scholarly journals Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of A Broad Trait?

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel E. Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
European Association ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Valid Measure ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S–1 bifactor model using 276 participants’ Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self–reported and peer–reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games’ shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self–reported and peer–reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self–assessments and peer–assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

scholarly journals Does Cooperation In the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel Eric Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Valid Measure ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness.

scholarly journals Situational Affordances for Prosocial Behaviour: On the Interaction between Honesty–Humility and (Perceived) Interdependence

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 655-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Columbus ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Daniel Balliet
Keyword(s):  
European Association ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Prosocial Behaviour ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Sampling Studies ◽  
Subjective Perceptions ◽  
High Conflict ◽  
Situational Affordances

Individual differences in prosocial behaviour are well–documented. Increasingly, there has been a focus on the specific situations in which particular personality traits predict prosocial behaviour. HEXACO Honesty–Humility—the basic trait most consistently linked to prosocial behaviour in prior studies—has been found to predict prosociality most strongly in situations that afford the exploitation of others. Importantly, though, it may be the subjectively perceived situation that affords the behavioural expression of a trait. Following this reasoning, we tested the proposition that Honesty–Humility would predict prosocial behaviour more strongly in situations characterised by, and perceived to contain, two dimensions of interdependence that can afford exploitation: high conflict and high power. However, across a series of incentivised economic games and two large experience sampling studies, we only found inconsistent evidence for the association between Honesty–Humility and prosocial behaviour. Furthermore, the link between Honesty–Humility and prosociality was neither conditional on objective interdependence nor on subjective perceptions of interdependence. Nonetheless, perceptions of conflict and power tracked objective properties of economic games and were related to prosocial behaviour in the lab and field. Future research should take individuals’ subjective understanding of situations into account, which may also help understand the (generalisability of the) effect of Honesty–Humility on prosocial behaviour. © 2019 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology

Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Comparison Group ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Preference Elicitation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

Different Games for Different Motives: Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015)

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 506-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Robert Böhm ◽  
Benjamin E. Hilbig
Keyword(s):  
Personality Traits ◽  
European Association ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Game Theoretic

Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed–motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different game correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game–theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.'s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology

scholarly journals Investigating the Relationship Between Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Moral Behavior Using Economic Games

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M. Tappin ◽  
Ryan T. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Behavioral Correlates ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Superiority ◽  
The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority (SPMS), however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N = 827; Study 2, N = 825), in which we indirectly assessed participants’ SPMS and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, SPMS was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the trust game, and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the dictator game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

scholarly journals Comparing Job Applicants to Non–Applicants Using An Item–Level Bifactor Model on the Hexaco Personality Inventory

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 669-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeromy Anglim ◽  
Gavin Morse ◽  
Reinout E. De Vries ◽  
Carolyn MacCann ◽  
Andrew Marty ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Desirability ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Personality Inventory ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Job Applicant ◽  
Item Level ◽  
Improved Model

The present study evaluated the ability of item–level bifactor models (a) to provide an alternative explanation to current theories of higher order factors of personality and (b) to explain socially desirable responding in both job applicant and non–applicant contexts. Participants (46% male; mean age = 42 years, SD = 11) completed the 200–item HEXACO Personality Inventory–Revised either as part of a job application ( n = 1613) or as part of low–stakes research ( n = 1613). A comprehensive set of invariance tests were performed. Applicants scored higher than non–applicants on honesty–humility ( d = 0.86), extraversion ( d = 0.73), agreeableness ( d = 1.06), and conscientiousness ( d = 0.77). The bifactor model provided improved model fit relative to a standard correlated factor model, and loadings on the evaluative factor of the bifactor model were highly correlated with other indicators of item social desirability. The bifactor model explained approximately two–thirds of the differences between applicants and non–applicants. Results suggest that rather than being a higher order construct, the general factor of personality may be caused by an item–level evaluative process. Results highlight the importance of modelling data at the item–level. Implications for conceptualizing social desirability, higher order structures in personality, test development, and job applicant faking are discussed. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology

scholarly journals Investigating the relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and moral behavior using economic games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Ryan McKay
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Behavioral Correlates ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Superiority ◽  
The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority, however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N=827; Study 2, N=825) in which we indirectly assessed participants’ self-perceived moral superiority, and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, self-perceived moral superiority was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the Trust Game; and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the Dictator Game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings, and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

scholarly journals Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Pascal J. Kieslich ◽  
Felix Henninger ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
European Association ◽  
Rank Order ◽  
Cooperative Behaviour ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
The Past ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Hexaco Model ◽  
Shed Light

Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay–offs in a symmetric two–person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

scholarly journals Emotional Tears: An Honest Signal of Trustworthiness Increasing Prosocial Behavior?

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 147470491987242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ian Reed ◽  
Yanal Matari ◽  
Molly Wu ◽  
Revathi Janaswamy
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expression ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Video Clip ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Other Regarding

How do our emotional tears affect the way we are treated? We tested whether tears, paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression, elicited prosocial behavior among perceivers. Participants viewed a video clip depicting a confederate partner with or without tears displaying either a neutral or sad facial expression before making a behavioral decision in one of two economic games. In a Trust game (Experiment 1), participants who played the role of the investor were more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate trustee with tears (paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate trustee without tears. However, in a Dictator game (Experiment 2), participants who played the role of allocator were no more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate recipient with tears (paired with either a neutral or sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate recipient without tears. Taken together, these findings suggest that tears increase prosocial behavior by increasing trustworthiness as opposed to generally increasing other-regarding altruistic tendencies.

Children selectively favor leaders and prosocial agents in an economic exchange

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Trust ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Antisocial Behaviors ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Child Friendly ◽  
Neutral Agent

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.

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