scholarly journals A Panting Consciousness: Beckett, Breath, and Biocognitive Feedback

2021 ◽  
pp. 435-459
Author(s):  
Marco Bernini

AbstractBooming Western interest in mindfulness and meditation has significantly mainstreamed breath and breathing practices, where focussed breathing is taken to be conducive to novel psychological states. Thanks to the regulation of breathing patterns, patterns in our thinking are not just affected but revealed, together with their entanglement with respiration (in a variety of looping effects here considered as ‘biocognitive feedback’). What makes this reciprocal feedback possible is the structural intimacy and co-dependency of breath and consciousness—a dyadic and dynamic relationship already conceptualised by William James, and today reappraised by contemporary, Buddhist-inspired cognitive sciences. Critically integrating psychological, cognitive, phenomenological, and narratological frameworks, this essay investigates the co-dependent intimacy between breath and cognition as represented, explored, and complicated in the narrative work of Samuel Beckett.

Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Madzia

AbstractThe paper proposes an outline of a reconciliatory approach to the perennial controversy between epistemological realism and anti-realism (constructionism). My main conceptual source in explaining this view is the philosophy of pragmatism, more specifically, the epistemological theories of George H. Mead, John Dewey, and also William James’ radical empiricism. First, the paper analyzes the pragmatic treatment of the goal-directedness of action, especially with regard to Mead’s notion of attitudes, and relates it to certain contemporary epistemological theories provided by the cognitive sciences (Maturana, Rizzolatti, Clark). Against this background, the paper presents a philosophical as well as empirical justification of why we should interpret the environment and its objects in terms of possibilities for action. In Mead’s view, the objects and events of our world emerge within stable patterns of organism-environment interactions, which he called “perspectives”. According to pragmatism as well as the aforementioned cognitive scientists, perception and other cognitive processes include not only neural processes in our heads but also the world itself. Elaborating on Mead’s concept of perspectives, the paper argues in favor of the epistemological position called “constructive realism.”


1989 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 483-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacopo P. Mortola ◽  
Clement Lanthier

We studied the breathing patterns of three newborn grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) at 2 – 3 days of age under normoxic and hypoxic conditions with the barometric technique, which does not require the animal to be restrained. Normoxic tidal volume was deeper and breathing rate slower than expected for newborns of this size on the basis of previously published allometric relationships. In addition, two characteristics were readily apparent: (i) occasional sudden long apneas, often exceeding 30 s in duration, and (ii) consistent brief interruptions of expiratory flow. Neither aspect is common in terrestrial newborns of this age, but both have been previously observed in adult seals. During hypoxia (10 min of 15% O2 and 10 min of 10% O2), ventilation increased markedly and steadily, at variance with what occurs in newborns of other species, indicating a precocial development of the regulation of breathing. This latter result also suggests that the blunted response to hypoxia previously reported in adult seals may be acquired postnatally with diving experience.


Author(s):  
Stephen Brock Schafer

The psychological nature of the electronic media environment is a virtual reality that—according to Jungian principles—is dreamlike. Perhaps it can be analyzed with Jung's Analytical Psychology. Science is experiencing a paradigm shift into a reality of mediated illusion, and psychological research on this illusion has become the human imperative. It may be stipulated that physics has abolished matter, conceding that “reality is organized mind stuff.” If cosmos is structured holographically and the brain is structured holonomically, it is probable that “mind stuff” is structured holographically. The Jungian concept of Psyche is a good place to begin researching the Media-sphere as mind stuff. Cognitive sciences are probing the brain and nervous system in search of the template for cognitive organization, and the salient features have already emerged. It appears that both conscious and unconsciousness cognitive dimensions have dramatic form. This dreamlike structure can be employed to analyze the media dream, and to foster coherent psychological states in contextual collectives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 343-371
Author(s):  
Stephen Brock Schafer

The psychological nature of the electronic media environment is a virtual reality that—according to Jungian principles—is dreamlike. Perhaps it can be analyzed with Jung's Analytical Psychology. Science is experiencing a paradigm shift into a reality of mediated illusion, and psychological research on this illusion has become the human imperative. It may be stipulated that physics has abolished matter, conceding that “reality is organized mind stuff.” If cosmos is structured holographically and the brain is structured holonomically, it is probable that “mind stuff” is structured holographically. The Jungian concept of Psyche is a good place to begin researching the Media-sphere as mind stuff. Cognitive sciences are probing the brain and nervous system in search of the template for cognitive organization, and the salient features have already emerged. It appears that both conscious and unconsciousness cognitive dimensions have dramatic form. This dreamlike structure can be employed to analyze the media dream, and to foster coherent psychological states in contextual collectives.


2021 ◽  
pp. 29-29
Author(s):  
Olivera Stanojlovic ◽  
Nikola Sutulovic ◽  
Dragan Hrncic ◽  
Dusan Mladenovic ◽  
Aleksandra Rasic-Markovic ◽  
...  

Emotions are specific psychological states brought about by neurophysiological changes associated with feelings, thoughts and behavioral responses. Emotions were considered as irrational experiences beyond the domain of logical perception because of their intertwinement with mood, temperament, creativity, motivation and personality. Through the centuries, emotions have been the focus of research among great classical philosophers, doctors, neuropsychologists, neuroscientists, neurologists and psychiatrists. The neurophysiological basis of behavior, such as emotional facial expression, and autonomic events in the physiological theory of William James and James-Lange and modified by Cannon-Bard, was followed by the two-factor theory of emotions of Schachter-Singer and Lazarus? higher-order cognitive evaluation. Four components that influence each other represent the concept of emotions and complete the overall emotional experience, and these are: autonomous (increase in heart rate, blood pressure); somatic (body language, facial expressions); cognitive (control, management), and subjective feeling (emotion, individual experience). The interplay between emotions and cognition has been the subject of research. Emotions can be evoked reflexively by simple physical stimuli (bottom-up), but can also be complex reactions involving cognitive, physiological and behavioral reactions (top-down). The amygdala, the ?alert" or ?neural alarm? structure, is responsible for conditioning fear, while the medial prefrontal cortex participates in emotion self-regulation and decision making.


Labyrinth ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
Susanne Moser

Philosophy of Emotions between Feeling-Theories, Cognition-Theories, and AxiologyThe article addresses some central philosophical issues in the current philosophical research on emotions. There are, on the one hand, those theories that owe their ancestry to the work of William James, arguing that emotions are bodily feelings or perceptions of bodily feelings; and, on the other hand, those theories that owe their ancestry to Aristotle and Brentano arguing that emotions are cognitive, world-directed intentional states. The author points out that emotions became the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy as well as in other branches of the cognitive sciences. In view of the proliferation of the increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotions as a research area isolated from the approaches of other disciplines, as for example psychology, neurology, and evolutionary biology.


1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace M. Jantzen

The definition of mysticism has shifted, in modern thinking, from a patristic emphasis on the objective content of experience to the modern emphasis on the subjective psychological states or feelings of the individual. Post Kantian Idealism and Romanticism was involved in this shift to a far larger extent than is usually recognized. An important conductor of the subjectivist view of mysticism to modern philosophers of religion was William James, even though in other respects he repudiated Romantic and especially Idealist categories of thought. In this article I wish first to explore William James' understanding of mysticism and religious experience, and then to measure that understanding against the accounts of two actual mystics, Bernard of Clairvaux and Julian of Norwich, who, for all their differences, may be taken as paradigms of the Christian mystical tradition. I shall argue that judging from these two cases, James' position is misguided and inadequate. Since James' account has been of enormous influence in subsequent thinking about mysticism, it follows that if his understanding of mysticism is inadequate, so is much of the work that rests upon it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Gantman ◽  
Robin Gomila ◽  
Joel E. Martinez ◽  
J. Nathan Matias ◽  
Elizabeth Levy Paluck ◽  
...  

AbstractA pragmatist philosophy of psychological science offers to the direct replication debate concrete recommendations and novel benefits that are not discussed in Zwaan et al. This philosophy guides our work as field experimentalists interested in behavioral measurement. Furthermore, all psychologists can relate to its ultimate aim set out by William James: to study mental processes that provide explanations for why people behave as they do in the world.


2009 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-12
Author(s):  
Andrea Vovka ◽  
Paul W. Davenport ◽  
Karen Wheeler-Hegland ◽  
Kendall F. Morris ◽  
Christine M. Sapienza ◽  
...  

Abstract When the nasal and oral passages converge and a bolus enters the pharynx, it is critical that breathing and swallow motor patterns become integrated to allow safe passage of the bolus through the pharynx. Breathing patterns must be reconfigured to inhibit inspiration, and upper airway muscle activity must be recruited and reconfigured to close the glottis and laryngeal vestibule, invert the epiglottis, and ultimately protect the lower airways. Failure to close and protect the glottal opening to the lower airways, or loss of the integration and coordination of swallow and breathing, increases the risk of penetration or aspiration. A neural swallow central pattern generator (CPG) controls the pharyngeal swallow phase and is located in the medulla. We propose that this swallow CPG is functionally organized in a holarchical behavioral control assembly (BCA) and is recruited with pharyngeal swallow. The swallow BCA holon reconfigures the respiratory CPG to produce the stereotypical swallow breathing pattern, consisting of swallow apnea during swallowing followed by prolongation of expiration following swallow. The timing of swallow apnea and the duration of expiration is a function of the presence of the bolus in the pharynx, size of the bolus, bolus consistency, breath cycle, ventilatory state and disease.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document