Passions and Reason in the Short Treatise
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza upholds the epistemological claims advanced in the Treatise on the Emendation, but also provides further developments concerning his theory of error and his account of how passions and knowledge relate to each other. Section 2.2 introduces Spinoza’s account of the passions as inadequate ideas caused by other inadequate ideas. Section 2.3 explains how his rejection of the Cartesian distinction between intellect and will further supports this account. Section 2.4 presents his epistemic remedy for the passions, which consists in the emendation of the inadequate ideas that underpin them. Section 2.5 examines the correspondence between Spinoza and Willem van Blijenbergh and shows how, in this context, Spinoza is forced to confront some crucial worries that emerge from his early ethical position. Section 2.6 argues that Spinoza’s early ethics does not have the conceptual resources required to offer a fully satisfying solution to these worries.