scholarly journals Does Cooperation In the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel Eric Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Valid Measure ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness.

scholarly journals Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of A Broad Trait?

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe ◽  
Daniel E. Forster ◽  
Eric J. Pedersen ◽  
Michael E. McCullough
Keyword(s):  
European Association ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Valid Measure ◽  
Personality Psychology ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Social Settings ◽  
Self Assessments

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S–1 bifactor model using 276 participants’ Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self–reported and peer–reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games’ shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self–reported and peer–reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self–assessments and peer–assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Comparison Group ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Preference Elicitation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

scholarly journals Investigating the Relationship Between Self-Perceived Moral Superiority and Moral Behavior Using Economic Games

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M. Tappin ◽  
Ryan T. McKay
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Behavioral Correlates ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Superiority ◽  
The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority (SPMS), however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N = 827; Study 2, N = 825), in which we indirectly assessed participants’ SPMS and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, SPMS was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the trust game, and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the dictator game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

scholarly journals Investigating the relationship between self-perceived moral superiority and moral behavior using economic games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M Tappin ◽  
Ryan McKay
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Moral Behavior ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Behavioral Correlates ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Superiority ◽  
The Relationship

Most people report that they are superior to the average person on various moral traits. The psychological causes and social consequences of this phenomenon have received considerable empirical attention. The behavioral correlates of self-perceived moral superiority, however, remain unknown. We present the results of two preregistered studies (Study 1, N=827; Study 2, N=825) in which we indirectly assessed participants’ self-perceived moral superiority, and used two incentivized economic games to measure their engagement in moral behavior. Across studies, self-perceived moral superiority was unrelated to trust in others and to trustworthiness, as measured by the Trust Game; and unrelated to fairness, as measured by the Dictator Game. This pattern of findings was robust to a range of analyses, and, in both studies, Bayesian analyses indicated moderate support for the null over the alternative hypotheses. We interpret and discuss these findings, and highlight interesting avenues for future research on this topic.

scholarly journals Emotional Tears: An Honest Signal of Trustworthiness Increasing Prosocial Behavior?

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 147470491987242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ian Reed ◽  
Yanal Matari ◽  
Molly Wu ◽  
Revathi Janaswamy
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expression ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Video Clip ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Behavioral Decision ◽  
Other Regarding

How do our emotional tears affect the way we are treated? We tested whether tears, paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression, elicited prosocial behavior among perceivers. Participants viewed a video clip depicting a confederate partner with or without tears displaying either a neutral or sad facial expression before making a behavioral decision in one of two economic games. In a Trust game (Experiment 1), participants who played the role of the investor were more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate trustee with tears (paired with either a neutral or a sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate trustee without tears. However, in a Dictator game (Experiment 2), participants who played the role of allocator were no more likely to share an endowment after viewing a confederate recipient with tears (paired with either a neutral or sad facial expression) in comparison to a confederate recipient without tears. Taken together, these findings suggest that tears increase prosocial behavior by increasing trustworthiness as opposed to generally increasing other-regarding altruistic tendencies.

Children selectively favor leaders and prosocial agents in an economic exchange

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Trust ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Antisocial Behaviors ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Child Friendly ◽  
Neutral Agent

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.

Measuring perceptions of post-conflict actors’ economic behavior: the case of Colombia

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Alonso Diaz ◽  
Nicolás Enrique Arévalo Jaimes ◽  
Sebastian Balcucho ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Tatiana García ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
University Students ◽  
Exposure To Violence ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Intertemporal Discounting

Exposure to violence has lasting effects on economic behavior years after it has ended. Previous literature has proved that there is an increase in altruism, impatience, and risk-seeking. However, it is unknown if regular citizens, not directly involved in the conflict, perceive such economic behavior in post-conflict actors. We asked participants to report, relative to them, how Colombia's post-conflict actors (ex-guerrillas, ex-paramilitaries, and victims) behave in different economic games (dictator game, lotteries, and intertemporal discounting). Our sample of university students believes that victims are less altruistic than current evidence with real victims, not particularly risky, and impatient. Also, that former combatants are risk-seeking, impatient, and altruistic towards victims. These beliefs about post-conflict actors' economic behavior do not consistently coincide with behavioral changes found in actual actors involved in violence and could guide reintegration policies.

The Relationship Between Career Adaptability and Job-Search Self-Efficacy of Graduates: The Bifactor Approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 106907272110022
Author(s):  
Marijana Matijaš ◽  
Darja Maslić Seršić
Keyword(s):  
Job Search ◽  
Self Efficacy ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
Sem Analysis ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
Specific Factor ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Career Adaptability ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Interview Performance

Career adaptability is an important resource for dealing with career transitions such as the transition from university to work. Previous research emphasized the importance of focusing on career adapt-abilities instead only on general career adaptability. The aim of this research was to investigate whether career adaptability can be conceptualized as a bifactor model and whether general and specific dimensions of career adaptability have a relationship with job-search self-efficacy of graduates. In an online cross-sectional study, 667 graduates completed the Career Adapt-Abilities Scale and Job Search Skill and Confidence Scale. The CFA analysis showed that the bifactor model of career adaptability had a good fit where general factor explained most of the items’ variance. The SEM analysis revealed that general career adaptability and the specific factor of confidence positively correlated with job-search and interview performance self-efficacy. Control only correlated with interview performance self-efficacy. Neither concern nor curiosity showed a significant relationship with job-search and interview performance self-efficacy.

scholarly journals When Fair Is Not Equal

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 847-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Eamonn Ferguson ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Real World ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Prosocial Behaviors ◽  
Contextual Cues ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
The Real

Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—have been found to predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet, most studies have used neutrally framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the absence of contextual cues. In this study ( N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on the previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and prosocial traits.

The Test of Gross Motor Development—Third Edition: A Bifactor Model, Dimensionality, and Measurement Invariance

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Sedigheh Salami ◽  
Paulo Felipe Ribeiro Bandeira ◽  
Cristiano Mauro Assis Gomes ◽  
Parvaneh Shamsipour Dehkordi
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Invariance ◽  
Motor Development ◽  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Factor Model ◽  
Bifactor Model ◽  
General Factor ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Gross Motor ◽  
Measurement Models ◽  
Gross Motor Development

Aim: To examine the latent structure of the Test of Gross Motor Development—Third Edition (TGMD-3) with a bifactor modeling approach. In addition, the study examines the dimensionality and model-based reliability of general and specific contributions of the test’s subscales and measurement invariance of the TGMD-3. Methods: A convenience sample of (N = 496; Mage = 7.23 ± 2.03 years; 53.8% female) typically developed children participated in this study. Three alternative measurement models were tested: (a) a unidimensional model, (b) a correlated two-factor model, and (c) a bifactor model. Results: The totality of results, including item loadings, goodness-of-fit indexes, and reliability estimates, all supported the bifactor model and strong evidence of a general factor, namely gross motor competence. Additionally, the reliability of subscale scores was poor, and it is thus contended that scoring, reporting, and interpreting of the subscales scores are probably not justifiable. Conclusions: This study shows the advantages of using bifactor approach to examine the TGMD-3 factor structure and suggests that the two traditionally hypothesized factors are better understood as “grouping” factors rather than as representative of latent constructs. In addition, our findings demonstrate that the bifactor model appears invariant for sex.

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