Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Law: The 2014 Revision of the Norwegian Constitution

2019 ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
Toril Marie Øie ◽  
Henrik Bull
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Fundamental Law

Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the Hungarian Legal System

ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Tímea Drinóczi
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Fundamental Law

Abstract The Constitutional Court declared in its ruling 22/2016 (XII 5) that by exercising its competences, it can examine whether the joint exercise of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary infringes human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty of Hungary, or Hungary’s self-identity based on its historical constitution.

The concept and socio-economic essence of the constitution as the fundamental law of the state

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-104
Author(s):  
Parvana Bayram Babaeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
State Power ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The People ◽  
Legal Document ◽  
The Will ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms

The Constitution is the fundamental law not only of the state, but also of society, expressing the will of statehood and the sovereignty of the people. The Constitution establishes the fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen, socio-political institutions of power and a system of self-government of the people and acts as a legal basis for the formation and development of civil society. The constitution can be viewed as a micromodel, a legal symbol of society. It is within its borders and on its basis that the mechanism of state power operates, the rights and freedoms of citizens are protected, the directions of social development are determined. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan is a fundamental legal document establishing sovereignty, independence and supremacy of state power. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan covers not only the structure of the state, but also non-state spheres - the foundations of the socio-economic structure, the cultural life of society, the rights, freedoms and duties of a person and a citizen. Key words: constitution, right, state, law, society, fundamental law, regulation, human rights and freedoms

Was There a “New Toryism” in the Earlier Part of George III's Reign?

1965 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian R. Christie
Keyword(s):  
American Revolution ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
British Politics ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Great Strength ◽  
Contractual Obligation ◽  
Political Traditions ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Political Groups

The reissue after twenty years of G. H. Guttridge's study, English Whiggism and the American Revolution, is very welcome. In many of its judgments this lucid, aseptic dissection of the ideas, attitudes, and policies of the opposition groups in British politics during the period of the Revolution bids fair to stand the test of a much longer period of time than has elapsed since its first appearance in 1942. The virile political traditions (some still traceable in modern British practice) which Hanoverian England inherited from the whiggism of the seventeenth century contained not one but several potentially competing principles; and the great strength of this study lies in the author's exposition of the ways in which these divergent principles were taken up by different political groups, with the effect of determining the stand taken by each, both on the American question and on concurrent issues of domestic politics. In Locke's writings radicals found justification for the creed of personality as the basis of political rights. All groups drew from them a belief that Parliament had an essential role in maintaining “the contractual obligation of monarchy to preserve certain fundamental rights,” but more than one principle followed from this premise. In the minds of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, and his friends, it was combined with pre-Lockeian concepts of fundamental law as an element in the constitution beyond the power of Parliament to alter. For the leaders and members of the Rockingham connection, Parliament's role was seen in, and secured by, its supremacy.

The Transition from Welfare to Workfare in Times of Crisis

2020 ◽  
pp. 49-72
Author(s):  
József Hajdú
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Family Policy ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Social Spending ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
State Obligations ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Individual

Many of the serious deficiencies in the Hungarian welfare state pre-date the 2010 political changes and a pronounced anti-poverty policy turn was evidently already on its way in 2008, especially concerning income protection for the long-term unemployed. As if this were not enough, according to the OECD, among the thirty-two OECD member states, Hungary and Greece were the only states where real public social spending had decreased since the onset of the economic crisis. More precisely, Hungary’s social policy answer to the crisis included the introduction of workfare, the diminishment of the second pillar pension, the abolishment of early pensions, the activation of family policy, and the encouragement of citizens’ self-support attitude. Moreover, in 2010 a two-thirds majority in parliament gave the government the possibility to enact fundamental changes to Hungary’s Constitution and legislation as a whole. Confronted with the experience of non-democratic regimes and the individual vision of fundamental rights, after the transition, the Fundamental Law indicates a shift of emphasis from state obligations towards individual citizens to citizens’ obligations towards the community.

Legal preconditions for majoritarian democracy: The case of Hungary

2021 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
Gábor Attila Tóth
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Winner Takes All ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
New System

The Constitution of Hungary promulgated in 2011 and officially called the Fundamental law thoroughly altered the Hungarian constitutional system. Scholars encounter difficulties when attempting to label the new system. While some typologies maintain that despite its illiberalism and populism the new system meets the formal criteria of legality and democracy, others insist that it represents an abuse of democratic constitutionalism. In what follows, I put two rival conceptions of democracy into the main focus to better understand the nature of the Hungarian constitutional system and the competing scholarly positions. First, I briefly introduce the contrast between the majoritarian and what I call the complex conception of democracy. My aim is to demonstrate that even if one subscribes to a majoritarian conception of democracy, certain legal and constitutional preconditions must be fulfilled. In the following sections, I examine the case of Hungary within this theoretical framework. The Hungarian constitutional system presents itself as a winner-takes-all majoritarian democracy. Nevertheless, an analysis of the legal preconditions of democracy - constitutional text, electoral system, legal institutions, fundamental rights, and the rule of law - can demonstrate that in this system, legal mechanisms do not serve to govern the formation of a legitimate majority rule. They create instead an autocratic system, the key attribute of which is the pretence of majoritarian democracy.

Canada's Legal Revolution: Judging in the Age of the Charter of Rights

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-588
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Basic Information ◽  
Legal Process ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights And Freedoms ◽  
The Relationship

I have been asked to speak to you about judging in the age of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with particular reference to remedies under the Charter. You will understand, I am sure, that my treatment of the subject will necessarily be in the nature of an overview.Stated broadly, I will be suggesting to you that the introduction of the Charter in Canada has required a fundamental reappraisal of how judges approach their tasks, of the processes that are employed and of the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government.Before developing these two propositions, however, I should first give you some basic information about our Charter; to those for whom this is very familiar ground, I apologize and promise brevity.The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was adopted by Canada in 1982, has one main animating principle from which flows one corollary. The animating principle is that certain human rights and freedoms should be part of the fundamental law of the land. The corollary is that when there is a dispute about the application or the meaning of these fundamental rights and freedoms, it is the responsibility of the courts in Canada to define and apply them through the legal process.

Rights Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Democratic Backsliding and Human Rights in Hungary

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-123
Author(s):  
Gábor Halmai
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Human Rights Standards

AbstractThe Article discusses the democratic backsliding after 2010 in Hungary, and how it affected the state of human rights in the country, a Member State of the European Union. The main argument of the Article is that paradoxically the non-legitimate 1989 constitution provided full-fledged protection of fundamental rights, while the procedurally legitimate 2011 constitution-making resulted in curtailment of rights and their constitutional guarantees. The Article first describes the democratic transition that occurred in 1989–1990 as a rights revolution and the results of the 2011 “illiberal” constitution, called Fundamental Law, as counter-revolution. The second part of the Article illustrates the constitutional and statutory regulation of human rights protection after this “rule of law revolution,” and the activist jurisprudence of the first Constitutional Court using the concept of an “invisible constitution” to protect human rights. The third part discusses the rights provisions of the new Fundamental Law and several statutes dismantling the guarantees of human rights, with special attention to the decreased possibilities of state institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, the ordinary judiciary and ombudsmen, as well as civil society organizations to effectively protect fundamental rights. The fourth part assesses the efforts of European institutions to force the Hungarian government to comply with the human rights standards laid down in the European Convention of Human Rights and in the Treaty of the European Union. The Article concludes that neither internal nor external challenges could prevent the development of a new authoritarian regime with no guaranteed human rights.

scholarly journals Aksjologiczne podstawy konstytucji

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Stawrowski
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Constitutional State ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Fundamental Values ◽  
Modern Form

The axiology embedded in a constitution refers to a political community in its most and its developed, modern form, which we refer to as a constitutional state. The basis of such a state institutional and legal structure, recorded in the fundamental law, is comprised of fundamental values that gradually filter into the consciousness and are subsequently universally accepted during a long-lasting, historical process which has been completed in a given cultural milieu. In order to indicate the values on which a constitutional state is founded and which it embodies, it is necessary to reach back to the very beginnings of not only a modern state before the epoch of a constitution, but also to those of the state as such. An axiological appraisal of a state must be based on the specific content of the ethical order at its foundations. There is a specific ‘axiology’ of exerting power as such, the basic yardstick for which is effectiveness. When we aim to appraise or draft a specific constitution, this pragmatic perspective must be taken into account. A well-organised system of the institutions of the state’s authority is, primarily, one which operates effectively.Axiologically, the most important part of a constitution, the one where the ethical foundations of the state are spelled out expressis verbis, is the catalogue of basic rights. At present, the main problem is the inflation of these rights, not only by rendering them too detailed, but also by placing political stipulations, social privileges or expectations regarded as generally right among them. (The II chapter of the Constitution now in force in Poland makes an instructive illustration of such an approach.) All these superfluous appendages not only litter the constitution, but also contribute to the devaluation of real fundamental rights as their meaning, essential to the maintenance of an interpersonal order, is diluted in the flood of quasi rights which have been added on.

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