever tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for getting its arms distributed. This has been an ongoing situation no matter what sanctions are imposed or the methods used to impose them. The North Koreans are constantly changing their TTP in order to adjust to the complex international law enforcement environment, and two key examples (combining illicit arms with legitimate cargo in containers placed on ships and then reflagging the ships) point to the fact that they are adjusting their TTP in order to adapt to sanctions, avoid detection by maritime forces of other nations, and stay below the radar of law enforcement around the world, which is often very wary of shipments tagged as North Korean. There are several other methods that North Korea uses to get around sanctions and conceal its illicit financial networks as well (all described in chapter 3). Thus far, it appears that these methods have been largely successful, and I examine in detail how the DPRK uses its government powers to get around sanctions and proliferate its arms for profit.

North Korea and Syria

North Korea has been proliferating chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, conventional arms, advisers, trainers, engineers, and technicians for a variety of projects to Syria for many years. While, in the 1990s, this proliferation picked up steam, it has been stepped up significantly during the Kim Jong-un era in light of a needy Syrian customer fighting a civil war. (North Korea has also supported Syria through proliferation and advisers in past conflicts.)

Setting the Context

People often see North Korea as a threat to the region, yet few have even an abstract knowledge of the vast network of proliferation to volatile regions that North Korea has operated for many years. It is this network that the book addresses. Understanding the military capabilities North Korea has is key to addressing how it proliferates these capabilities, whom it proliferates these capabilities to, and how we can contain this proliferation. This book is unique because it addresses all this.

North Korean Proliferation on the African Continent

There are so many countries in Africa that North Korea provides goods and services to that space does not permit the listing of all its activities there. In this chapter, the focus will be on the military proliferation activities that have occurred since the beginning of the Kim Jong-un era (with a focus on how many of these activities began long before Kim Jong-un became the North Korean leader). African countries to which North Korea continues to sell military weapons, refurbishment, and training include (but are not limited to) Ethiopia, Eritrea, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Uganda, and even Egypt.

Understanding the Product

North Korea’s nuclear weaponization program and its ballistic missile programs have developed compelling capabilities that can potentially threaten all the Middle East, Africa, and Europe when proliferated (and many of these systems have already been proliferated). North Korea’s advances in maritime capabilities are important as well, including a new submarine with long-range capabilities and a developing capability to fire a ballistic missile. The North’s ground forces have not been idle, as high training levels and important initiatives in training have added to potential capabilities, including artillery and rocket systems that could create havoc in ongoing conventional conflicts in both the Middle East and Africa.