Shared Mental Models of the Late Soviet Period

This chapter advances a conceptualization of collective identity as a set of shared cognitive structures (or mental models) about the collective self. Below I argue that the Soviet Union was successful in instilling a Soviet collective identity and that the two main mental models that constituted this identity were a sense of Soviet exceptionalism and a sense of the Soviet state being surrounded by the enemy. These shared mental models represented important pillars supporting individual-level dignity and self-esteem for many Soviet citizens as well as a source of their perceptions of in-group and out-group members. Empirical findings from Yuri Levada’s “simple Soviet person” project and a variety of secondary data are used to support the central claims of this chapter.

The Return of the “Soviet” through the “National” in Post-Soviet Russia

The first chapter examines the phenomenon of a visible return of Soviet practices and institutions in “post-Crimea” Russia, along with the rising public support and approval for Joseph Stalin. Arguing against culturally based explanations that focus on the legacy of the Soviet man (homo sovieticus), it views these recent trends as a sign of strengthening of the Russian nationals’ sense of collective identity that is argued to be the most socially and politically significant achievement of Vladimir Putin’s leadership. This chapter presents the central argument of the book and the analytical approach that builds on social identity theory to explain “mature Putinism.”

Le Cirque Politique à la Russe

This chapter advances further the analysis of media as a political legitimation mechanism in Russia by delving into the role of political talk shows in controlling public opinion in Russia. Borrowing most effective practices from Western media and American “outrage industry,” the Russian media professionals create TV programming focused on the personalities of their hosts and driven by moral outrage, anger, and other uncivil techniques. The analysis zooms in on Vladimir Solovyev’s talk shows, considered most crucial for the Kremlin-based propaganda efforts, and pays specific attention to the toolkit used by Solovyev and other media personalities in service of the Kremlin.

MMM for VVP

Putin’s leadership is constructed through media. This chapter explores the key points in the development of the Kremlin-controlled media machine, including the key actors, central mechanisms, and the dominant ideological frames. The chapter makes an argument that the media machine evolved in response to arising political challenges such as Ukraine’s 2004 “Orange revolution,” the 2011–2012 public protests in Russia, and the new standoff with the West after the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

The White Knight and the Red Queen

This chapter relies on the “new psychology of leadership”—an approach to analyzing leadership process relying on social identity theory—to explain the relationship between Vladimir Putin and the Russian people. The main insights of this theory highlight the key elements that make Putin’s leadership effective. These are the shared popular perceptions: (1) that Putin is “one of us”; (2) that he is “doing it for us”; (3) that he is “crafting a sense of us”; and (4) that he is “making us matter.” In this chapter I address each of these elements conceived as a glue that links the followers to the leader and discuss how these sentiments get manifested in people’s own articulations. This chapter also discusses the results of an original survey experiment that aimed at testing the political implications of prompting insecure collective identity.

Searching for a New Mirror

Putin has built his leadership on collective identity politics and Russia’s perceived need to be recognized by the world. This concluding chapter presents three short vignettes to highlight the central issues in state-society relations in contemporary Russia and to argue that the issue of individual and collective recognition is central to state-society relations inside Russia. In all three stories we see individuals denied their dignity and recognition by the state. These issues could be used by political entrepreneurs to construct a new frame that is likely to resonate with the broader population in Russia and present an alternative to the system created under Putin’s leadership.

Constructing the Collective Trauma of the 1990s

This chapter investigates the role of the 1990s for the political legitimation of Russia’s current political leadership. It builds on the constructivist approach to analyze the role of collective trauma in Russia and demonstrates that the cultural and political constructions in Russia over the past two decades have gone hand in hand in their modes of representing the collective experience of the 1990s. This decade has been represented entirely in black colors, highlighting and exaggerating the negative side of these experiences. The chapter demonstrates that this frame of the 1990s is propagated by the pro-Kremlin media personalities and is frequently invoked by Vladimir Putin in his speeches and press conferences.

The New Russian Identity and the Burden of the Soviet Past

This chapter explores the difficult historical and geopolitical context that the new Russia found itself in as it emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The anti-communist ideological choice of Russia’s ruling elites stood uncomfortably with Russia’s status as the main successor to the Soviet Union. Yeltsin’s government underplayed the importance of symbolic issues in the 1990s. As a result, Russian society found itself in a state of symbolic collapse and void that, in combination with painful economic and social realities, led to a widely shared sense of confusion, shame, and anxiety.