Passions and Reason in the Short Treatise

In the Short Treatise, Spinoza upholds the epistemological claims advanced in the Treatise on the Emendation, but also provides further developments concerning his theory of error and his account of how passions and knowledge relate to each other. Section 2.2 introduces Spinoza’s account of the passions as inadequate ideas caused by other inadequate ideas. Section 2.3 explains how his rejection of the Cartesian distinction between intellect and will further supports this account. Section 2.4 presents his epistemic remedy for the passions, which consists in the emendation of the inadequate ideas that underpin them. Section 2.5 examines the correspondence between Spinoza and Willem van Blijenbergh and shows how, in this context, Spinoza is forced to confront some crucial worries that emerge from his early ethical position. Section 2.6 argues that Spinoza’s early ethics does not have the conceptual resources required to offer a fully satisfying solution to these worries.

Cultivating Passionate Agreement

Chapter 6 discusses how Spinoza implements his account of passions and reason, developed in the Ethics, in the context of the political theory presented in the Political Treatise. Section 6.2 reconstructs his account of reason in this work, in which he distinguishes between a descriptive and normative use of the notion of reason. Section 6.3 introduces the interpretative problems that this account raises. These problems can be solved by implementing the cooperative account of reason introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. This requires using Spinoza’s distinction between universal and proper common notions to account for the descriptive and normative uses of reason respectively. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate how this reading applies to his detailed discussion of monarchy and aristocracy. Section 6.6 develops the implications of this reading of Spinoza’s political science in order to fully address the threat that oppressive societies pose to an individual’s power of developing reason.

Conclusion

This book has defended two main claims. First, Spinoza’s moral philosophy underwent a significant evolution from his early writing (TIE and KV) to the later works (TTP, Ethics, and TP). The outcome of this evolution is that he downplayed his early commitment to the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind by developing a new account of the relationship between reason and passions. Second, Spinoza’s later account of reason is built on the notion of agreement in nature, which leads to considering rationality the mental expression of the extent to which individuals cooperate with others and agree in nature with the other parts of the causal network in which they operate. This general conclusion stresses the two main consequences of this reading: first concerning the internal reasons that led Spinoza to revise his early views, and second concerning the philosophical achievements that came with this transformation.

Passions and Reason in the Ethics

Chapter 5 develops the interpretation introduced in Chapter 4 by showing how the notion of agreement in nature underpins another crucial distinction in Spinoza’s ontology: namely, that between actions and passions. Section 5.2 presents the conceptual link between the individual conatus, the power of acting and the degree of agreement in nature. Section 5.3 discusses how the distinction between activity and passivity relies on the notion of agreement. Section 5.4 argues that passions (under appropriate circumstances) can initiate positive causal feedback loops, which lead to maximizing agreement in nature and fostering activity. Section 5.5 implements this reading to interpret and clarify Spinoza’s techniques to master the passions discussed in the fifth part of the Ethics. Section 5.6 argues that the reading presented in this chapter is better placed than other current interpretations to make full sense of Spinoza’s techniques.

Common Notions in the Ethics

Chapter 4 focuses on Spinoza’s account of reason and common notions introduced in the Ethics, and interprets common notions as an expression of the degree of agreement in nature between the individual and the external causes that determine it. After some preliminaries in Section 4.2, Section 4.3 introduces the conceptual machinery relevant to the notions of parts and wholes, and agreement in nature that Spinoza presents in Letter 32. Section 4.4 argues that this mereological account of parthood and the notion of agreement in nature underpin his discussion of reason in the Ethics. Section 4.5 contends that this reading of reason in terms of agreement in nature leads to a better understanding of his distinction between universal and proper common notions. Section 4.6 presents some alternative readings of his account of reason in the Ethics, and possible objections that might be raised against the interpretation developed in this chapter.

A Passionate Path Towards the Supreme Good in the Theological-Political Treatise

The Theological-Political Treatise investigates whether the moral teachings contained in the Bible can lead to the Supreme Good. Spinoza seems to introduce the possibility of attaining the Supreme Good (phrased in terms of ‘salvation’) without relying on the innate adequate idea of God but rather on obedience. Section 3.2 investigates how passions can be used to support obedience. Section 3.3 discusses the differences between intellectual salvation and salvation through obedience. Section 3.4 argues that Spinoza defends an instrumentalist account of obedience, according to which someone can be truly virtuous insofar as his practice creates the conditions for the development of the mind’s power of thinking. Section 3.5 implements this instrumentalist reading to explain the sense in which the practice of life taught by Biblical prophets can be considered a genuine means of progressing towards the Supreme Good. Section 3.6 explains why this instrumentalist reading is preferable to various alternative readings.

The Path Towards the Supreme Good in the Treatise on the Emendation

Chapter 1 focuses on Spinoza’s account of the Supreme Good in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. It argues that epistemic means are the only strictly necessary means of achieving the Supreme Good. Section 1.2 presents the central tenets of Spinoza’s early ethical view. Section 1.3 discusses the role that Spinoza attributes to social factors and why they are ultimately inessential for attaining the Supreme Good. Section 1.4 reconstructs Spinoza’s account of the passions and argues that Spinoza treats passions as inadequate ideas and potential obstacles in reaching the Supreme Good. Section 1.5 discusses some interpretative issues entailed by Spinoza’s account of ethical progress towards the Supreme Good. Section 1.6 investigates the epistemological underpinnings of Spinoza’s position in order to clarify why adequate ideas are such that they necessitate the mind to embrace them as true and adequate.

Introduction

This book defends two connected claims. First, from an historical point of view, it argues that Spinoza’s moral philosophy evolved significantly over time. In his early writings, Spinoza’s account of ethical progress towards the Supreme Good relies mostly on the epistemic self-sufficiency of the mind. In Spinoza’s mature writings, however, the emphasis shifts significantly towards the mind’s need to rely on appropriate forms of social cooperation with others. Second, from a more philosophical point of view, the book defends a reading of Spinoza’s later thought that offers a new way of understanding the relationship between reason, passions, and social embeddedness. This Introduction presents the theme of the book. It further explains the approach followed throughout the discussion, as well as how the reading proposed here is situated with respect to existing Spinoza scholarship. The Introduction also provides an outline of the contents.