Evolution of Compassion Under Un-Repeated Interaction

2008 ◽  
pp. 273-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shinsuke Suzuki ◽  
Eizo Akiyama
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Interaction

First encounter effects in testing of highly automated vehicles during two experimental occasions – The need for recurrent testing

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Andersson ◽  
Azra Habibovic ◽  
Daban Rizgary
Keyword(s):  
Driver Behavior ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Gaze Behavior ◽  
Repeated Testing ◽  
Automated Vehicles ◽  
Automated Driving ◽  
Perceived Safety ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Over Time

Abstract To explore driver behavior in highly automated vehicles (HAVs), independent researchers are mainly conducting short experiments. This limits the ability to explore drivers’ behavioral changes over time, which is crucial when research has the intention to reveal human behavior beyond the first-time use. The current paper shows the methodological importance of repeated testing in experience and behavior related studies of HAVs. The study combined quantitative and qualitative data to capture effects of repeated interaction between drivers and HAVs. Each driver ( n = 8 n=8 ) participated in the experiment on two different occasions (∼90 minutes) with one-week interval. On both occasions, the drivers traveled approximately 40 km on a rural road at AstaZero proving grounds in Sweden and encountered various traffic situations. The participants could use automated driving (SAE level 4) or choose to drive manually. Examples of data collected include gaze behavior, perceived safety, as well as interviews and questionnaires capturing general impressions, trust and acceptance. The analysis shows that habituation effects were attenuated over time. The drivers went from being exhilarated on the first occasion, to a more neutral behavior on the second occasion. Furthermore, there were smaller variations in drivers’ self-assessed perceived safety on the second occasion, and drivers were faster to engage in non-driving related activities and become relaxed (e. g., they spent more time glancing off road and could focus more on non-driving related activities such as reading). These findings suggest that exposing drivers to HAVs on two (or more) successive occasions may provide more informative and realistic insights into driver behavior and experience as compared to only one occasion. Repeating an experiment on several occasions is of course a balance between the cost and added value, and future research should investigate in more detail which studies need to be repeated on several occasions and to what extent.

Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games

2001 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Dilip Mookherjee ◽  
Debraj Ray
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Repeated Interaction

scholarly journals Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2193-2208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Kvaløy ◽  
Trond E. Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Relational Contracting ◽  
Strong Assumption ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that this probability is endogenously determined. We analyze a principal-agent relationship where the verifiability of the agent's output is determined by the principal's investment in drafting an explicit contract. The model is well suited for analyzing the relationship between explicit contracting, legal courts, trust, and relational contracting. In particular, we show how trust—established through repeated interaction—and legal courts may induce contractual incompleteness. (JEL D82, D86)

scholarly journals Mutual interdependence versus repeated interaction: An experiment studying voluntary social exchange

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth ◽  
M. Vittoria Levati ◽  
Georg von Wangenheim
Keyword(s):  
Social Exchange ◽  
Repeated Interaction

scholarly journals Doing Theatre: Theatre Pedagogy through the Folktale

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 80-91
Author(s):  
Jean Small
Keyword(s):  
Procedural Memory ◽  
West African ◽  
French Language ◽  
The West ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Art Form ◽  
Language And Literature ◽  
Theatre Pedagogy ◽  
The Brain

Theatre Pedagogy holds that cognition is body-based. Through performance the body’s unconscious procedural memory learns. This information learned through repeated interaction with the world is transmitted to the brain where it becomes conscious knowledge. Theatre Pedagogy in this case study is based on the implementation of a Caribbean cultural art form in performance, in order to teach Francophone language and literature at the postsecondary level in Jamaica. This paper describes the experience of “doing theatre” with seven university students to learn the French language and literature based on an adaptation of two of Birago Diop’s folktales. In the process of learning and performing the plays, the students also understood some of the West African cultural universals of life which cut across the lives of learners in their own and in foreign cultural contexts.

scholarly journals Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e1008217
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Excellent Performance ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Evolutionary Simulation ◽  
Evolutionary Robustness ◽  
Full Cooperation

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.

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