Emotional Tears: An Honest Signal of Trustworthiness Increasing Prosocial Behavior?

How do our emotional tears affect the way we are treated? We tested whether tears, paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression, elicited prosocial behavior among perceivers. Participants viewed a video clip depicting a confederate partner with or without tears displaying either a neutral or sad facial expression before making a behavioral decision in one of two economic games. In a Trust game (Experiment 1), participants who played the role of the investor were more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate trustee with tears (paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate trustee without tears. However, in a Dictator game (Experiment 2), participants who played the role of allocator were no more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate recipient with tears (paired with either a neutral or sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate recipient without tears. Taken together, these findings suggest that tears increase prosocial behavior by increasing trustworthiness as opposed to generally increasing other-regarding altruistic tendencies.

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Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of A Broad Trait?

European Journal of Personality ◽

10.1002/per.2180 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 89-103 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

William H.B. McAuliffe ◽

Daniel E. Forster ◽

Eric J. Pedersen ◽

Michael E. McCullough

Keyword(s):

European Association ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Bifactor Model ◽

Trust Game ◽

General Factor ◽

Valid Measure ◽

Personality Psychology ◽

Economic Games ◽

Social Settings ◽

Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S–1 bifactor model using 276 participants’ Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self–reported and peer–reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games’ shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self–reported and peer–reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self–assessments and peer–assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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The Influence of Social Class on University Students’ Prosocial Behavior Based on the Game Perspective

Complexity ◽

10.1155/2021/9951595 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 ◽

pp. 1-10

Author(s):

Hao Ding ◽

Feng Xu ◽

Jia-Ming Zhu

Keyword(s):

Social Class ◽

University Students ◽

Prosocial Behavior ◽

Significant Influence ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Trust Game ◽

Design Experiment ◽

Chinese University ◽

The World ◽

Research Objects

In the present research, based on the game research paradigm, the research tools are the dictator game and the trust game, and the research objects are Chinese university students. We adopt 2(self-social class: high, low) × 2(target social class: high, low) between-subjects design experiment to investigate the influence of social class on university students’ prosocial behavior. Across the experimental study, we find that (1) in the two situations of dictator game and trust game, self-social class has no significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior; (2) in the situation of dictator game, target social class has a significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior, and it is regulated by self-social class. Under the condition of low self-social class, the higher the target social class, the more prosocial behavior of university students, which confirms the perspective of status and negates “if you are poor, you will be good for yourself.” Under the condition of high self-social class, the lower the target social class, the more prosocial the behavior of university students, which confirms the perspective of fairness and echoes “if you are good, you will be good at the world”; (3) in the context of the trust game, target social class has a significant influence on university students’ prosocial behavior, and there is no interaction effect with self-social class.

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Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

Therapeutic Communities The International Journal of Therapeutic Communities ◽

10.1108/tc-06-2017-0017 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 39 (2) ◽

pp. 98-107 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Anup Gampa ◽

Jessica V. Linley ◽

Brian Roe ◽

Keith L. Warren

Keyword(s):

Criminal Behavior ◽

Time Preference ◽

Comparison Group ◽

Ultimatum Game ◽

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Preference Elicitation ◽

Trust Game ◽

Content Type ◽

Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

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Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

Social Psychological and Personality Science ◽

10.1177/19485506211055622 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 194855062110556

Author(s):

Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽

Isabel Thielmann ◽

Ingo Zettler ◽

Stefan Pfattheicher

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Social Preferences ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Game Studies ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Economic Games ◽

Social Game ◽

The Social ◽

As If

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

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Investigating the Relationship Between Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Moral Behavior Using Economic Games

Social Psychological and Personality Science ◽

10.1177/1948550617750736 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 135-143 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ben M. Tappin ◽

Ryan T. McKay

Keyword(s):

Dictator Game ◽

Moral Behavior ◽

Social Consequences ◽

Trust Game ◽

Future Research ◽

Behavioral Correlates ◽

Economic Games ◽

Alternative Hypotheses ◽

Moral Superiority ◽

The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority (SPMS), however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N = 827; Study 2, N = 825), in which we indirectly assessed participants’ SPMS and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, SPMS was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the trust game, and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the dictator game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

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Investigating the relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and moral behavior using economic games

10.31234/osf.io/kqmuz ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ben M Tappin ◽

Ryan McKay

Keyword(s):

Dictator Game ◽

Moral Behavior ◽

Social Consequences ◽

Trust Game ◽

Future Research ◽

Behavioral Correlates ◽

Economic Games ◽

Alternative Hypotheses ◽

Moral Superiority ◽

The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority, however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N=827; Study 2, N=825) in which we indirectly assessed participants’ self-perceived moral superiority, and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, self-perceived moral superiority was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the Trust Game; and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the Dictator Game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings, and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

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Does Cooperation In the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

10.31234/osf.io/sjgca ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

William H.B. McAuliffe ◽

Daniel Eric Forster ◽

Eric J. Pedersen ◽

Michael E. McCullough

Keyword(s):

Dictator Game ◽

Bifactor Model ◽

Trust Game ◽

General Factor ◽

Valid Measure ◽

Economic Games ◽

Social Settings ◽

Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness.

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Role of the prefrontal cortex in prosocial and self-maximization motivations: an rTMS study

Scientific Reports ◽

10.1038/s41598-021-01588-6 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Oksana Zinchenko ◽

Olga Savelo ◽

Vasily Klucharev

Keyword(s):

Prefrontal Cortex ◽

Prosocial Behavior ◽

Dictator Game ◽

Prosocial Motives ◽

Dorsolateral Prefrontal ◽

The Right ◽

Theta Burst ◽

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation ◽

Healthy Participants

AbstractMore than a decade of neuroimaging and brain stimulation studies point to a crucial role for the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) in prosocial behavior. The intuitive prosociality model postulates that the rDLPFC controls intuitive prosocial behavior, whereas the reflective model assumes that the rDLPFC controls selfish impulses during prosocial behavior. The intuitive prosociality model implies that the transient disruption of the rDLPFC should increase voluntary transfers in both dictator and generosity games. In contrast, the reflective model suggests that the transient disruption of the rDLPFC should decrease transfers in the dictator game, without affecting voluntary transfers in the generosity game, in which selfish motives are minimized. The aim of this paper was to compare predictions of the intuitive and reflective models using the classic dictator game and generosity game and continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS). In this study, two groups of healthy participants (dictators) received either cTBS over the rDLPFC or right extrastriate visual areas. As shown by the results, the transient disruption of the rDLPFC significantly promoted prosocial motives in the dictator game only, particularly in the trials with the lowest dictator’s costs. These findings partially support the notion that the rDLPFC controls intuitive prosocial behavior.

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