Reflexivity, Reality, and Relationality. The Inadequacy of Bourdieu’s Critique of the Phenomenological Tradition in Sociology

Author(s):  
Martin Endress
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-150
Author(s):  
Henning Nörnberg

This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality.


Communicology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-33
Author(s):  
N.V. Kirillina

The paper represents the analysis of the concept of communicative. The choice of topic is determined by the search for criteria and tools for assessing the results of strategic communication, taking into account the development of its interactive forms. The author leads the existing approaches to the definition of the concept of engagement and identifies the areas for further interdisciplinary research of the specified subject, and raises the issue of the appropriateness of using the engagement indicators in the assessment the social potential of communication. The work is based on the phenomenological tradition in the interpretation of communicative processes and the metamodel of communication of R. Craig. The author uses the methods of comparative analysis, analogy, generalization, and combined methodology of interdisciplinary analysis.


The paper provides an analysis of the structuralist and phenomenological traditions in interpretation of female body practices. The structuralist intellectual tradition bases its methodology on concepts from social anthropology and philosophy that see the body as ‘ordered’ by social institutions. Structuralist approaches within academic feminism are focused on critical study of the social regulation of female bodies with respect to reproduction and sexualisation (health and beauty practices). The author focuses on the dominant physical ideal of femininity and the means for body pedagogics that have been constructed by patriarchal authority. In contrast to theories of the ordered body, the phenomenological tradition is focused on the “lived” body, embodied experience, and the personal motivation and values attached to body practices. This tradition has been influenced by a variety of schools of thought including philosophical anthropology, phenomenology and action theories in sociology. Within academic feminism, there are at least three phenomenologically oriented strategies of interpretation of female body practices. The first one is centred around women’s individual situation and bodily socialization; the second one studies interrelation between body practices and the sense of the self; and the third one postulates the potential of body practices to destabilize the dominant ideals of femininity and thus provides a theoretical basis for feminist activism. The phenomenological tradition primarily analyses the motivational, symbolic and value-based components of body practices as they interact with women’s corporeality and sense of self. In general, both structuralist and phenomenological traditions complement each other by focusing on different levels of analysis of female embodiment.


Author(s):  
Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad

The Introduction outlines the various chapters. It then situates the question of ‘body’ in the modern Western philosophical tradition following Descartes, and argues that this leaves subsequent responses to come under one of three options: metaphysical dualism of body and subject; any anti-dualist reductionism; or the overcoming of the divide. Describing the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty as a potent example of the third strategy, the Introduction then suggests his philosophy will function as foil to the ecological phenomenology developed and presented in the book. Moreover, one approach within the Western Phenomenological tradition, of treating phenomenology as a methodology for the clarification of experience (rather than the means to the determination of an ontology of the subject) is compared to the approach in this book. Since classical India, while understanding dualism, did not confront the challenge of Descartes (for better or for worse), its treatment of body follows a different trajectory.


2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-399
Author(s):  
Lester Embree>

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-165
Author(s):  
Andrew Barrette ◽  

This paper investigates a moment in the history of the phenomenological movement and offers an argument for its enduring significance. To this end, it brings to light, for the first time in a half-century, Manfred Frings’ rejected and so unpublished translation of Edmund Husserl’s Ideas II. After considering the meaning of the term Leib, which Frings renders ‘lived-body’ and to which the editor suggests ‘organism,’ a brief argument for the living tradition of phenomenology is given. It is claimed that the enduring significance of the document is found in the elucidation of the need to renew the phenomenological tradition through a collaboration across generations. Thus, even in its supposed “failure,” Frings’ translation gives data to future thinkers for insight into both their own life and the life of the ideas of phenomenology itself.


Phainomenon ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Marcus Brainard

Abstract This article deals with “epoch” and “epoché”, each of which plays a central role in Heribert Boeder’s thought. Because it understands itself as the building of rational wholes, or logoi, his thought - but also that which it builds - is termed the “logotectonic”. The first part of the article situates the logotectonic epoché in the phenomenological tradition, particularly with respect to its key manifestations in Husserl and Heidegger, while also setting it off from that tradition. It is shown to be not a method of access to consciousness, to say nothing of a withholding of Being, but rather a fundamental reticence on the part of the inquirer with respect to what has been thought. It is an exclusion of one’s idiosyncrasies in order to approach what has been thought in and on its own terms. It is this new epoché, and it atone, that gives access to the epoch in Boeder’s sense. Each of three epochs of philosophy is governed by a unique principle, which is given voice in the wisdom proper to that epoch atone and to which philosophy responds (either negatively or positively). The character of this response is the basis of Boeder’s claim that the history of philosophy is the “crisis of principles.” The principle of a given epoch determines the tasks to be accomplished by the philosophy of that epoch. Once the full range of tasks is completed, the epoch is concluded, making way for a new principle and thus a new epoch. The succession of epochs comes to an end, however - in Hegel. In view of this end, the article then takes up the subsequent “periods” of thought: modernity and submodernity; it seeks to show briefly how neither constitutes an epoch, but also how the end of submodernity coincides with the opening up of the possibility of rescuing wisdom from its oblivion and granting it a present that makes dwelling possible once again. This is precisely task that moves the logotect and, by extension, the logotectonic.


Author(s):  
Mark Coeckelbergh

In chapter 6 objections to these material romanticisms and to the narrative about romanticism and technology are constructed. First, drawing on classic anti-romantics, the argument is constructed that romanticism leads to escapism or what I call cyber narcissism. Then a position is elaborated that criticizes the current material romanticism for not being romantic enough, for failing to reach the romantic aims. It is argued that our hyper-romanticism in the form of Web 2.0 and its social media risks to destroy its very aims. It is concluded that, seen from these perspectives, material romanticism’s promise of a synthesis of enlightenment and romanticism is not kept and there is no “end of the machine” in sight. However, then it is argued that the criticisms discussed here may well be anti-romantic, but largely (but not completely and not always) remain within the “romantic order”. The chapter draws on Coyne’s reading of the phenomenological tradition in order to start exploring what a less dualistic and less romantic view would look like. The chapter ends with a summary of what we can nevertheless learn from the romantic tradition.


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