North Korea and Military Proliferation to Iran

2018 ◽  
pp. 80-100
Author(s):  
Bruce E. Bechtol
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Spare Parts ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Arms Sales ◽  
Conventional Weapons

Evidence of Pyongyang’s arms sales to Iran begins with the evidence that North Korea has been proliferating conventional and unconventional weapons to Iran since the early 1980s. Since that time, North Korea has shipped nearly every kind of ballistic missile it builds, not to mention related military advisers, engineers, technicians, and trainers, to Iran. It has proliferated nuclear technology, missile technology, conventional weapons, and numerous spare parts to Iran. But it has also shipped conventional weapons and spare parts to Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. This has been going on for years. I also reflect—in detail—on what North Korea has proliferated to Iran in the Kim Jong-un era, beginning in December 2013.

North Korea in 2017

Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Korean Society ◽  
The Us ◽  
Heated Debate ◽  
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Kim Jong Un continued to consolidate his power through personnel changes, and North Korean society saw increasing consumerism, along with signs of growing inequality. The economy did well through early 2017 but the subsequent effects of sanctions remained uncertain. North Korea conducted its first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and its sixth nuclear test, triggering heated debate in the US and elsewhere about how to respond. Kim clearly is not going to give up working on weapons of mass destruction.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 717. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999). Pp. 432.

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 577-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith S. Yaphe
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Delivery Systems ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Mass Destruction ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
Weapons Systems

Tony Cordesman has become a veritable institution among Washington policy analysts. Few are more prolific, especially in the area of comparative analysis of weapons systems. He can be depended on to produce data-rich, comprehensive, lavishly documented studies of military doctrine and usage, intentions to acquire or produce weapons systems, and willingness to abide by international arms-control regimes. These two books are no exception. They include indepth analyses of conventional and non-conventional weapons systems. It is the latter that makes these books so important to analysts of regional weapons development and arms control. Cordesman examines Iraqi and Iranian acquisitions, from purchase, absorption, production, and use of conventional weapons to efforts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—the so-called weapons of mass destruction—and the requisite ballistic-missile–delivery systems.

Washington will prove a paper tiger on North Korea

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Technology Transfer ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Delivery Systems ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Status ◽  
North Korean Regime

Significance Since its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has made steady progress in nuclear weapons technology. The July 4 ICBM test reflects its progress on delivery systems with longer ranges and increased sophistication. Pyongyang routinely claims to possess the status as a full nuclear power with the ability to retaliate with strategic nuclear arms against a US attack. Impacts Beijing is likely to share Washington’s concerns about nuclear technology transfer by a more secure North Korean regime. However, Washington is likely to position more rapid-strike conventional forces in the region, over China’s vociferous objections. Once North Korea is confident in its deterrent, it may be willing to offer a cessation of testing in exchange for sanctions relief.

Kim has the initiative in US-North Korea relations

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Short Range ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Content Type ◽  
South Korean

Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.

Lopsided Security on the Korean Peninsula

Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Kil Joo Ban
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Korean Peninsula ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
The North ◽  
Conventional Weapons

North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balance of insecurity, where the weaker North Korean side faced South Korea and the combined ROK–US forces. The second set was intended to shift the balance of insecurity into an imbalance of terror while ensuring that only Pyongyang would be armed with nuclear weapons in the area. The “gray zone” discourse of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (rather than North Korea) ended up bolstering North Korea’s nuclear program, while South Korea intensified only its conventional weapons program.

Analysis of the flight trajectory characteristics of North Korea SLBM due to launching mode

2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (04) ◽  
pp. 1643005
Author(s):  
Kyoung Haing Lee ◽  
Hyeong Pil Seo
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Northeast Asia ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Flight Trajectory ◽  
Asymmetric Warfare ◽  
The North ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense ◽  
Test Flight

The current research aims to simulate the flight trajectory of the North Korean submarine–launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and analyze its flight characteristics based on its range control method. Recently, North Korea has completed the test flight of SLBM and it has become a significant threat to international security. North Korea obtained SLBM technologies from Russia while disbanding decommissioned Russian submarines, and it is suspected that North Korea will continue to experiment in related fields along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons. If North Korea completes the development of SLBM and deploys the missiles, it means the completion of the three asymmetric warfare elements (nuclear weapon, ballistic missile, and submarine) and they will be the most significant threats to northeast Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to scientifically analyze SLBM to adeptly respond to such threat. One characteristic of SLBM is capability of attacking its target in a variety of ways based on its range control method. Based on this fact, the current research derives the flight equation of North Korean SLBM and simulates its flight trajectory based on various range control methods. The flight trajectories that we derive can be used to establish an effective anti-ballistic missile defense system in northeast Asia.

North Korea's Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter C. Clemens
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Republic Of Korea ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
International Support ◽  
East European ◽  
Self Reliance

Soviet and East European documents provide significant revelations about the interactions of North Korea and its allies. First, they show Pyongyang's longstanding interest in obtaining nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons. Second, they reveal that North Korea's leadership consistently evaded commitments to allies on nuclear matters—particularly constraints on its nuclear ambitions or even the provision of information. Third, North Korea's words and deeds evoked substantial concerns in Moscow and other communist capitals that Pyongyang, if it obtained nuclear weapons, might use them to blackmail its partners or risk provoking a nuclear war. When aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was not forthcoming, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sought to bypass Moscow and obtain assistance from the Kremlin's East European clients and, when that proved fruitless, from Pakistan. The absence of international support reinforced the logic of self-reliance and “military first,” pushing North Korea to pursue an independent line with respect to its nuclear weapons. These patterns cannot be extrapolated in a linear way, but they surely suggest reasons for caution by those hoping to engage North Korea in a grand bargain.

scholarly journals Threat Assessment of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) of North Korea

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Younghan Park ◽  
Kyungwon Oh ◽  
Jiwon Kim
Keyword(s):  
North Korea ◽  
Threat Assessment ◽  
Ballistic Missile

Missile and minister's purge raise North Korea risk

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Intelligence Service ◽  
Economic Improvement

Subject North Korea's politics and foreign relations. Significance North Korea on May 9 announced its first ever test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Separately, Pyongyang has yet to comment on allegations by South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) on May 13 that the North's defence minister, Hyon Yong-chol, was publicly executed using anti-aircraft guns around April 30, apparently for disrespect and disobedience to Kim. Impacts Delivering on pledges of economic improvement would buy Kim loyalty, but there are reasons for pessimism. The new missile threat will raise North Korea's place on the list of US priorities. Decisions on missile defence in South Korea will become more urgent.

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