The U.S. allowance trading system for sulfur dioxide: An update on market experience

1995 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renee Rico
Author(s):  
Richard Revesz ◽  
Jack Lienke

The Walter C. Beckjord Generating Station sits on the banks of the Ohio River, less than twenty miles southeast of Cincinnati, in Clermont County, Ohio. Beckjord offers a near-perfect case study of the costs of grandfathering. Construction of the plant was announced in November 1948, and its first 100-megawatt coal unit was operational by June 1952. Five additional units came online between 1953 and 1969. Because the units were constructed prior to 1971, all were exempt from the EPA’s New Source Performance Standards. For most of the 1970s, they also managed to avoid complying with any emission limitation under Ohio’s implementation plan for meeting the sulfur dioxide NAAQS, even though Ohio’s original plan, approved by the EPA in 1972, would have subjected Beckjord to a state emission standard—1.6 pounds of SO2 per million Btus of heat input—that was only 33 percent less stringent than the federal new-source standard of 1.2 lbs/MMBtu. In 1973, Ohio utilities convinced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to invalidate the Ohio plan on procedural grounds. The court ordered the EPA to hold an additional hearing at which regulated plants could voice their objections, but before the agency could oblige, the governor of Ohio withdrew the plan from consideration. A year later, Ohio submitted a far less stringent proposal that would have allowed Beckjord to continue emitting at its uncontrolled level: 4.8 lbs/MMBtu. But that plan, too, was struck down on procedural grounds, this time by a state environmental review board. In 1976, after Ohio failed to offer any replacement for its second proposal, the EPA stepped in with a federal plan that would limit Beckjord’s emissions to 2.02 lbs/MMBtu. (This, according to the latest EPA computer modeling, was the level necessary for Ohio to attain the sulfur dioxide NAAQS.) After yet more litigation by Ohio utilities—including Beckjord’s owner, Cincinnati Gas & Electric—the bulk of the federal plan was upheld in 1978. (In rejecting the utilities’ challenge, the Sixth Circuit noted that Ohio was the only state in the country that still lacked an enforceable SO2 implementation plan.)


2009 ◽  
pp. 1289-1308
Author(s):  
Motoaki Tazawa

In order to improve convenience for investors through competition among stock exchanges, operation of Proprietary Trading Systems (PTS) was authorized as a form of securities business under the Securities and Exchange Act. The Japanese PTS is equivalent to ATS (Alternative Trading System), ECN (Electronic Communications Network) in the United States and MTF (Multilateral Trading Facilities) under MiFID in the EU. In 1998, ATS and ECN had already started in the United States and Japan’s PTS followed the U.S. model. Telecommunication and information technologies and computer technologies made PTS possible, and PTS makes the border between the market and brokers ambiguous. Traditional regulations on broker-dealers and stock exchanges will inevitably be reviewed and regulations on securities markets will have to be reformed.


1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert N Stavins

The most ambitious application ever attempted of a market-based approach to environmental protection has been for the control of acid rain under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, which established a sulfur dioxide allowance trading program. This essay identifies lessons that can be learned from this grand experiment in economically oriented environmental policy. The author examines positive political economy lessons, asking why this system was adopted from acid-rain control in 1990, and he considers normative lessons that can be learned from the program's structure and performance, focusing on lessons for the design and implementation of future systems.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 271-274
Author(s):  
Elizbeth Baltzan

The Trump administration has made no secret about its frustration with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Campaign rhetoric is being channeled into policy. The United States is single-handedly strangling the Appellate Body by blocking appointment of new members and complaining about those who are holding over past their terms. The latest WTO ministerial resulted in no deals. An administration that touts enforcement has largely eschewed filing WTO complaints. The president's imposition of duties pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) is a manifestation of deeper concerns with the asymmetry that was built into the global trading system—asymmetry the United States encouraged at the time. That asymmetry contributed to the U.S. status as the market of last resort: the destination of choice for excess production, with adverse consequences for domestic producers of similar goods.


2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 1850070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kozo Kiyota ◽  
Robert M Stern

The Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World Production and Trade is used to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S. trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers, and global (multilateral) free trade. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalization. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on nonmember countries for some of the FTAs analyzed. In comparison to the welfare gains from the U.S. FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States and the FTA partners and from global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The U.S. FTAs are based on “hub” and “spoke” arrangements. It is shown that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system, which could be avoided if multilateral liberalization in the context of the Doha Round were to be carried out. Kozo Kiyota is Associate Professor of International Economics in the Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC), the University of Tokyo and a Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). He received his Ph.D. from Keio University, Tokyo, Japan. His research focuses on empirical microeconomics. He has published articles in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and The World Economy. Robert M. Stern is Professor of Economics and Public Policy (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.


1998 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Schmalensee ◽  
Paul L Joskow ◽  
A. Denny Ellerman ◽  
Juan Pablo Montero ◽  
Elizabeth M Bailey

This paper summarizes recent empirical research on compliance costs and strategies and on permit market performance under the U.S. acid rain program, the first large-scale, long-term program to use tradeable emissions permits to control pollution. An efficient market for emissions permits developed in a few years, and this program more than achieved its early goals on time, and it cost less than had been projected. Because of expectation errors, however, investment was excessive, and permit prices substantially understate abatement costs. The tradeable permits approach has worked well, but it is not a miracle cure for environmental problems. Coauthors are Paul L. Joskow, A. Denny Ellerman, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey.


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