Epilogue

This concluding chapter argues that scientific exploration of the space environment should remain a priority even if space settlements are established, and even if technological breakthroughs decrease the cost of spaceflight enough to increase spaceflight activities by orders of magnitude. It addresses the enduring need to engage in scientific examination in order to establish the viability of space environments for human habitation. It also reaffirms the value of scientific exploration, knowledge, and understanding—which will only become more significant in space societies, if they are ever established. The Epilogue concludes by addressing the possible development of revolutionary technologies, the opportunity costs associated with prioritizing scientific exploration, and the future value of scientific exploration, knowledge, and understanding in space.

Introduction

This chapter highlights pushes to commercialize space exploration as foils for raising questions about which fundamental values and goals spaceflight serves, emphasizing the interdisciplinary nature of these issues. It also provides a summary of the book. Intended to contribute to professional philosophical discourse, this book is also intended to be accessible, meaningful, and relevant to individuals from a wide range of disciplinary and vocational backgrounds—from planetary scientists to political scientists; from astrobiologists to anthropologists; from space program employees to lawyers and legal scholars. The reasons why we should reject most basic tenets of space advocacy, and the reasons the book offers in their place, should be persuasive to a wide audience, including philosophers as well as anyone with serious interests in space exploration and space policy.

The Need for Forbearance in Space Settlement

This chapter argues that there is not an urgent need for humans to establish space settlements. It defends the existence of an in-principle obligation to settle space to ensure long-term human survival, and shows that such an obligation is not defeated by various forms of skepticism about duties to future generations, including the “Non-Identity” problem. However, it argues that for the foreseeable future, space settlements will not be effective tools for ensuring long-term human survival, and that for the time being, the scientific exploration of space should be prioritized over space settlement. It also argues that space settlements would risk the wrongful exploitation of settlers and their descendants, and that space settlement would be impermissible if it led to diminution of reproductive autonomy.

The Instrumental Value of Scientific Knowledge and Understanding and the Rationale for Space Science

This chapter provides a defense of the instrumental value of scientific knowledge and understanding as well as a defense of the use of public funds in support of scientific research, including space science. It motivates a more sophisticated understanding of the “spinoff” justification for space exploration by drawing on research in philosophy of science which connects social progress to scientific progress, and scientific progress to scientific exploration. This establishes the instrumental value of scientific (including space) exploration. It then uses a framework derived from Mark Brown and David Guston to argue that democratic states have obligations to provide wide-ranging and substantial support for scientific research, including space research. Finally, it provides an overview of various space research projects, identifying the ways they contribute to democratic governance. It also contains a discussion of the crewed vs. robotic exploration debate.

The Intrinsic Value of Scientific Knowledge and Understanding

This chapter provides a detailed and epistemologically informed defense of the intrinsic value of scientific knowledge and understanding. It responds to Lars Bergström’s criticisms of the value of scientific knowledge. It then devises a naturalistic approach to intrinsic value that is used to argue that true belief (and, in turn, knowledge) is intrinsically valuable because true beliefs are valued for their own sake, and such acts of valuation help to explain the overall scientific worldview. It next considers and rejects Duncan Pritchard’s attempt to show that understanding is more epistemically valuable than true belief, arguing that Pritchard’s view of understanding as a cognitive achievement fails to include anything of epistemic value other than the epistemic value of the true beliefs which are compresent with understanding. Finally, it uses virtue-theoretic approaches to epistemic value to generate prima facie obligations to acquire scientific knowledge and understanding.

Rationales for Space Exploration

This chapter considers and rejects traditional spaceflight rationales, accenting the insubstantial evidence that is usually offered in their support. It uses regression analyses and public opinion data to show that spaceflight activities do not have a clear impact on either STEM degree conferral rates or overall scientific literacy within the United States. Next, it uses public opinion data to show that the general public is not especially interested in astrobiology or in the scientific search for extraterrestrial life. It also uses genetics and anthropological research to show that there is no innate human biological compulsion to explore space. Finally, it describes and criticizes the “space frontier” metaphor as well as basic arguments for space resource exploitation and space settlement.

The Need for Forbearance in Space Resource Exploitation

This chapter argues that space resource exploitation should not be encouraged through enabling legislation. It discusses the legal context of space exploitation, rejecting oft-repeated promises that space exploitation will yield tangible benefits for the majority of humanity. Surveying recent planetary science research, it argues that most of the easily accessible space resources are scarce, and so do not exist in quantities capable of ameliorating terrestrial resource depletion. It also identifies a need to regulate the use of space resources to prevent especially scarce resources such as lunar and asteroidal water from being wasted on projects that benefit only the already fortunate. It argues that scientific uses of space and its resources should be prioritized.

The Scope and Justification of Planetary Protection

This chapter argues that the scope of planetary protection policies should be expanded to include all potential sites of interest to space science. It begins by providing an overview of planetary protection policies and their history. This is followed by discussions of Charles Cockell’s views on the ethics of microbial life, Holmes Rolston’s views on the preservation of natural value in the solar system, and Tony Milligan’s views on respecting natural integrity in space. It argues that each view unnecessarily understates the scope of science’s interest in the protection of space environments. Since every space environment is virtually unexplored, as a precautionary default it should be assumed that a space environment is of interest to science (and thus worth protecting) until otherwise proven.